Stacy v. United States, No. 22-2003 (7th Cir. 2023)
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In 2014, Stacy was convicted of bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and ordered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 in restitution jointly and severally with a codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the government forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims. When Stacy entered federal custody he suffered from pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems worsened and he sought treatment through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. Stacy did not receive the procedure while incarcerated. Stacy filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the federal prison was negligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The government settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability but agreeing to pay him $75,000. The government expected the Treasury Department to offset the $75,000 settlement for application to Stacy’s restitution debt.
The district court rejected Stacy’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law authorizes the government to offset Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it has been past due since the time of sentencing.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2003 ANDREW STACY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:19-cv-00301 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 2, 2023 ____________________ Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. A restitution order in a criminal case requires Andrew Stacy to pay the government more than one million dollars. But the government also owes Stacy $75,000 from a Federal Tort Claims Act settlement. The government plans to o set the FTCA settlement against Stacy’s restitution debt, to which he objects. The district court rejected Stacy’s challenge to the government’s use of o set, and we 2 No. 22-2003 a rm. Federal law authorizes the government to o set Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt. I. Background Stacy’s restitution obligations arose from a 2014 conviction for bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and ordered restitution. In total, the court ordered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 jointly and severally with a codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the government forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims. Stacy’s time in prison eventually led to an FTCA claim. When Stacy entered federal custody in 2015, he su ered from pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems worsened while incarcerated, and he sought treatment through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. But Stacy did not receive the procedure while incarcerated—it was performed only after his release in 2016. Stacy led suit against the United States in 2019, alleging the federal prison was negligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The United States settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability but agreeing to pay him $75,000. While the settlement concluded the FTCA claim, it did not resolve what would happen with the settlement funds. The parties di ered on whether the money could be o set against Stacy’s outstanding restitution obligations, and they memorialized that dispute in the settlement agreement. The government expected the Treasury Department “to o set the entire $75,000 settlement amount … for application to Stacy’s criminal judgment debt.” Stacy disagreed and preserved the right to “ le a motion before the district court seeking to prevent No. 22-2003 3 the United States Department of the Treasury from performing an o set.” The parties executed the agreement, and Stacy moved in the district court to preclude the o set. The district court rejected Stacy’s arguments and held that the government can o set his settlement money. Stacy appeals. II. Jurisdiction We determine rst whether we have jurisdiction and whether sovereign immunity shields the government’s o set use from judicial challenge. See generally Avila v. Pappas, 591 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 2010); Lipsey v. United States, 879 F.3d 249, 253 (7th Cir. 2018). Resolution of both issues turns on interpretation of the FTCA, which “waive[s] the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees” and confers federal court jurisdiction over qualifying claims. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). The parties agree the district court had jurisdiction over Stacy’s negligence claim against the United States, but they dispute whether 28 U.S.C. § 1346(c) confers federal court jurisdiction over Stacy’s o set challenge. That provision says, “The jurisdiction conferred by this section includes jurisdiction of any set-o , counterclaim, or other claim or demand whatever on the part of the United States against any plainti commencing an action under this section.” § 1346(c). Stacy argues this waives sovereign immunity and confers federal court jurisdiction over his challenge to the government’s use of o set here. The government disagrees. It reads § 1346(c) narrowly, arguing federal courts in FTCA cases have “jurisdiction over a set-o or other claim only when that other claim is brought by the United States against the plainti , not the other way around.” Because Stacy challenges o set here, the government asserts § 1346(c) fails 4 No. 22-2003 to waive sovereign immunity or grant jurisdiction. Per the government, “The court in an FTCA case can award damages, but there is nothing in the FTCA that gives courts the power to say what happens to the money.” The district court resolved this issue in Stacy’s favor, holding that § 1346(c) “is written broadly and includes