Washington v. City of Chicago, No. 22-2467 (7th Cir. 2024)
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The case involves plaintiffs Tabatha Washington and Donte Howard who were charged with first-degree murder. They were detained for over a year before being acquitted. They then filed a suit against the City of Chicago and three police detectives, alleging unlawful pretrial detention under the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution under Illinois law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Previously, the Circuit Court of Cook County had found probable cause to detain both plaintiffs without bail. A few weeks later, a grand jury indicted them on charges of first-degree murder, including a felony-murder theory premised on felony mob action. The plaintiffs argued that the detectives deliberately misled judges and the grand jury to secure these determinations of probable cause.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that even if the detectives' alleged misrepresentations and omissions were accepted as true, the prosecutors' independent fact-gathering and the remaining undisputed evidence still supported probable cause to detain the plaintiffs. Therefore, the judicial determinations of probable cause were presumed to be valid, and the pretrial detention of the plaintiffs did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims failed for the same reason.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2467 TABATHA WASHINGTON and DONTE HOWARD, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:20-cv-00442 — Manish S. Shah, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2023 — DECIDED APRIL 15, 2024 ____________________ Before ROVNER, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This case presents claims for unlawful pretrial detention under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state-law claims for malicious prosecution. Plainti s Tabatha Washington and Donte Howard claim that defendants, Chicago Police Department detectives Vincent Alonzo, Adrian Garcia, and Demosthenes Balodimas, deliberately misled judges and a grand jury to secure judicial determinations of probable cause 2 No. 22-2467 to detain plainti s on charges of rst-degree murder. After over a year in custody, Washington and Howard were tried and acquitted on all charges. They then led this suit. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and plainti s have appealed. Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful pretrial detention can survive a judicial determination of probable cause. See generally Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017) (Manuel I). “[P]retrial detention is a ‘seizure’—both before formal legal process and after—and is justi ed only on probable cause.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 366–67. “[I]f the proceeding is tainted— [such as] by fabricated evidence—and the result is that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the con ned person’s Fourth Amendment rights….” Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 369 n.8. The existence of probable cause is a defense to both Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution claims. Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2021). Consequently, this case turns on whether probable cause existed to detain Washington and Howard in advance of their trials. In civil litigation like this case, a rebuttable presumption of probable cause arises after a judicial determination of probable cause. See Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477. To overcome this presumption, plainti s must show “that the o cer who sought the warrant [1] ‘knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements to the judicial o cer, and [2] that the false statements were necessary to the judicial o cer’s determination that probable cause existed for the arrest.’” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010) (alterations omitted), quoting Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, No. 22-2467 3 320 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2003), citing in turn Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). 1 Here, undisputed facts show that plainti s cannot rebut this presumption. Even if we assume plainti s’ list of the detectives’ alleged misrepresentations and omissions is correct, plainti s cannot meet the second prong of the test in Beauchamp: establishing that those false statements or deliberately misleading omissions were “necessary” to the judicial o cers’ determinations of probable cause. This is so for two independent reasons. First, the State’s Attorney’s O ce conducted its own independent fact-gathering before deciding to le charges. Second, and again, assuming that plainti s’ list of misrepresentations and misleading omissions is correct, the remaining undisputed facts would still show probable cause to detain plainti s for rst-degree murder. Because plainti s cannot overcome the presumption of probable cause that arises after a judicial determination, we a rm summary judgment for the defendants. I. Factual and Procedural Background A. Factual History In the evening of May 30, 2018, plainti s Tabatha Washington and Donte Howard, along with Washington’s cousin Carlton White, all engaged in physical altercations with Kim Edmondson outside Washington’s apartment in Chicago. When the con ict ended, Edmondson left the area and walked about half a mile north. There he encountered three of his friends, Anthony Beard, Khadijah Hill, and Larry 1 Because Beauchamp was the first case in which we set out this twoprong test, we refer to it as the Beauchamp test in this opinion. See 320 F.3d at 742–43. 4 No. 22-2467 Nelson, in a parking lot. Edmondson was shirtless and bleeding from his lip and chest. He told his friends that he had been jumped by two men and one or two women with a pole. He then walked behind a nearby dumpster to urinate. Soon after that, someone else told Beard, Hill, and Nelson that Edmondson had collapsed. They walked over and saw him behind the dumpster lying on his back, not breathing, with blood pooling around his head. They called 911 and agged down nearby police o cers, but rst responders were unable to revive Edmondson. He was pronounced dead at the scene. The medical examiner later concluded that Edmondson died from blunt-force trauma to the back of the head. Chicago Police Department detectives Vincent Alonzo, Adrian Garcia, and Demosthenes Balodimas arrived to investigate. The three parking-lot witnesses each told them of Edmondson’s wounds to the chest and lip, and they told the detectives Edmondson’s story about being beaten up by several of his neighbors. One of the parking-lot witnesses knew where Edmondson had lived and led detectives to the apartment building, about a half-mile away—the same building where Washington lived. The detectives canvassed the building to see if anyone knew about an altercation with Edmondson. Detective Balodimas later said that, when he was standing outside Washington’s apartment, he heard her say, “F*** that b**** he got what he deserved,” and “he ain’t gonna get my gun.” Balodimas also said he heard White say, “You gotta protect, you