Wesley v. Hepp, No. 22-2968 (7th Cir. 2024)
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This case concerns Johnnie Wesley, who was brought in for questioning by Wisconsin police in connection with a murder investigation. Wesley invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interrogation, and the interrogation ceased. However, he was interrogated two more times, during which he made incriminating statements implicating himself in the murder. Wesley was subsequently charged with felony murder. He moved to suppress the incriminating statements on two grounds: (1) the officers did not honor his initial invocation of his right to remain silent, and (2) he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The motion was denied and Wesley was convicted. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was dismissed.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to Wesley’s case. The court determined that Wesley's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" after he invoked it during the first interrogation, and that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The court reasoned that Wesley's statements during the third interrogation could reasonably be interpreted as exculpatory, rather than as an invocation of silence.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2968 JOHNNIE MERTICE WESLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. RANDALL HEPP, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:18-cv-52-pp — Pamela Pepper, Chief Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2023 — DECIDED JANUARY 5, 2024 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. On February 6, 2014, Wisconsin police brought Johnnie Wesley in for questioning related to an ongoing murder investigation. During an initial interrogation, Wesley invoked his right to remain silent, and the interrogation ceased. Nine hours later, officers attempted to interrogate Wesley a second time; again, he indicated he did not wish to speak. On February 7, officers interrogated Wesley a third time. During that interrogation, Wesley made these 2 No. 22-2968 statements: (1) “Ain’t nothing to talk about doe.”; (2) “I ain’t got shit to say about no homicide.”; and (3) “Can I go back to my cell now?” Later, during the same interrogation, Wesley made incriminating statements implicating himself in the homicide. After the State of Wisconsin charged Wesley with felony murder, he moved to suppress the incriminating statements on two grounds. First, he argued that the officers did not scrupulously honor his initial invocation of his right to remain silent. Second, he argued that he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. The trial court denied his motion, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Wesley’s petition for review. Wesley then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. His petition was dismissed, and this appeal followed. Because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to Wesley’s case, we affirm. I Wisconsin police took Johnnie Wesley into custody on February 5, 2014, in connection with the murder of Bruce Lloyd. The next day, around 11:43 am, Detective Katherine Spano interrogated Wesley. Detective David Dalland was also present, though he did not ask any questions. After a brief back-and-forth, the following exchange occurred: SPANO: Okay—so you don’t want to talk to me right now? WESLEY: About no murder no. SPANO: You don’t want to hear the facts or the story— WESLEY: About no murder no— No. 22-2968 3 SPANO: —or the reasons of why we believe you were responsible? WESLEY: No. The interrogation ended shortly after this exchange; Miranda warnings were not given. Approximately nine hours later, at 9:27 pm, Detective Kevin Klemstein tried to interrogate Wesley a second time, but Wesley still did not wish to speak. That interrogation did not proceed. On February 7, at around 2:50 pm, Detective Dalland, who was present but silent at the rst interrogation, and Detective Kent Corbett initiated a third interrogation with Wesley. Before giving Miranda warnings, the following conversation took place: DALLAND: Look, listen, let me get through what I need to do rst and then we can talk if that's what you want. Okay. Is that fair? WESLEY: Ain’t nothing to talk about doe. That’s what I'm sayin. Ya'll steady questioning me about nothing I don't know nothing about. I don’t do nothing. I sit in the house all day. I don’t do nothing. DALLAND: And if that’s what you want to tell me, then that is your right and I am going to listen. Okay. But like I said, I have our little rules that we have to go by okay? WESLEY: yea … I feel where you coming from and all but shit. 4 No. 22-2968 Miranda warnings were then given, and the interrogation continued. Detective Dalland tried to discuss the homicide with Wesley: DALLAND: Having those rights in line is it okay if we— WESLEY: Ughh—you can say— DALLAND: —exchange information? Now can I ask you questions? WESLEY: You can say what you want but it just, I ain’t got shit to say about no homicide. I don’t kill people. I never attempted to kill nobody I never … I don’t do that. I’m not that type of person. I just lost my momma November 7. DALLAND: And I am sorry for your loss. … DALLAND: Well, you can pick and choose whatever you choose to respond to, and what you don’t want to respond to. I am asking for a yes or no. Do you—are you— WESLEY: I ain’t got shit to talk about no homicide because I ain’t know nothing about it. That’s why I’m telling you now. You asking me questions about this homicide case I know nothing about it o cer. DALLAND: Okay. WESLEY: Honest to God truth I don’t know nothing. No. 22-2968 5 Upon further questioning, Wesley continued to deny involvement in Lloyd’s death but admitted he had bought marijuana from Lloyd months