all cases, like this case, where the United States claims a set-o against an FTCA plainti .” “We review de novo a determination of subject matter jurisdiction.” Nichols v. Longo, 22 F.4th 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Big Shoulders Cap. LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande R.R., Inc., 13 F.4th 560, 567 (7th Cir. 2021)). The plain language of § 1346(c) confers jurisdiction here. Stacy is a “plainti commencing an action under [the FTCA],” and he is challenging a “set-o … on the part of the United States” being used against him. § 1346(c). Resisting this conclusion, the government asks us to read “on the part of the United States against any plainti ” as a one-way conferral of jurisdiction applicable only when the government seeks an o set—not when an FTCA plainti seeks to enjoin an o set. We disagree with the government’s reading. Section 1346(c) grants subject matter jurisdiction over “any set-o … whatever on the part of United States” against an FTCA plainti . Id. (emphasis added). The instigating party’s identity does not matter. Even though Stacy was the movant below, the United States still seeks to use o set against an FTCA plainti . Accordingly, jurisdiction exists to hear this case. III. Discussion We turn to the merits of Stacy’s appeal. He presents four main arguments for why the government is not authorized to o set his FTCA settlement award against his restitution debts. First, he asserts that the statute governing criminal restitution No. 22-2003 5 procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3664, outright prohibits use of o set to enforce restitution obligations. Second, he argues that o set is improper because o set only applies to funds owed to the government and, per Stacy, his debt is “owed” to his victims. Third, Stacy contends that o set is only appropriate for delinquent debts, and he claims to be current on his obligations. Fourth, Stacy asserts that nothing in his restitution order mandates that “settlements or other forms of large funds received by [the] plainti … be applied toward his restitution.” The government responds that through his criminal plea agreement, Stacy waived his challenge to o set. Beyond waiver, the government asserts an o set is authorized by statute and consistent with the district court’s restitution order. Because the government’s ability to o set turns on statutory interpretation, our review is de novo throughout. United States v. Miller, 883 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 2018). We start with this last point, the government’s contention that Stacy may not challenge o set. When Stacy pleaded guilty, he “agree[d] that the United States may enforce collection of any ne or restitution imposed in this case pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3572, 3613, and 3664(m), notwithstanding any payment schedule set by the Court.” The government reads that provision to mean that Stacy has waived “any challenge to the United States’ administrative o set rights.” We see it di erently. Stacy agreed the government could use 18 U.S.C. §§ 3572, 3613, and 3664(m). But neither § 3572 nor § 3613 deal directly with o set. Section 3664 authorizes enforcement of restitution by “all other available and reasonable means,” but whether “all other available and reasonable means” includes o set is one of the questions 6 No. 22-2003 Stacy raises on appeal. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). So, nothing in the agreement forecloses Stacy’s challenge to the o set. Turning to Stacy’s four arguments, we begin with whether § 3664—which outlines procedures for enforcing restitution orders—bars the use of o set. Stacy argues that statute does, and he directs our attention to subsection (c), which states, “The provisions of this chapter, chapter 227, and Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be the only rules applicable to proceedings,” meaning restitution proceedings, “under this section.” Stacy interprets § 3664(c) to mean that the government cannot enforce a restitution order using tools, like o set, housed elsewhere in the Code. But this interpretation ignores § 3664(m)(1)(A), which reads “(i) An order of restitution may be enforced by the United States in the manner provided for in subchapter C of chapter 227 and subchapter B of chapter 229 of this title; or (ii) by all other available and reasonable means.” Id. (emphasis added). By its plain text, § 3664 authorizes the government to enforce restitution orders not just through a stipulated set of mechanisms but also through “all other available and reasonable means.” Id. O set, as a collection tool available to the United States, is such a means of enforcement. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3728, 3711, 3716. Perhaps recognizing this issue, Stacy suggests that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) changes the equation. That provision requires an individual who “receives substantial resources … including … settlement … during a period of incarceration” to apply the value of those resources to outstanding restitution debts. § 3664(n). For Stacy, the fact that subsection (n) requires incarcerated individuals to apply settlement money to their restitution debt means non-incarcerated individuals need not do so. But this argument fails in view of § 3664(m), No. 22-2003 7 which authorizes the United States to enforce restitution orders using all its available and reasonable means. We do not read § 3664(n) to constrain a co-equal statutory provision. As a nal point, Stacy agrees that the United States can enforce restitution orders but argues § 3664 “does not say an order of settlements or judgments received may be enforced by the United States.” So, Stacy contends that “[r]estitution ordered by a