gotta ght.” Plainti s dispute all of these assertions. A detective knocked on the door of Washington’s apartment and Washington, White, and Howard opened the door. Howard at rst told the detectives they could not enter without a No. 22-2467 5 warrant. The detectives asked if everything was alright, and Washington told them “there was an altercation earlier, with some guy that had been evicted from this building.” She also said, “He was trying to ght me.” Washington then allowed the detectives to enter her apartment. She and White spoke to detectives in one room while Howard and another friend, Cynthia Cage, sat on a couch nearby. White explained that there was an altercation with a man who had been evicted from the building who “kept coming around trying to ght,” and White was defending himself. Washington added “he tried to hit me,” saying she hit him to defend herself. Detective Garcia told the group that they needed to come to the police station to straighten everything out. Washington said that Cage had not been involved in the altercation and that Howard had just gotten there. Howard told detectives falsely that his name was Jeremiah Johnson and claimed that he had just arrived at the apartment. The detectives handcu ed Washington and White, placed them in separate squad cars, and took them to the police station for further investigation. Once at the station and just after midnight on May 31, Detectives Garcia and Alonzo began separately interrogating Washington and White. During the various overnight interrogations, White and Washington recounted a variety of sometimes contradictory details about their encounter with Edmondson. The district court’s order granting summary judgment provides a thorough account of their various explanations during these interrogations. Washington v. City of Chicago, No. 20-cv-442, 2022 WL 2905669 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2022). White told detectives that Edmondson had attacked him a week earlier and had left a cut on his face. White said the 6 No. 22-2467 altercation earlier that evening started when Edmondson— clearly high on cocaine or other drugs—approached him and Cage and repeatedly called Cage a b****. When White tried to calm him down, Edmondson swung at him. White ducked the punch and hit Edmondson once. White eventually indicated that Washington came out from her apartment with a gray, non-wooden stick and hit Edmondson “probably three” times—in the chest, arm, and lip—telling him, “stop playing with my cousin.” After being told that Washington had identi ed a third man involved in the ght, White ultimately con rmed that the other man in the ght had been Howard, whom the detectives had spoken to in Washington’s apartment but who had given the detectives a false name and falsely said he had just arrived there. White said that Howard was tussling in the street with Edmondson but that they were not really ghting. White repeatedly told detectives that neither Howard nor Edmondson landed a punch on the other and that Edmondson left after the ght with Howard. It was then, according to White, that Washington ran up and hit Edmondson with the little stick. According to White, Edmondson then said, “I’ll be back,” and walked away, and White thought it was over. White was adamant that no one ever hit Edmondson on the top of the head and that Edmondson had no head injury when he left the scene of the altercation. In separate interrogations the same night, Washington at rst denied having any negative history with Edmondson. She admitted to hitting Edmondson in the chest with a stick or a pole after he tried to hit her, and she said White had stepped in and begun to ght Edmondson. She also admitted No. 22-2467 7 that after she had tried to break up the ght between White and Edmondson, a third man had gotten involved, at rst saying that she did not know his identity but ultimately identifying him as plainti Howard, the second man in her apartment earlier that evening. The detectives told her they did not believe she was physically capable of causing the fatal damage to Edmondson’s head. Washington eventually told the detectives three times that Howard had struck Edmondson twice in the head with a pole. She apologized to the detectives for lying and insisted that she did not know how hard Howard had hit Edmondson. Later that morning, May 31, detectives went back to Washington’s apartment to speak to her friend Cage. Cage told the detectives that White and Edmondson started arguing in front of the building and that White punched Edmondson while the two were arguing. Cage said that during the altercation between White and Edmondson, Washington had approached with a pole in her hand and had hit Edmondson with it several times. Then, Cage continued, Howard began to ght with Edmondson in the middle of the street, landing some punches before Edmondson walked away toward the parking lot where he encountered his friends Beard, Hill, and Nelson. She said Edmondson was bleeding from the mouth but otherwise appeared ne when he left. Later that same day, a prosecutor from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s O ce, Assistant State’s Attorney Patrick Waller, began re-interviewing witnesses. ASA Waller interviewed the parking-lot witnesses (Beard, Hill, and Nelson) at the police station. The witnesses repeated that Edmondson had walked up to them with cuts on his chest and 8 No. 22-2467 lip and said that a couple of guys and a woman jumped him with a pole or a pipe. Edmondson had then walked o and collapsed behind a dumpster. Hill also said that she had observed Edmondson only from the front and did not see any leaking or dripping blood down his back. None of the three witnesses told detectives or the state’s attorneys that they saw Edmondson bleeding from the top or back of his head. Later that night, ASA Waller then re-interviewed White and Washington separately. White told ASA Waller that he had been with Cage, Washington, and Howard, and that Edmondson had tried to force his way into Washington’s apartment. That was when Washington had threatened Edmondson with a pole. Edmondson had backed away but started to yell and got “into White’s face” before White struck him. Howard had then approached and started ghting with Edmondson in the street. Washington had gone into the house, come out with a little gray aluminum stick, and hit Edmondson multiple times in the chest, arm, and lip. Shortly after, ASA Waller reinterviewed Washington. She told Waller that she had been outside with Cage, White, and Howard when Edmondson approached and got in her face. At that point, she said, she found a light metal pole on the ground and swung it at him three times. She said she struck Edmondson on the left side of his lip rst and then on his chest after he jumped at her again, but that the third swing missed because Edmondson had jumped back. ASA Waller asked Washington about Howard’s involvement. Washington said he and Edmondson had thrown only a few punches and then Edmondson had left. When Waller asked whether she, Cage, Howard, and White were discussing the altercation in the apartment later that night, No. 22-2467 9 Washington told Waller that she could not remember