earlier. Detective Corbett then took charge of questioning and indicated that he had evidence connecting Wesley to the murder, which led to the following exchange: WESLEY: I don’t know—that’s why I’m trying to tell ya’ll I don’t know shit about shit—I been telling ya’ll that for two days I don’t know. All I know is ya’ll got the wrong person. I still ain’t got my Newport—and we’ve been sitting here talking for at least 30 minutes. Chips and water but no Newport. CORBETT: You’re two up on me. I don’t have water or chips. [four to ve seconds of silence] WESLEY: Can I got [sic] back to my cell now? CORBETT: Is that really going to help you? WESLEY: Is me telling ya’ll something I don’t know going to help me? Well, it isn’t going to help me. But me nding some information can that help me? Eventually, Detective Dalland kept questioning Wesley, asking him if he had planned to rob or shoot someone the night of Lloyd’s death. Wesley admitted that he had attempted to rob Lloyd at gunpoint, that Lloyd tried to wrestle the gun away from Wesley, and that Lloyd was shot during the struggle. 6 No. 22-2968 Based on these admissions, the State of Wisconsin charged Wesley with one count of felony murder. Wesley moved to suppress his admissions, arguing that (1) his initial invocation of silence was not scrupulously honored, see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), and (2) he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation, see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). After the trial court denied Wesley’s motion, he pleaded guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals a rmed his conviction, State v. Wesley, 371 Wis. 2d 563 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016), and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied his petition for review. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Wesley petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied Wesley’s petition but granted a certi cate of appealability. This appeal followed. II Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and E ective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may issue writs of habeas corpus for petitioners in state custody. Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2015). “A petitioner in state court custody is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Pruitt v. Neal, 788 F.3d 248, 262–63 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). A federal court may grant a habeas application with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits only if a state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the No. 22-2968 7 State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). In his petition, Wesley only brings constitutional challenges under § 2254(d)(1). While we review a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition de novo, “we review the decision of the last state court to address the merits of the petitioner’s claim … with deference.” Pruitt, 788 F.3d at 264 (citation omitted). That deference is substantial. “To grant the petition, we must conclude that the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, not our own.” Flint v. Carr, 10 F.4th 786, 796 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The petitioner must show “far more than that the state court’s decision was merely wrong or even clear error.” Smith v. Boughton, 43 F.4th 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “If this standard is di cult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). Simply put, § 2254 provides relief only when the state court’s holding was objectively unreasonable. Smith, 43 F.4th at 708 (noting that a state court errs only when no “fairminded jurists” could disagree that the state court’s decision con icted with Supreme Court precedent). Wesley’s petition argues that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals misapplied two Supreme Court cases: (1) Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), and (2) Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). We address each argument in turn. A Wesley rst asserts that his right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored after he invoked it during the rst interrogation. In Mosley, the Supreme Court “held that the admissibility of statements obtained after a defendant invokes his right to remain silent is dependent on whether the defendant’s right to cut o questioning was ‘scrupulously honored.’” 8 No. 22-2968 United States v. Montgomery, 555 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103). The Supreme Court did not lay out explicit factors for this determination, but courts across the country have extrapolated their own non-exhaustive factors based on the facts and reasoning of the case. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado-Saldivar, 62 F.3d 697, 699 (5th Cir. 1995); Davie v. Mitchell, 547 F.3d 297, 310 (6th Cir. 2008). To be sure, no single multifactor test reigns supreme. Rather, Mosley is best understood to have created “a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether police have breached their duty to honor a suspect’s right to remain silent.” Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2006). In our circuit, for example, we consider four factors: “[(1)] the amount of time that lapsed between interrogations; [(2)] the scope of the second interrogation; [(3)] whether new Miranda warnings were given; and [(4)] the degree to which police of cers pursued further interrogation once the suspect had invoked his right to silence.” Montgomery, 555 F.3d at 633 (quoting United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 1998)). On the other hand, Wisconsin courts use a multifactor test that, while similar to our own, has additional considerations: (1) whether the original interrogation was promptly terminated; (2) whether the interrogation resumed only after the passage of a signi cant period of time; (3) whether the suspect was given complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation; (4) whether a di erent o cer resumed the questioning; and (5) whether the second interrogation was limited to a crime that was not the subject of the earlier interrogation. State v. Hartwig, 366 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Wis. 1985). Wesley does not challenge the legal validity of Wisconsin’s multifactor test, nor could he. Under § 2254, the state court No. 22-2968 9 need only apply Supreme Court precedent reasonably. State courts may adopt their own multifactor tests based on that precedent, so long as the test accurately re ects the law; here, it does. The test is both consistent with Mosley’s holding and re ects the totality of the circumstances the Court considered in that case. Accordingly, in analyzing whether the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Mosley, we rely on Wisconsin’s test. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778–79 (2010) (noting that the circuit court erred when it evaluated the reasonableness of the state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent through the lens of the circuit’s own three-factor test, when the Supreme Court case “nowhere established [those] three factors as a constitutional test”). First, Wesley’s initial interrogation was promptly terminated after he invoked his right to remain silent. Wesley argues that Miranda warnings were not given before the rst interrogation, but that is not pertinent to the rst factor. That is, our Mosley factors, as well as Wisconsin’s, only focus on whether Miranda warnings were given in the subsequent interrogation. Here, Detective Spano gathered some logistical information from Wesley in an initial interrogation, Wesley quickly invoked his right to remain silent, and the interrogation ceased. That is all the rst factor contemplates. Second, there was a signi cant lapse of time between the interrogations. Wesley believes his right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored because he was interrogated three times in less than thirty-six hours. This is hardly unreasonable. Less than three hours passed between the rst and second interrogations in Mosley, yet the Supreme Court found that time lapse su cient. 423 U.S. at 104–06. Here, nine hours elapsed between the rst and second interrogations, and 10 No. 22-2968 approximately seventeen hours elapsed between the second and third interrogations. It was not unreasonable for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to nd a su cient lapse in time between interrogations. Third, Miranda warnings were given before the third interrogation. Wesley does not dispute this fact. Fourth, a different officer conducted the questioning in the third interrogation. Detective Dalland conducted the third interrogation, while Detective Spano conducted the first interrogation (Detective Klemstein conducted the brief second interrogation, which is not challenged). Wesley objects to Detective Dalland’s presence at the first interrogation, even though he did not speak. However, he points to no law suggesting that the mere presence of an officer at both interrogations contravenes the holding in Mosley. Indeed, the Court in Mosley found no constitutional violation in part because Mosley “was questioned by another police officer.” Id. at 104 (emphasis added). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ focus on the officers conducting the questioning, rather than the other officers present, does not rise to an objectively unreasonable application of this precedent to these facts, particularly because Mosley does not create a firm rule on the issue. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (noting that in habeas cases, “[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations”). Fifth, the subject matter of the third interrogation was the same as that of the first: Lloyd’s murder. Thus, the fifth factor favors Wesley. However, we have held that “the constitutionality of a subsequent police interview depends not on its subject matter but rather on whether the police, in conducting the interview, sought to undermine the suspect’s resolve to No. 22-2968 11 remain silent.” Schwensow, 151 F.3d at 659. “Such an approach naturally follows from Mosley because Mosley did not elevate any one factor as predominant or dispositive nor suggest that the enumerated factors are exhaustive.” Montgomery, 555 F.3d at 633 (cleaned up). Thus, while the fifth factor favors Wesley, it is not conclusive. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, and noting that most factors favored the state, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that the officers did not seek to undermine Wesley’s right to remain silent. Based on the facts of the case and the considerations supplied in Mosley, this conclusion was not objectively unreasonable. B The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in finding that Wesley did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent during the third interrogation. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Supreme Court concluded that an individual seeking to invoke the right to remain silent must do so “unambiguously.” 