court in a criminal proceeding is separate to any settlements received in a civil suit.” This argument re ects a mistaken understanding of restitution, which creates a debt obligation that may be satis ed from qualifying defendant assets. United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An order for payment of restitution becomes a lien on all property and rights to property of the defendant upon entry of judgment … .”); 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (stating that a restitution order creates a lien in favor of the United States). A settlement award is one such asset, so restitution and settlement funds are not separate as Stacy contends. Nor does the government enforce a settlement agreement or civil judgment merely by capturing the qualifying proceeds. In sum, § 3664 does not prevent the government from using o set. Second to consider is whether, in this context, o set is otherwise authorized. For that, we brie y review federal o set statutes. Title 31 U.S.C. § 3728 addresses situations, like here, where a plainti wins a judgment against the United States but already owes the government money. In that case, § 3728 commands that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold paying that part of a judgment against the United States Government presented to the Secretary that is equal to a debt the plainti owes the Government.” § 3728(a). It then describes 8 No. 22-2003 the government’s next steps for dealing with the money: the government can o set the judgment amount if the plainti agrees, or it can “have a civil action brought if one has not already been brought.” § 3728(b); see also 31 C.F.R. § 256.22. Di erent o set rules are housed in 31 U.S.C. § 3711 and § 3716. 1 Section 3711(a)(1) requires executive, judicial, or legislative agency heads to try to collect claims “of the United States Government for money or property.” It also provides that an agency head is not to discharge any outstanding debt until all appropriate collection steps have been taken, “including (as applicable)—(A) administrative o set.” § 3711(g)(9)(A). For its part, § 3716(a) addresses what happens when an agency head’s collection e orts are not successful: “After trying to collect a claim from a person under section 3711(a) of this title, the head of an executive, judicial, or legislative agency may collect the claim by administrative o set.” That same section also requires federal agencies owed a “legally enforceable nontax debt that is over 120 days delinquent” to notify the Secretary of the Treasury “for purposes of administrative o set.” § 3716(c)(6)(A). We pause to highlight the relevant distinctions between the two o set statutes at play, § 3728 and § 3716. The rst is that § 3728 is more speci c than § 3716. Whereas § 3728 deals precisely with judgments won against the United States, § 3716 covers a broad swath of debts owed to the government. Cf. §§ 3728(a); 3716(a). Second, o set under the two provisions takes place at di erent points in the payment timeline. 1 Section 3716 refers to offset as “administrative offset,” while § 3728 uses the term “setoff.” For sake of consistency, we describe operation of both statutes as “offset.” No. 22-2003 9 Section 3728 o set occurs “prior to payment certi cation,” while § 3716 o set happens after certi cation but before disbursement. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 256.21, with §§ 285.1(m)(1), and 285.5(d)(6), (e)(1). Given its more speci c application, § 3728 appears to control o set in this context. Nonetheless, we examine both § 3728 and § 3716 for any indication that the United States may not o set Stacy’s settlement. 2 Looking to this statutory framework, Stacy argues that o set is authorized only for debts owed to the United States. O set cannot apply to him, he says, as restitution is owed to victims, not the United States. Stacy is partially correct. Indeed, o set applies only to debts owed to the government. Sections 3716 and 3711 both refer to the government collecting “claims,” with “claim” statutorily de ned as “any amount of funds or property that has been determined by an appropriate o cial of the Federal government to be owed the United States.” 31 U.S.C. § 3701(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 3728(a), likewise pertains to “debt[s] the plainti owes to the Government.” § 3728(a) (emphasis added). But Stacy is incorrect that his restitution debt is not “owed” to the United States for purposes of o set—it is. The statutory scheme for payment of restitution debt makes this clear. To start, Stacy’s restitution is paid directly to the United States, not the victims. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(c), the Attorney General is responsible for collecting unpaid restitution. That strongly signals restitution debt is a debt owed to the government. Moreover, § 3612(c) provides that “[a]n order of restitution … does not create any right of action against the United 2 A comparison of these two offsets can be found here: https://fiscal.treasury.gov/judgment-fund/offsets.html. 10 No. 22-2003 States by the person to whom restitution is ordered to be paid.” So, the victims are not authorized to sue the United States if the government fails to disburse the restitution it collects from o enders. This further con rms that restitution is a debt owed to the government. And for o set under 31 U.S.C. § 3716, the de nitions section lends additional clarity. As discussed above, § 3716 refers to the government collecting “claims.” For purposes of § 3716, the meaning of “claim” or “debt” “includes, without limitation … any amount the United States is authorized by statute to collect for the bene t of any person.” § 3701(b)(1)(D). Restitution is a debt collected by the government for the bene t of another person, so