Deborah Brumit v Granite City, Illinois, No. 22-2828 (7th Cir. 2023)

Annotate this Case

After the Supreme Court held in HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002), that a public housing authority may enforce a term in a tenant’s lease allowing eviction if a member of the household or guest commits a crime (even without the tenant’s knowledge), some cities enacted ordinances extending that approach to private leases. Granite City, Illinois, required private landlords to evict tenants not as a condition of receiving a subsidy but as a matter of regulatory compulsion. Plaintiffs permitted their adult daughter to stay in their leased home occasionally, and one night they welcomed their daughter and her boyfriend into their house briefly. After they left, they were arrested for stealing a van. The City served a “Notice of Violation.” A hearing officer directed Plaintiffs’ landlord to begin eviction proceedings. The landlord dragged his feet long enough for them to file suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. A district court entered a temporary restraining order, which it later converted to a preliminary injunction. In January 2022, Plaintiffs gave up their lease voluntarily and moved out of Granite City.

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs contend that if they prevail on the merits, they will be entitled to nominal damages. The court explained Plaintiffs’ potential problem is that their complaint did not allege a “completed” violation of their rights, so they have failed to identify a concrete injury that could be redressed by nominal damages.

Download PDF

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2828 DEBORAH BRUMIT and ANDREW SIMPSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 19-CV-1090-SMY — Staci M. Yandle, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED MAY 25, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 16, 2023 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and LEE, Circuit Judges. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. After the Supreme Court held in HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002), that a public housing authority may enforce a term in a tenant’s lease allowing eviction if a member of the household or guest commits a crime (even without the tenant’s knowledge), some cities enacted ordinances extending that approach to private leases. The Justices remarked in Rucker that the decision involved subsidized 2 No. 22-2828 tenancies rather than the regulation of private conduct. 535 U.S. at 135. They added that the approved system also allowed the landlord discretion to decide whether eviction is appropriate. Id. at 133–34. Granite City, Illinois, departed from the Rucker model in both ways. It required private landlords to evict tenants not as a condition of receiving a subsidy but as a ma[er of regulatory compulsion, and it deprived landlords of any discretion to excuse violations. Deborah Brumit and Andrew Simpson permi[ed their adult daughter to stay in their leased home occasionally during 2019. One night that June they welcomed their daughter and her boyfriend into their house brie y. After the visitors left, they were arrested for stealing a van. Within days, the City served a “Notice of Violation.” Plainti s contested this Notice, but a hearing o cer directed plainti s’ landlord to begin eviction proceedings. The landlord, who did not want to evict Brumit and Simpson, dragged his feet long enough for them to le this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. A district court swiftly entered a temporary restraining order, which it later converted to a preliminary injunction forbidding eviction while the federal suit continued. In January 2022, while still protected by this injunction, Brumit and Simpson gave up their lease voluntarily and moved out of Granite City. They do not plan to return, even though Granite City has amended its ordinance to abrogate the features about which they complain. The parties agree that these events eliminate the justi cation for prospective relief. Indeed, one might think that they make the case moot. But the district court rendered a decision—without mentioning the possibility that the case became moot when the plainti s left Granite City—and decided against Brumit and No. 22-2828 3 Simpson on the merits. 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167052 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2022). (The district court had held, while the plainti s still lived in Granite City, that the amendments to the ordinance, which were not retroactive, did not themselves make the case moot. 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24316 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2021).) In this court, Brumit and Simpson contend that, if they prevail on the merits, they will be entitled to nominal damages, which prevents mootness. That e ect of nominal damages is well established. See, e.g., Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021). But what the Supreme Court said in Uzuegbunam is that “a request for nominal damages satis es the redressability element of standing where a plainti ’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right.” 141 S. Ct. at 802. Plainti s’ potential problem is that their complaint did not allege a “completed” violation of their rights (whether that right is one to due process of law or freedom of intimate association), so have failed to identify a concrete injury that could be redressed by nominal damages. Granite City told their landlord to evict them, but plainti s do not contend that the landlord complied. They resided in their leased home until they left Granite City for other reasons. Uzuegbunam said that a completed violation supports nominal damages and added that “[n]ominal damages … are unavailable where a plainti has failed to establish a past, completed injury.” Id. at 802 n.*. We therefore asked the parties to le post-argument memoranda addressing the question whether plainti s have su ered a “completed” violation of their rights and, if not, whether there is any basis for an award of nominal damages. We asked, in particular, whether any decision of the Supreme Court or a court of appeals has 4 No. 22-2828 awarded nominal damages after a threatened violation was averted. Plainti s’ post-argument submission does not identify any decision of the sort we have mentioned but contends that they nonetheless were injured by the stress and anxiety the Notice caused and by the expenses incurred in the hearing and the litigation. Brumit says that the stress led her to stop working. Plainti s also characterize the Notice as an impairment of their lease contract. If they were seeking actual damages, we would need to decide whether these ma[ers qualify, given the norm that the a[orneys’ fees, costs, and stress of litigation do not justify adjudication of a suit that is otherwise moot. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70–71 (1986); Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480–81 (1990). But Brumit and Simpson have never requested anything but an injunction and nominal damages. So the question remains: does an unsuccessful a[empt to have someone evicted support nominal damages? Thousands of unsuccessful eviction or foreclosure actions must begin every year, only to be abandoned when the plainti gives up (perhaps because the suit rests on a mistake of fact) or a court blocks the procedure. We asked at oral argument whether these unsuccessful e orts ever lead to nominal damages. Plainti s have not found such a case. That’s signi cant, if only because Uzuegbunam stressed the importance of history in revealing when nominal damages are appropriate. And we have not been given any other indication that the dictum in Uzuegbunam saying that “[n]ominal damages … are unavailable where a plainti has failed to establish a past, completed injury” neglects any line of precedent—or any single precedent, for that ma[er. No. 22-2828 5 This case therefore is moot. The district court’s judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

Primary Holding

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment entering a temporary restraining order, which it later converted to a preliminary injunction forbidding eviction while the federal suit continued. The court remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy.

Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.