United States v. Bloate, No. 07-2357 (8th Cir. 2011)
Annotate this CaseDefendant was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment and he appealed, asserting a Speedy Trial Act (Act), 18 U.S.C. 3161, violation and other trial and sentencing errors. The court affirmed and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the Speedy Trial issue, reversed, and remanded. On remand, the court held that the government did not waive its argument that the subsidiary period was excludable under the Act. The court also held that defendant's waiver of pretrial motions was not "any pretrial motion" under section 3161(h)(1)(D) and the ten-day period at issue was not excludable. Therefore, the court held that a total of 75 non-excludable days elapsed from defendant's indictment through the date his trial began and due to this violation of the Act, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment. The court further held that, although the Act required dismissal of the indictment, the district court could determine, under section 3162(a)(1), whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Court Description: Criminal case - criminal law. For the Court's prior opinion in the matter, see U.S. v. Bloate, 534 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2008). Reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Bloate v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010). Government did not waive its argument that a period of time was excludable under Section 3161(h)(1)(D) of the Speedy Trial Act; Bloate's waiver of pretrial motions is not "any pretrial motion" under subparagraph (D) of the section which excludes delay resulting from any pretrial motion, as the Supreme Court has interpreted the subparagraph as measuring time actually consumed by consideration and disposition of a pretrial motion and a waiver presents nothing for the court to consider; as such the period in question is only excludable if accompanied by district court findings and, in the absence of any findings, the period was not excludable; since the period was not excludable, a total of 75 days elapsed between defendant's indictment and the beginning of his trial, and his rights under the Act were violated; the indictment must be dismissed, and the district court should determine on remand whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on July 25, 2008.
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