Doe I, et al v. Nixon, et al, No. 11-3112 (8th Cir. 2013)
Annotate this CasePlaintiffs were each convicted of an offense for which he or she was required to register as a sex offender in Missouri. Each conviction occurred prior to June 30, 2008, when the Missouri Legislature enacted Missouri Revised Statute 589.426 (the Halloween Statute). This appeal stemmed from plaintiffs' challenge to the Halloween Statute. The district court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were moot because there was no reasonable expectation that they would be prosecuted under the Halloween Statute and that consequently plaintiffs no longer had standing to proceed. Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees and costs as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The court concluded that the district court's October 27, 2008, order effectively served as a judicial pronouncement without judicial relief and did not confer prevailing party status upon plaintiffs. Because neither basis identified by plaintiffs conferred prevailing party status upon them, the court reversed the district court's grant of attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs under section 1988, as well as the district court's amendment of the judgment under Rule 59 to reflect the award of attorneys' fees and costs. Because they were not entitled to attorneys' fees, their appeal of the district court's reduction of fees was dismissed as moot. Further, the district court did not err in determining that plaintiffs lacked standing and in dismissing plaintiffs' second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Court Description: Civil case - Attorneys' fees. The district court's October 27, 2008 order granting a stay of Missouri's "Halloween Statute" concerning sex offenders' participation in Halloween activities never provided judicial relief because the order was stayed by this court, and, as a result, the district court order could not confer prevailing party status on plaintiffs; district court order dismissing the plaintiffs' case as moot did not confer prevailing party status on them; since neither basis identified by the plaintiffs confers prevailing party status on them, the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs under Section 1988 is set aside, and their appeal of the district court's order reducing their fees is dismissed as moot; plaintiffs' fear of arrest and prosecution under the Halloween statute is speculative and hypothetical and there is no reasonable expectation that a prosecution based upon such arrest will occur, and the district court did not err in determining plaintiffs lacked standing and in dismissing their second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.