speci cs but said everybody had been talking loudly about what had happened. ASA Waller confronted Washington about her previous statements about Howard striking Edmondson in the head with the pole. Washington responded that she had been talking fast and was scared and nervous. Washington said that she had not meant to say Howard had hit Edmondson with the pole. Howard “was hitting him with his sts,” Washington said, and “that’s why I said I don’t see how his head got bust[ed].” Washington repeatedly insisted that she had never hit Edmondson in the head. Edmondson’s autopsy was performed the morning of May 31. The medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was blunt-force trauma to the head. The autopsy revealed a 1.25-inch by .75-inch laceration on the top, back, right side of Edmondson’s head; a hole in his skull that was about one inch by one inch, and fragments of bone within the brain. Other injuries included lacerations and contusions to Edmondson’s left lip, an abrasion to his left ear, a laceration to the center of his chest, and multiple contusions on both arms. The examiner concluded that Edmondson’s death was a homicide based on the investigator’s report of assault and her own examination of Edmondson’s injuries, which were consistent with an assault. The examiner spoke with defendant Alonzo about the results of her autopsy. Washington gave consent to search her apartment to locate the pole she had used on Edmondson. At her apartment, Detectives Alonzo and Balodimas recovered four silver metal poles that appeared to be one inch in diameter, which they submitted to the Illinois State Police crime lab for processing. At that point, ASA Waller designated the investigation as 10 No. 22-2467 continuing and advised another ASA, Laura Ayala-Gonzalez, of all the information he had learned during his investigation. B. Procedural History in State Court The next day, on June 1, ASA Ayala-Gonzalez approved a rst-degree murder charge against Washington. This charge was the subject of Washington’s pretrial detention hearing. At the time, Howard had not yet been arrested. The Felony Minutes form—created and signed by Detective Alonzo for use in a probable-cause detention hearing and approved by ASA Ayala-Gonzalez—stated: “The facts brie y stated are as follows: The defendant, Washington, was arrested after investigation determined that the victim Kim Edmondson was struck on and about the head with a metal object several times by Washington. The victim Edmondson subsequently expired due to the injuries received.” Detective Alonzo spoke with ASA Ayala-Gonzalez when she approved the charges for Washington and rejected charges for White. At Washington’s hearing on June 2, the Circuit Court of Cook County denied bail, nding “that the proof is evident and presumption great that [Washington], along with some other uncharged co-defendants as of yet, committed the offense.” Immediately after this determination of probable cause, the prosecutor informed the court that he had amended the charge to “felony murder based upon [mob] action,” which is a rst-degree murder charge in Illinois. Defense counsel waived any objection to this change. 2 2 The hearing transcript reads “felony murder based upon action” and the insertion of “mob” is suggested by the defendants here. We believe this is the most likely reading of the transcript. No. 22-2467 11 Howard was taken into custody on June 4. On June 6, ASA Ayala-Gonzalez approved the rst-degree murder charge against him. At the start of Howard’s pretrial detention hearing before a Cook County judge on June 7, the complaint against him was amended to add a violation of probation. In the remainder of his hearing, the court found probable cause to detain Howard without bail on both the murder and probation violation charges until the “murder case” with Washington was to be heard three weeks later. On June 28, 2018, Washington and Howard were indicted by a grand jury for the o enses of felony mob action and rstdegree murder. The grand jury heard testimony from defendant Detective Alonzo, as well as Washington’s friend Cage, and the parking-lot witnesses, Nelson, Beard, and Hill. Washington and Howard were indicted under all three prongs of Illinois’s rst-degree murder statute, including on a felony murder theory premised on the underlying felony of mob violence. Over a year later, after a one-day bench trial, a Cook County judge found Washington and Howard not guilty on all counts. C. Federal Proceedings Washington and Howard then led this suit against Detectives Alonzo, Garcia, and Balodimas, and the City of Chicago for unlawful pretrial detention under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for malicious prosecution under Illinois law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court began its analysis “with the o enses of mob action and rst-degree murder—the charges brought by prosecutors and on which the grand jury indicted plainti s.” 12 No. 22-2467 2022 WL 2905669, at *10. The district court considered the existence of probable cause for pretrial detention premised on a felony-murder theory with mob violence as the underlying felony, though plainti s had also been indicted on other theories of rst-degree murder. After identifying the elements of the felony-murder and mob violence o enses, the district court held that “at the time of plainti s’ … detention, defendants possessed probable cause to believe that plainti s had acted as part of a group that engaged in violence against Edmondson.” Id. Per the district court, “undisputed facts demonstrate that, at the time of plainti s’ … detention … [i]t was reasonable, given these facts, for defendants to believe that plainti s had engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. “The facts known to defendants reasonably suggested that plainti s … were part of a group engaged in physical violence against Edmondson.” Id. The district court said that this “was enough to support the … detention of plainti s while prosecutors weighed speci c charges.” Id. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant detectives and the City of Chicago on all claims and terminated the case. Washington and Howard led this appeal. II. Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We draw ‘all justi able inferences’ in the favor of the nonmoving party.” Flexible Steel Lacing Co. v. Conveyor Accessories, Inc., 955 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 2020), quoting Anderson v. No. 22-2467 13 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). We have applied this standard in our account of the facts. III. Analysis A. Fourth Amendment: Pretrial Detention Without Probable Cause Section 1983 authorizes suits against police o cers and others who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights while acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plainti s’ suit under section 1983 alleges that the City of Chicago and three of its police detectives violated their Fourth Amendment rights. To prove a Fourth Amendment violation, a plainti must show rst that a seizure occurred, and then, if so, that the seizure was unreasonable. Carlson v. Bukovic, 621 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). “[P]retrial detention is a ‘seizure’—both before formal legal process and after….” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 366– 67 (2017) (Manuel I). The Fourth Amendment “establishes ‘the standards and procedures’ governing pretrial detention” in criminal cases. Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 360, quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). The standard of reasonableness required to justify “pretrial detention is probable cause, that is, o cial knowledge of ‘facts and circumstances su cient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing’ the detainee has committed a criminal o ense.” Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original), quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111. Plainti s Washington and Howard argue that the defendant detectives violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures by causing them to be 14 No. 22-2467 detained before trial without probable cause. See Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 364–69. 3 B. The Presumption of Validity for Judicial Determinations of Probable Cause Judicial determinations of probable cause are ordinarily entitled to a presumption of validity, Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477, and “an indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause,” Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir. 2019). But this presumption is rebuttable. In Manuel I, the Supreme Court taught that Fourth Amendment claims sometimes survive a judicial determination of probable cause. 580 U.S. at 368–69 (plainti may seek relief for violations of Fourth Amendment rights “not merely for his (pre-legalprocess) arrest, but also for his (post-legal process) pretrial 3 In the district court, the parties debated whether, to sustain pretrial detention, a finding of probable cause must relate to the charged offense, or whether a generic finding of probable cause to believe the detainee committed any criminal offense is sufficient. In its order granting summary judgment, the district court implied that Washington and Howard could have been lawfully detained in advance of their trial for first-degree murder and mob action because probable cause existed for other crimes under the Illinois code, such as battery, aggravated battery, disorderly conduct, and obstruction. Washington and Howard challenge this portion of the district court’s ruling, arguing that, because plaintiffs’ probablecause hearings had been directed specifically to the charges of murdering Edmondson, probable cause for pretrial detention could not be premised on “other hypothetical charges.” On appeal, the defendants seem to have conceded this point, admitting that pretrial detention required “probable cause to believe that Washington and Howard killed Edmondson,” and waiving any argument that probable cause related to any criminal conduct would have been sufficient. Because we find the undisputed facts support probable cause for first-degree murder and mob action, we need not decide this issue here. No. 22-2467 detention.” explained: 15 (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court The Fourth Amendment prohibits government o cials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. That can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probablecause determination is predicated solely on a police o cer’s false statements. Then, too, a person is con ned without constitutionally adequate justi cation. Legal process has gone forward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement. And for that reason, it cannot extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim…. Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 367 (citations omitted). Manuel I “clari ed that the constitutional injury arising from a wrongful pretrial detention rests on the fundamental Fourth Amendment principle that a pretrial detention is a ‘seizure’—both before formal legal process and after—and is justi ed only on probable cause.” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 476–77, citing Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 366–67. In this sort of claim, “the constitutional right in question is the ‘right not to be held in custody without probable cause,’” which gives rise to a Fourth Amendment claim under section 1983 since “the essential constitutional wrong is the ‘absence of probable cause that would justify the detention.’” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 479, quoting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (Manuel II). “Put another way, the initiation of formal legal 16 No. 22-2467 process ‘did not expunge [plainti ’s] Fourth Amendment claim because the process he received failed to establish what that Amendment makes essential for pretrial detention— probable cause to believe he committed a crime.’” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477, citing Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 368–69. C. Overcoming the Presumption of Validity Plainti s argue they were detained before trial without probable cause in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights as set out in Manuel I. 580 U.S. at 366–67. Both plainti s received judicial determinations of probable cause pursuant to legal process: Washington and Howard were separately brought before the Circuit Court of Cook County for bail hearings. The court found probable cause to detain both without bail. A few weeks later, Washington and Howard were indicted by a grand jury on charges of rst-degree murder, including a felony-murder theory premised on felony mob action. Under Manuel I, these judicial determinations of probable cause do not automatically bar plainti s’ Fourth Amendment claims for wrongful pretrial detention, regardless of whether the judicial determinations of probable cause were made in a bail hearing or through an indictment. Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 369 n.8 (“Nothing in the nature of the legal proceeding establishing probable cause makes a di erence for purposes of the Fourth Amendment….”). Thus, plainti s must overcome the presumption of validity created by the judicial determinations of probable cause at their bail hearings and in their indictment. “[T]his presumption is premised on an ‘assumption … that there will be a truthful showing’ of probable cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original), quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164–65 (1978). We have thus No. 22-2467 17 held that “the presumption may give way on a showing [1] that the o cer who sought the warrant ‘knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements to the judicial o cer, and [2] that the false statements were necessary to the judicial o cer’s determination that probable cause existed for the arrest.’” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410 (alterations omitted), quoting Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2003), citing in turn Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56. The second half of the test in Beauchamp follows logically from the requirement that, “[t]o establish personal liability in a section 1983 action, the plainti must show that the o cer ‘caused the deprivation of a federal right.’” Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 539 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1999), quoting in turn Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). We discuss each prong in turn. 1. Prong One: False Statements Made to Judicial O cer To satisfy the rst prong of Beauchamp, plainti s Washington and Howard argue that the police detectives deliberately misrepresented certain inculpatory evidence and omitted exculpatory evidence in their communications to the prosecutors, the bail hearing courts, and the grand jury. Plainti s identify the following conduct by defendant detectives as instances of false statements or omissions: False Statements (1) oral statements to prosecutors that Washington hit Edmondson on the “head” when referring to her blow to his lip; (2) written statements on the Felony Minutes form submitted in Washington’s pretrial 18 No. 22-2467 detention hearing that she struck Edmondson “on and about the head with a metal object several times” and that Edmondson “subsequently expired due to the injuries received”; (3) oral statements to prosecutors that either plainti hit Edmondson in the back of the head with any weapon, causing Edmondson’s fatal wound in the back of his skull; (4) statements to judicial o cers that Detective Balodimas overheard incriminating statements, which plainti s claim he unilaterally invented. Omissions (1) failure to share with prosecutors or judicial o cers video evidence showing Edmondson walking half a mile after the altercation; (2) failure to tell prosecutors that no witness saw a wound on the back of Edmondson’s head prior to his fall near the dumpster; (3) failure to tell prosecutors that White and Washington had reported that Edmondson was the aggressor in the altercation, not Washington or Howard. We begin with the purported false statements. We are reviewing a grant of summary judgment to defendants, which requires us to give plainti s the bene t of any genuine disputes of material fact and any reasonable favorable inferences, but we do not draw inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture. King v. Hendricks County Comm’rs, 954 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2020). Items (1) and (2), No. 22-2467 19 the defendants’ statements to judicial o cers and on the Felony Minutes form that Washington hit Edmondson on the head, referring to the wound she caused on his lip, might be true in a technical sense. As one of the defendants reminded plainti s’ counsel in a deposition, “[t]he lip … is part of the head.” A jury could reasonably deem such statements intentionally misleading, though, since defendants knew that Washington admitted to hitting him in the lip while Edmondson died from blunt-force trauma to the back of his head. This is especially true of the statements on the Felony Minutes form, which asserted that Washington’s blows caused Edmondson’s death. As to statement (3), the detectives did have an admission from Washington herself that Howard had hit Edmondson on the head with a metal pipe, so we do not believe a reasonable jury could nd any statement to that e ect was knowingly or recklessly false. But (4), the incriminating statements purportedly overheard by defendant Balodimas, are also disputed material facts. Because we construe facts in favor of the nonmoving parties on summary judgment, we must assume they were invented by Balodimas. Thus, for the purposes of summary judgment, we nd that statements (1), (2), and (4) were false statements made intentionally, knowingly, or with at least reckless disregard for their truth, satisfying the rst prong of Beauchamp. We also consider the asserted misleading omissions. As to omission (1), it remains disputed whether prosecutors had access, before plainti s’ initial bail hearings, to the security footage of Edmondson walking half a mile after his altercation with Washington and Howard. On May 31, before the rst bail hearing, defendant Alonzo reviewed footage of 20 No. 22-2467 Edmondson entering the parking lot and showing no obvious signs of distress. On June 6, several days after Washington’s bail hearing but the day before Howard’s bail hearing, Alonzo also obtained video from Edmondson’s half-mile walking route between the site of the altercation and the location of the dumpster. It remains in dispute whether defendants ever turned these videos over to the State’s Attorney’s O ce for consideration in their charging decisions. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that defendants did not. The trial judge relied on these videos in her acquittal, and we agree that these videos are material and exculpatory. We nd that a reasonable jury could infer that defendants exhibited at least reckless disregard for the truth in failing to turn over the parking-lot video. Its exculpatory value was self-evident, and defendants had access to it well in advance of both plainti s’ bail hearings. This omission satis es the rst prong of Beauchamp. For omissions (2) and (3), a reasonable jury could not infer that the omissions were made with intentional, knowing, or reckless disregard for the truth. The defendants knew that ASA Waller had independently re-interviewed Washington, White, and the parking-lot witnesses because a detective sat in on each of these interviews. In those interviews, Washington told ASA Waller that Edmondson was the one who started cursing at her and threatening a physical confrontation. White told ASA Waller that the confrontation started when Edmondson tried to force his way into Washington’s apartment. And each of the parking-lot witnesses told ASA Waller the location of the wounds they saw on Edmondson’s body prior to his death, with none mentioning the back of his head. Consequently, no reasonable jury could nd that defendants’ failure to inform prosecutors No. 22-2467 21 that no parking-lot witness saw a wound on the back of Edmondson’s head, and their failure to report Washington and White’s statements that Edmondson had been the aggressor, were done with intentional, knowing, or reckless disregard for the truth. Omissions (2) and (3) do not satisfy the rst prong of Beauchamp. In sum, for purposes of summary judgment, we treat statements (1), (2), and (4), as well as omission (1), as false statements made to a judicial o cer “knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth,” satisfying the rst prong of Beauchamp’s test for overcoming the presumption of validity of judicial determinations of probable cause. 320 F.3d at 742. We next assess this bundle of arguable misstatements and omissions under Beauchamp’s second prong. 2. Prong Two: Misrepresentations Necessary to Judicial Finding of Probable Cause? The second prong of Beauchamp requires “that the false statements were necessary to the judicial o cer’s determination that probable cause existed.” 320 F.3d at 742. We begin with a threshold issue: what sort of causation is required between the false statements and the judicial determination of probable cause to overcome the presumption of validity? Defendants argue for but-for causation, grounded in Beauchamp’s use of “necessary” to describe the causal relationship. Id. Plainti s, meanwhile, rely on Manuel’s use of the word “tainted” to argue for a lesser standard, which they claim is akin to “proximate cause.” 