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010). Courts applying this standard have looked for simple, unambiguous statements showing that the suspect wished to end interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Abdallah, 911 F.3d 201, 211–12 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding the defendant’s statement that he “wasn’t going to say anything at all” to be an unambiguous invocation); Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 107 (4th Cir. 2011) (same as to, “I have decided not to say any more”); Jones v. Harrington, 829 F.3d 1128, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2016) (same as to, “I don’t want to talk no more”). “Thompkins also emphasized an important corollary to its clear-invocation rule: if a suspect’s attempt to invoke his right 12 No. 22-2968 to remain silent is ‘ambiguous or equivocal,’ the police ‘are not required to end the interrogation … or ask questions to clarify’ the suspect’s intent.” Smith v. Boughton, 43 F.4th 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381). “The key inquiry, then, is whether a reasonable officer under the circumstances would understand the defendant’s statements as an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent.” Id. In applying this standard, courts may look at the statement within the context of the interrogation. Id. at 711. But this contextual interpretation “is only required where the defendant’s words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are ambiguous.” Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987); see also Smith, 43 F.4th at 710–11 (noting that courts do not run afoul of Barrett if ordinary listeners would need context to understand the meaning of the defendant’s words). Wesley alleges that he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the third interrogation with three separate phrases: (1) “Ain’t nothing to talk about doe.”; (2) “I ain’t got shit to say about no homicide.”; and (3) “Can I go back to my cell now?” The Wisconsin Court of Appeals disagreed, and that conclusion was not objectively unreasonable given Supreme Court precedent. Wesley’s first statement, “Ain’t nothing to talk about doe,” was made right before Detective Dalland read Wesley his Miranda rights. At that point, Detective Dalland had only just begun to explain the situation and the underlying murder. While Wesley’s statement could mean he wished to no longer speak at all, it also could reasonably be interpreted to mean that he knew nothing about the specific crime, was not responsible for it, and saw no reason for his detention. In fact, his subsequent statements support this latter interpretation: No. 22-2968 13 “That’s what I’m sayin. Ya’ll steady questioning me about nothing I don’t know nothing about. I don’t do nothing. I sit in the house all day. I don’t do nothing.” It was not objectively unreasonable for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to find Wesley’s statement to be merely exculpatory, rather than an invocation of silence. The second statement arose after Miranda warnings were given, when Detective Dalland asked, “Now can I ask you questions?” Wesley responded, “You can say what you want, but it just, I ain’t got shit to say about no homicide. I don’t kill people. I never attempted to kill nobody I never.” Like the first statement, Wesley’s second statement could reasonably be interpreted as an exculpatory one. When Detective Dalland asked Wesley if he could continue the interrogation, Wesley allowed Dalland to “say what [he] want[ed].” And Wesley’s “I ain’t got shit to say about no homicide” statement again was at best ambiguous, perhaps indicating a lack of knowledge of and culpability for the specific crime (the homicide), rather than an unequivocal desire to end the interrogation. Again, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ conclusion that this statement was ambiguous was not objectively unreasonable. Wesley attempts to show that his first two statements were clear invocations of his right to remain silent by analogizing to the statements made in Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994), and Smith v. Boughton, 43 F.4th 702 (7th Cir. 2022). However, those cases do not count as clearly established federal law under § 2254. Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 24 (2014) (“[C]ircuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Moreover, Wesley’s statements critically 14 No. 22-2968 differ from those in Davis and Smith. In Davis, we suggested (without deciding) that a suspect’s statements of, “I don’t want to talk no more,” and, “I don’t want to talk about it any more,” might have invoked his right to remain silent. 13 F.3d at 1138–39. Similarly, in Smith, we reviewed whether the statement, “I don’t want to talk about this,” sufficiently invoked the right to remain silent. 43 F.4th at 710. These statements unambiguously stated, at least in part, “I don’t want to talk.” Here, Wesley’s first two statements equated to, “There is nothing to talk about.” This distinction is significant. On the one hand, Wesley could mean that he did not want to talk, as he now argues. But another reasonable inference to draw is that Wesley had nothing to talk about because he was not responsible for and knew nothing about the crime. This is the exculpatory inference that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably drew based on applicable Supreme Court precedent. Wesley’s third statement—“Can I go back to my cell now?”—fares no better than the previous two. Taken in context, Wesley’s inquiry is not an unambiguous assertion of his right to remain silent. The statement gives rise to several competing inferences. Of course, Wesley believes the only reasonable inference is that he invoked his right to remain silent. However, another possible inference based on the plain, ordinary meaning of the statement is that Wesley, after a noticeable five-second pause in questioning, was simply asking if the interrogation was over and if he could return to his cell. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that Wesley did not, through this statement or any other, unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent. AFFIRMED
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