United States v. Hueston, No. 23-1057 (7th Cir. 2024)
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The case arose from a tipster's information that led to an investigation and subsequent search of David Hueston's apartment in Marion, Indiana. The search, which was conducted under a warrant, produced drugs, cash, a gun, and ammunition. Hueston was charged with various drug-related offenses. He sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that the detectives deliberately or recklessly made misleading omissions and misrepresentations to obtain the search warrant. The district court denied Hueston's motion after conducting a Franks hearing, and Hueston appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that though the affidavit supporting the search warrant contained omissions and inaccuracies, it was not clear that the detectives acted with deliberate intent or recklessness to mislead the judge who issued the warrant. The court noted that the detectives' consultation with a prosecutor both before and after drafting the affidavit argued against a finding of intent to mislead. The court also found that the good-faith exception applied, meaning that the police officers acted in good faith reliance upon a facially valid warrant. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Hueston's motion to suppress the evidence.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-1057 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plainti -Appellee, v. DAVID HUESTON, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. No. 21-CR-37 — Holly A. Brady, Chief Judge. ____________________ ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 2023 — DECIDED JANUARY 12, 2024 ____________________ Before WOOD, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A tipster alerted law enforcement that David Hueston was dealing drugs out of his Marion, Indiana apartment. After a brief investigation, detectives obtained a search warrant and discovered Hueston along with drugs, cash, a gun, and ammunition in the apartment. Indicted on various drug-related charges, Hueston moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the detectives deliberately or recklessly made misleading omissions and 2 No. 23-1057 misrepresentations to obtain the search warrant. The district court denied Hueston’s motion to suppress after holding a Franks hearing, and Hueston now appeals that decision. I. Background A. Investigation In February 2021, a tipster reported to a Grant County, Indiana Sheri ’s Deputy that David Hueston was dealing drugs. That deputy passed the information along to the Joint E ort Against Narcotics (“JEAN”) Team Drug Task Force. A few days later, Detectives Michael Ross and Leland Smith, members of the JEAN Team and Marion, Indiana police o cers, met with the tipster. In a partially recorded conversation, the tipster explained that he wanted to break his methamphetamine addiction by turning in his dealer, Hueston, to police. He told detectives he had been buying drugs from Hueston for a few months. In fact, he had been in Hueston’s apartment three or four days earlier and seen a softball-sized bag of heroin and three pounds of methamphetamine. He also reported that Hueston had guns “just laying around.” After showing the detectives Hueston’s picture, the tipster rode with them to the duplex in Marion where he claimed Hueston lived. He identi ed the front door of the building, explaining that the building had only two interior doors, one leading to the downstairs apartment and another leading to Hueston’s apartment upstairs. A green Mini Cooper was parked outside the duplex, which the tipster said Hueston owned. At some point that day, Detective Ross retrieved the tipster’s records in the local Grant County database and found No. 23-1057 3 an arrest for theft in 2015. Sometime after Hueston’s arrest, Detective Ross ran a full background check on the tipster and discovered convictions for theft and domestic battery, as well as misdemeanor arrests. The day after meeting the tipster, the detectives began electronic and in-person surveillance of Hueston’s apartment. A pole camera recorded the back of the duplex throughout the day; the detectives conducted visual surveillance of the front entrance during the afternoon and evening hours with a brief break for dinner. The detectives observed about 30 people enter the building during this time. A few cars also came and went, including the Mini Cooper, which was driven by a woman. After running the plates on that Mini Cooper, the detectives discovered they belonged on a 2012 Hyundai owned by a woman. That evening, the detectives attempted to apprehend a blue car that had parked for a few minutes near Hueston’s apartment; the detectives believed the car’s occupants had gone into Hueston’s apartment. After an unsuccessful attempt to stop the car, Detectives Ross and Smith returned to the stakeout. Later that night, a man parked a black truck outside the building and entered the duplex. Although the detectives did not see him enter the interior door to Hueston’s apartment, Detective Smith could see the only other interior door leading to the downstairs apartment, which he did not use. They inferred, then, that the man must have gone to Hueston’s apartment. When the driver returned to the truck and drove away, a Grant County Sheri ’s Deputy pulled him over for a tra c violation and found methamphetamine, other drugs, and a 4 No. 23-1057 scale. Sometime later—it is not clear when—that man was identi ed as a known drug dealer. B. A davit and Search Warrant After the discovery of drugs in the black pickup truck, Detective Smith continued surveillance on Hueston’s apartment and Detective Ross left to draft an a davit in support of a search warrant for the apartment. Detective Ross discussed the case with a local prosecutor, drafted the a davit, and received the prosecutor’s approval on the written a davit before submitting it to the issuing judge. The a davit included no information about the tipster other than noting the receipt of his initial tip; it did not indicate that the tipster’s identity was known to police or that he had met with detectives who recorded their conversation. 