4 4 Plaintiffs do not explain why they think proximate causation, which is usually defined more narrowly than factual, but-for causation, would be an easier standard to meet. But we take it that plaintiffs are actually 22 No. 22-2467 The relevant line in Manuel I says that “if the proceeding is tainted—as here, by fabricated evidence—and the result is that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the con ned person’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 369 n.8. When the Supreme Court’s statement is read in context, it becomes clear that defendants’ but-for standard is the correct one. Even the line referencing a “tainted” proceeding requires that, as a result of the taint, “probable cause is lacking.” Id.; see also Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014) (calling it a “traditional background principle[]” of law that “a phrase such as ‘results from’ imposes a requirement of but-for causation”). This tracks with our use of “necessary” in Beauchamp. See 320 F.3d at 742; see also United States v. Hat eld, 591 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2010) (“necessary condition” is another way of naming a “but-for” cause); Ramos v. City of Chicago, 716 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013) (civil plainti must show not only that detention was based on false evidence but also that his “seizure would lack probable cause without that false evidence”). Thus, the second prong of Beauchamp requires us to determine whether the evidence permits a reasonable inference that the arguably false statements and misleading omissions were collectively a but-for cause of the judicial determinations of probable cause to detain plainti s on rst-degree murder charges. In this case, two independent reasons bar a nding of butfor causation. First, the State’s Attorney’s O ce conducted its arguing for something akin to “substantial factor” causation, which applies in the “rare” situation where “multiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently, produce a result,” and under which strict but-for causation is not required. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214–15 (2014). No. 22-2467 23 own independent fact-gathering before ling charges, rather than relying on the allegedly misleading statements of the defendant detectives. Second, “when the lies are taken out and the exculpatory evidence is added in,” the remaining undisputed evidence still su ced to support probable cause. Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2019). Each reason alone would be su cient to a rm summary judgment. We discuss each in turn. a. Independent Investigation by Prosecutors Eliminates But-For Causation First, plainti s fail to overcome the causation problem posed by prosecutors’ own factual investigation in this case. Because the State’s Attorney’s O ce did an independent investigation into the facts before approving charges and presenting the case to the bail courts and the grand jury, any misstatements and/or omissions by the defendant detectives regarding those same facts were not necessary to the judicial determinations of probable cause. Plainti s admit that ASA Waller, the prosecutor originally assigned to determine whether charges should be led, independently “spoke to Defendants and re-interviewed witnesses.” Waller re-interviewed Washington and White, as well as the three parking-lot witnesses, Nelson, Beard, and Hill. From these interviews, as the district court noted, [T]he State’s Attorney’s O ce knew … that no one claimed that Washington hit Edmondson on the top or back of his head or reported seeing Edmondson bleeding from the top or back of his head before his collapse. The prosecutor had access to the medical examiner and all the 24 No. 22-2467 relevant witnesses and underlying source material. Waller also knew that Washington had gone back on her story about Howard hitting Edmondson in the head with a pole (because Washington told Waller this). 2022 WL 2905669, at *12. When a di erent prosecutor, ASA Ayala-Gonzalez, was assigned to the case, ASA Waller told her all he had learned from his independent fact-gathering. ASA Ayala-Gonzalez evaluated that evidence and then approved charges of rst-degree murder against Washington and Howard. Plainti s are correct that there were di erent prosecutors at the two bail hearings, but this only makes clear that the State’s Attorney’s o ce collectively investigated the case. We agree with the district court that plainti s presented “no evidence that any defendant duped the State’s Attorney into seeking pretrial detention or pursuing grand-jury indictments.” 2022 WL 2905669, at *12. Like the district court, we nd that “[t]he only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the undisputed evidence is that the State’s Attorney maintained control over plainti s’ prosecution.” Id. The independent fact-gathering by the State’s Attorney’s O ce, leading to an independent decision to prosecute plainti s, rendered super uous any lies, misleading statements, or omissions by defendants relating to those independently gathered facts. See Coleman, 925 F.3d at 351 (overcoming presumption of probable cause requires “evidence that law enforcement obtained the indictment through improper or fraudulent means”). If plainti s believed the prosecutors had also knowingly or recklessly made false or misleading statements about material evidence, they might have tried to sue those prosecutors. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, No. 22-2467 25 273–74 (1993) (absolute prosecutorial immunity does not extend to prosecutor acting in an investigatory capacity “before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested”). The prosecutor’s independent investigation alone is su cient reason to a rm summary judgment. It renders the purported misstatements and omissions by the detective defendants unnecessary to any judicial o cer’s determination of probable cause. Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 742–43. We address next a second, independent reason that but-for causation is lacking between the misstatements and omissions and the judicial determinations of probable cause. b. Su cient Evidence Remained to Support Probable Cause Even if the prosecutors had relied exclusively on the police detectives’ descriptions of events, which we assume included the misrepresentations and omissions discussed above, there remained enough uncontested, reliable evidence to support probable cause as a matter of law. This is a second reason why, under Beauchamp, the misstatements and omissions raised by plainti s were not a necessary but-for cause of any judicial o cer’s determination of probable cause. This point supplies an independent ground for a rming summary judgment. “Probable cause is a common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of criminal activity; it exists whenever … a court has enough information to warrant a prudent person to believe,” that, in this case, Washington and Howard killed Edmondson. Young, 987 F.3d at 644, quoting Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 411; see also Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2023) (“The existence of probable cause … depends, in the rst 26 No. 22-2467 instance, on the elements of the predicate criminal o ense(s) as de ned by state law.” (alterations in original; internal citation omitted)). Probable cause “deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). It “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity,” so it “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). Probable cause is “‘assessed objectively’ based on ‘the conclusions that the … o cer reasonably might have drawn from the information known to him.’” Young, 987 F.3d at 644, quoting Holmes v. Village of Ho man Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007). “In determining whether information submitted to a judicial o cer in support of a warrant application was suf cient to establish probable cause, we look only at what the o cer knew at the time he sought the warrant, not at how things turned out in hindsight.” Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 743. Probable cause existed if, at the time of plainti s’ pretrial detention hearings, “the facts and circumstances within [the of cer’s] knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were su cient to warrant a prudent person in believing that [plainti s] had committed the crimes.” Id. Here, the judicial o cers were presented with su cient undisputed facts to establish probable cause to believe that Washington and Howard killed Edmondson. Both plainti s were admittedly in a physical altercation with Edmondson a short time before he died. Washington admitted that she hit Edmondson with a metal pole on his chest and his lip. Detectives located a pole matching the description given by witnesses in Washington’s apartment. A short time later, No. 22-2467 27 Edmondson died from a serious wound to the head. Before he died, Edmondson told the parking-lot witnesses that he had been beaten by people who lived in his building, which is where Washington lived. The detectives had no evidence that Edmondson encountered any other person who might have caused his death, which the autopsy determined was due to blunt-force trauma to Edmondson’s head. And Washington and Howard had been deceptive and evasive with defendant detectives upon arrest. Howard gave the detectives a false name, and Washington initially denied knowing the identity of the other person involved in the altercation with Edmondson, even though she knew and later admitted it was Howard. Washington did not admit to dealing the fatal blow to the back of Edmondson’s head, of course, but the detectives were not required to assume that no such blow took place. Bridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Police are entitled to draw on eyewitness descriptions without being required to assume that witnesses got every detail right, or that every omission from a description must establish that the omitted fact did not occur.”). Far from it. Given Washington’s admitted strike to Edmondson’s face with a pipe, no reasonable jury could have found it unreasonable for the detectives to infer that Washington dealt an additional blow to the back of Edmondson’s head with the same weapon. See Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When presented with a credible report of criminal behavior, an o cer ‘is under no constitutional obligation to exclude all suggestions that the witness or victim is not telling the truth.’”), quoting Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 2007). This is especially true where suspects exhibit “evasive and deceptive” behavior, as both Washington and Howard had by lying in their 28 No. 22-2467 initial interrogations. United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006). Plainti s make much of the detectives’ statements in Washington’s interrogation that she “couldn’t have done” the “damage that was done to [Edmondson’s] head,” and that they did not believe Washington was “strong enough to do the damage that [Edmondson] … sustained.” The state was not required to prove as an element of the charges whether Washington or Howard dealt the fatal blow; either or both of them could be convicted under a theory of felony murder. Second, the interrogators’ statements occurred in an attempt to lead Washington to reveal the identity of the third person involved in the altercation. Law enforcement o cers are not bound to be truthful when trying to elicit information, including the identities of others involved in the o ense. Johnson v. Pollard, 559 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The fact that an of cer misrepresents the strength of the evidence against a defendant is insu cient, standing alone” to render a resulting confession unreliable). Indeed, the detectives’ interrogation on this point was fruitful. Washington eventually told the detectives that Howard hit Edmondson on the back of the head. It is true that Washington later retracted this statement while being questioned by ASA Waller. But neither ASA Waller nor the detectives were obliged to believe Washington’s recantation. See Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 724 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Many putative defendants protest their innocence, and it is not the responsibility of law enforcement o cials to test such claims once probable cause has been established.”); see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (summarizing Sang Ken Kim v. City of Chicago, 858 N.E.2d 569, 578–79 (Ill. App. 2006), as a case “a rming summary No. 22-2467 29 judgment because probable cause existed at time of arrest despite later recantation of accusation and allegedly coercive interrogation”). We recognize that some facts known to detectives at the time weighed against a conclusion that Washington and Howard committed the murder. Washington is physically small in stature, and the pipe recovered from her home was a lightweight silver pole one inch in diameter originally thought to be a table leg but later identi ed as part of a feeding tube machine for her children. None of the parking-lot witnesses said that they had seen any blood coming from what must have been a serious wound on the back of Edmondson’s head, even when he turned and walked away from them. And Edmondson had been able to maintain a conversation with those witnesses, describing to them the altercation that had just occurred. There is also security footage showing Edmondson walking half a mile after his altercation with the plainti s without any visible distress or blood. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that the detectives had access to that video before plainti s’ probable cause hearings. These serious factual discrepancies contributed heavily to plainti s’ eventual acquittal, and for good reason. But probable cause demands much less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1022 (7th Cir. 2011) (probable cause determination “does not require evidence su cient to support a conviction, nor even evidence that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a crime” (internal citation omitted)). Probable cause existed as a matter of law even when we give the plainti s the bene t of factual disputes. 30 No. 22-2467 Plainti s rely on other cases nding a lack of probable cause to support pretrial detention, but they are distinguishable. Hurt v. Wise is a post-Manuel I case reversing a grant of summary judgment on a wrongful pretrial detention claim. 880 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2018), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019). In Hurt, the “only source of probable cause” to arrest and detain the plainti was his supposed confession, “so everything turn[ed] on it.” 880 F.3d at 837 (emphasis in original). But the supposed confession was “replete with easily veri ed and contemporaneous evidence of inaccuracy and unreliability.” Id. “Several critical ‘facts’ that [plainti ] o ered were facially impossible. For example, if [plainti ’s] account of where he and his siblings had dumped [the victim’s] body … was true, the body would have had to oat upstream four to six miles to have arrived at the location where it was found.” Id. (emphasis in original). This, plus other facts in the confession that were plainly contradicted by physical or documentary evidence, led us to conclude that probable cause could not be established as a matter of law. Id. at 841–42. In another post-Manuel I case, Rainsberger v. Benner, we again found that probable cause could not be resolved as a matter of law, a rming a denial of quali ed immunity on a standard of review identical to that for summary judgment. 913 F.3d at 643. There, the defendant O cer Benner had led a probable cause a davit for the arrest of plainti Rainsberger on the theory that he murdered his mother, Ruth. After charges were dropped against Rainsberger, he led a section 1983 suit alleging that O cer Benner had lied in his a davit. In our analysis, we “eliminate[d] the alleged false statements, incorporate[d] any allegedly omitted facts, and then evaluate[d] whether the resulting ‘hypothetical’ a davit No. 22-2467 31 would establish probable cause.” Id. at 647, quoting Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2012). We said that the remaining “package of facts” supporting probable cause boiled down to these: Ruth’s murderer might have been someone she knew, because the attack was not necessarily connected to a burglary. Some drawers had been opened and her purse and medication were missing; at the same time, there was no sign of a forced entry, and Ruth’s checkbook, credit cards, and some cash were still in the apartment. Rainsberger had a key to her apartment, and cell phone records did not rule out the possibility that he was in the vicinity of her apartment complex when the attack happened. Shortly before he found his mother and called 911, Rainsberger stopped at a Kroger across the street from his mother’s apartment to buy an iced tea. He walked in plain view through the Kroger parking lot carrying a piece of trash, which he threw away in a receptacle by a Redbox machine on his way into the store. He correctly described Ruth’s injury as a blow to the head, even though he had not removed the blanket to see the wound. In contrast, the rst responder, who did remove the blanket, initially thought that Ruth had been shot. Rainsberger and his two siblings would inherit about $33,000 apiece if his mother died. When Benner brought the Rainsberger children to the police station under false pretenses, Rainsberger and his brother refused Benner’s request that they 32 No. 22-2467 take a polygraph test. A week later, they voluntarily gave ngerprints and submitted to a DNA buccal swab. Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 648. Many of these facts, we noted, “would be true of most children of aging parents …. These unremarkable facts would be reason to suspect Rainsberger only if other information cast them in a suspicious light.” Id. But “[t]he totality of these circumstances support[ed] nothing more than bare suspicion….” Id. at 649. “If probable cause exists here, then anyone who experiences the tragedy of discovering a murdered family member—and who correctly assesses the cause of the injury and recently threw something away in a public trash can—can be arrested for murder. Probable cause is a low bar, but this evidence does not clear it.” Id. Hurt and Rainsberger look nothing like the bundle of facts that remain to support probable cause to detain Washington and Howard, even with the purported “lies stripped and the omissions added.” Id. at 648. Washington’s admission that both plainti s were involved in a physical altercation with the victim and had struck him with sts and a metal pole shortly before he was found dead are hardly “unremarkable facts” requiring “other information [to] cast them in a suspicious light.” Id. Nor would a belief that Washington and Howard killed Edmondson contradict the laws of nature, as in Hurt. See 880 F.3d at 837. The defendant detectives had no evidence that anyone else had encountered Edmondson between the altercation and his death, except for the parking-lot witnesses who reported open wounds on Edmondson’s face and chest. Prior to arrest and during initial questioning, Washington and Howard were evasive and deceptive toward the detectives. No. 22-2467 33 And even if the detectives did not believe Washington alone was capable of dealing the fatal blow, the charged felonymurder theory did not require that she did. Consequently, after eliminating the alleged misrepresentations and adding in the omissions, undisputed facts show that probable cause would have still existed to detain Washington and Howard pending their trials. No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Thus, even if we assume that the prosecutors, judges, and grand jury relied on the asserted false statements and omissions by the defendant detectives, Washington and Howard cannot show that such false statements were “necessary” to the judicial determinations of probable cause as required to overcome the presumption of validity. Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 742–43. Consequently, the judicial determinations of probable cause are presumed to be valid, and the pretrial detention of Washington and Howard did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 367. D. Malicious Prosecution Claim Plainti s’ claims for malicious prosecution fail for the same reason that their Fourth Amendment claims fail—the detectives and courts had probable cause to detain them. See Young, 987 F.3d at 646, citing Martinez v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) (“To state a claim for malicious prosecution under Illinois law, a plainti must allege that: (1) he was subjected to judicial proceedings; (2) for which there was no probable cause….”). Because plainti s’ pretrial detention was supported by probable cause based on the prosecutors’ independent fact-gathering and even if the purported lies and omissions are accepted as true, the district 34 No. 22-2467 court properly granted summary judgment on their malicious prosecution claims. The district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants is AFFIRMED.
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