1 It did not mention the tipster’s drug addiction or arrest history known to Detective Ross at the time. Although it stated that the detectives had been told Hueston had drugs and guns in his apartment, it did not indicate the tipster had rsthand knowledge of this information. The a davit included the tip about the Mini Cooper but did not disclose that the detectives only observed a woman driving the car or that it was not registered to Hueston. It also incorrectly stated that the driver of the black truck “was observed walking out of the residence,” even though the detectives did not speci cally observe him enter or exit the interior door leading to Hueston’s apartment. 1 Although Hueston argues that the a davit also omitted the fact that the tipster was paid for the information he provided, the detectives testi ed that they only decided to pay the tipster after the successful raid on Hueston’s apartment. Consequently, the fact of payment could not have been included in the a davit. No. 23-1057 5 The a davit included other details gleaned from the investigation, including foot and vehicle tra c and the contents of the black pickup truck, which tests revealed to be methamphetamine, opiates (including fentanyl), and marijuana. Based on the a davit, an Indiana Superior Court magistrate judge issued a search warrant for Hueston’s apartment, which the detectives executed later that night. They found Hueston in the apartment, as well as thousands of dollars in cash, methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and a handgun and ammunition. C. District Court Proceedings In April 2021, Hueston was indicted in the Northern District of Indiana for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 100 grams or more of heroin, possessing a rearm in furtherance of those drug tra cking crimes, and being a felon in possession of a rearm. In September of that year, Hueston moved to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment because the supporting af davit did not establish probable cause. Hueston also led a motion for a Franks hearing. The district court granted his request for a hearing, nding the a davit and its alleged omissions “troubling.” At the hearing, both Detective Ross and Detective Smith testi ed before the district court judge, answering questions on direct and cross-examination about their interactions with the tipster, the information they gathered while conducting surveillance on Hueston’s apartment, and the information contained within and excluded from the a davit. After the hearing, the district court concluded that the detectives’ testimony was credible and found no reckless or deliberate 6 No. 23-1057 disregard for the truth, despite identifying multiple omissions and one misstatement in the a davit. The district court found that most of the omissions were immaterial, and some would have actually bolstered probable cause, indicating a lack of deliberate intent to mislead the issuing judge. Although the court expressed some doubt about whether the a davit supported probable cause, it ultimately concluded that it need not answer that question because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Hueston pled guilty and expressly reserved his right to appeal the court’s suppression order. He now appeals that order. II. Analysis When a district court denies a motion to suppress following a Franks evidentiary hearing, we review that decision and any factual ndings for clear error. United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Gregory, 795 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2015)). Factual ndings include “whether the o cer made statements deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Edwards, 34 F.4th 570, 580 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Williams, 718 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2013)). We review legal determinations de novo. United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2021). Application of the good-faith exception is one such legal determination. Gregory, 795 F.3d at 741; United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir. 2009). No. 23-1057 7 A. Franks Violation The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for police to obtain a search warrant. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant exists if there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Woodfork, 999 F.3d at 516 (internal quotations omitted). A “neutral and detached magistrate” must determine whether probable cause exists. United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). Because “[t]he ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to determine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the information the police submit,” a search warrant “is not valid if the police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting false, material information, or by omitting material information from the a davit provided to the issuing judge.” Woodfork, 999 F.3d at 516 (internal quotations omitted). If a defendant can make a “‘substantial preliminary showing’ of (1) a material falsity or omission that would alter the probable cause determination, and (2) a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth,” the defendant is entitled to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to determine whether the court should suppress evidence obtained under the search warrant. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 819– 20 (7th Cir. 2014). The district court then “must suppress evidence seized during a search ‘when the defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the a davit in support of the warrant contains false statements or misleading omissions, (2) the false statements or omissions were made deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth, and (3) probable cause 8 No. 23-1057 would not have existed without the false statements and/or omissions.’” Edwards, 34 F.4th at 580 (quoting Williams, 718 F.3d at 647–48); see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56. Hueston argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that the detectives did not make false statements or omissions deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. At the Franks hearing where both Detective Ross and Detective Smith testi ed, the district court had the ability to assess their credibility. After the hearing, the judge concluded that the detectives’ testimony was credible and that any misstatements and omissions in the a davit were not intentional or reckless, ndings that we defer to unless “after considering all of the evidence, we cannot avoid or ignore a de nite and rm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Edwards, 34 F.4th at 580–81 (quoting United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 383 (7th Cir. 2021)). We agree with the district court that the a davit is lacking. Certain details should have been included in the a davit, such as information about the tipster’s identity and the Mini Cooper’s registration. The a davit did not give a full picture of the investigation and fell short of what we expect from an investigating o cer. The district court did not, however, clearly err by crediting the detectives’ explanations and nding that they did not act with recklessness or a deliberate intent to mislead the issuing judge. Cf. United States v. Spears, 673 F.3d 598, 603, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2012) ( nding no clear error where the district court credited o cers’ testimony and no information in the record showed that credibility determination to be an error). The af davit’s misstatements and omissions were unwise—even sloppy—but the evidence in the record does not No. 23-1057 9 unequivocally show the detectives, including Detective Ross as the author of the a davit, intended to mislead the issuing judge. Two examples are illustrative. Detective Ross testi ed that he did not disclose the tipster’s drug addiction because despite his drug use, the tipster appeared to be of “sound mind” and was not under the in uence of drugs when he met with the detectives. The record gives us no reason to believe that the judge clearly erred in crediting that testimony. Similarly, although Detective Ross did not disclose the tipster’s arrest history in the a davit, the district court found his explanation for this omission reasonable when he testi ed that he disclosed the 2015 theft arrest to the prosecutor and that crimes of dishonesty more than ve years old did not typically alter an informant’s credibility. The district court’s credibility determination is especially reasonable because Detective Ross left out both helpful and unhelpful facts. It is di cult to discern an intent to mislead— rather than mere carelessness—since much of the omitted information would have reinforced the a davit. Many omitted facts would have bolstered probable cause by establishing the tipster’s credibility, including the fact that he met with the detectives, that they recorded the conversation, and that the tipster personally observed drugs in Hueston’s apartment and purchased drugs from him just three or four days before talking to the detectives. As further evidence of good intent, 10 No. 23-1057 Detective Ross also consulted with the prosecutor before and after drafting the a davit. 2 Considering the helpful information the detectives omitted from the a davit and Detective Ross’s consultation with the prosecutor both before and after drafting the a davit, the district court reasonably concluded after hearing his testimony and assessing his credibility that Detective Ross did not intend to mislead the issuing judge. Remaining inadequacies do not rmly convince us that the district court committed clear error here. We therefore a rm the district court’s nding that no Franks violation occurred. B. Good-Faith Exception Hueston faces another hurdle: the good-faith exception sometimes forgives reliance on a awed warrant. The goodfaith exception responds to “the substantial societal costs of the [exclusionary rule],” when wrong-doers go free because of the exclusion of relevant and probative evidence. United States v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2010). Consequently, the “suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy when the o cers who obtained the evidence did so in good faith reliance upon a facially valid warrant issued by a magistrate or judge.” Id. The very decision to obtain a warrant “creates a presumption that the 2 At oral argument, Hueston argued that the prosecutor’s approval should not carry weight because that approval is only as good as the information police disclose to the prosecutor. But Detective Ross did reveal the tipster’s identity to the prosecutor. Under these circumstances, consultation with and disclosures to the prosecutor counsel against nding an intent to mislead. No. 23-1057 11 o cer acted in good faith.” United States v. Yarber, 915 F.3d 1103, 1106 (7th Cir. 2019). A defendant can rebut this good-faith presumption “by demonstrating that the issuing judge failed to perform his neutral and detached function and served as a rubber stamp for the police; that the o cer was dishonest or reckless in preparing the a davit; or that the a davit was so lacking in probable cause that no o cer could have reasonably relied on it.” Bell, 585 F.3d at 1052 (citing United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). Hueston has failed to present evidence that the issuing judge was not acting in a neutral and detached way. Nor can Hueston overcome the presumption of good faith by showing dishonesty or recklessness since we have already concluded that Detective Ross did not commit a Franks violation. And the a davit’s de ciencies were not so egregious as to alert any reasonable o cer to any lack of probable cause, particularly in light of the detective’s consultation with the prosecutor before and after drafting the a davit. Because Hueston has not overcome this heavy presumption, we a rm the district court’s nding of good faith. As the district court correctly noted, because the goodfaith exception applies, we need not decide whether the a davit is supported by probable cause. See Woodfork, 999 F.3d at 519. III. Conclusion Because the district court reasonably found the detectives’ testimony credible and because the good-faith exception applies, we a rm its denial of Hueston’s motion to suppress. 12 No. 23-1057 * * * The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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