it quali es under that de nition as a “debt” or “claim” subject to o set. For these reasons, Stacy’s argument that his restitution debt is not owed to the United States lacks statutory support. At least one other circuit court similarly reads these o set statutes. See United States v. Whitbeck, 869 F.3d 618, 620 (8th Cir. 2017) (“An order of restitution … is based on the victim’s losses, but it is an obligation owed to the government.”) (citation omitted). Third, Stacy argues that o set is authorized only for “delinquent” nancial obligations and emphasizes that he is current on his monthly restitution payments. This position apparently relies on language from the o set statutes and regulations indicating that only delinquent or past due debt quali es. See § 3711(g)(9)(A) (instructing that agency heads must make appropriate e orts “[b]efore discharging any delinquent debt”); 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(d)(3)(i) (“A debt submitted to Fiscal Service for collection by centralized o set must be: (A) Past-due in the amount stated by the creditor agency … .”). No. 22-2003 11 Assuming without deciding 3 that o set applies only to delinquent debt, this contention does not help Stacy. Contrary to his arguments, his debt is delinquent. When the sentencing court ordered Stacy to pay restitution, it included instructions in a “Schedule of Payments” document. There, the court ordered that Stacy’s restitution was to be made in a “lump sum payment … due immediately.” The court provided further information in a “special instructions” section, where it ordered: “The nancial obligations are due immediately from any non-exempt assets. Otherwise, during imprisonment, Defendant shall make payments through the BOP’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Any balance remaining upon release shall be paid while on supervised release in an amount that is equal to 10% of Defendant’s net monthly income.” Notwithstanding the rst sentence repeating that restitution is “due immediately,” Stacy reads the special instruction as creating distinct, severable obligations. For Stacy, the rst sentence means that “if the person owing a criminal restitution has all the funds available immediately, then it is to be paid.” But, because his non-exempt assets fell short, Stacy contends his obligations changed. He believes he was required to make payments through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated and, now that he has been released, is responsible for paying monthly 10% of his net monthly income. Based on this interpretation, Stacy argues his restitution debt is not past due or delinquent. We read the district court’s sentencing order di erently. The schedule of payments sheet lists various options from 3 Nothing in 31 U.S.C. § 3728 or its accompanying regulations suggests that only delinquent debt may be offset against a judgment award. 12 No. 22-2003 which the district court can choose. Though several involve installment payments, in Stacy’s case the district court selected “[l]ump sum payment.” By doing so, the court ordered Stacy to make a lump sum payment “due immediately.” The court provided additional detail in a special instructions section: “The nancial obligations are due immediately from any non-exempt assets.” Given that language, Stacy’s restitution was due in full on the date his sentence was imposed. Stacy has not satis ed the entire amount, so it is delinquent. Stacy responds that the sentencing order lays out an installment schedule, such that his restitution is current as long as he keeps making his 10% net monthly income payments. Contrary to Stacy’s interpretation, though, the court’s implementation of minimum monthly payments does not modify the underlying tardiness of his restitution debt. When we interpret restitution orders, we consider any conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Fariduddin, 469 F.3d 1111, 1113 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The [sentencing] form must be read harmoniously with the statute and the special condition of supervised release … .”). Doing so here con rms the function of Stacy’s special payment instructions. One of Stacy’s special conditions of supervised release commands, “The balance of any nancial obligation shall be paid in monthly payments during supervised release at a rate of ten percent of the defendant’s net monthly income.” Given that condition, Stacy’s monthly payments do not mean his debt, which was due immediately as a lump sum, is current. Rather, the monthly payments serve as a minimum threshold above which Stacy must remain to avoid violating his sentencing order and potentially returning to prison. Those minimum payments are merely a “ oor” which Stacy must maintain. See id. (identifying no contradiction in a sentence that required defendant to pay full No. 22-2003 13 restitution immediately but also ordered monthly payments of at least $150 because failure to pay monthly minimum would violate a condition of supervised release and “[a] oor under payments di ers from a schedule”). Regulations pertaining to § 3716 o set and debts owed to the Department of Justice accord with this conclusion. See 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(b) (“Delinquent or past-due refers to the status of a debt and means a debt has not been paid by the date speci ed in the agency’s initial written demand for payment, or applicable agreement or instrument … .”); 28 C.F.R. § 11.11(b) (“Judgment debts remain past due until paid in full.”). Accordingly, Stacy’s restitution debt is delinquent. Fourth, Stacy argues that the restitution order “de nitely does not indicate that any settlements and judgments are to be paid toward the restitution immediately.” Per Stacy, “[i]f this were the case, the language would indicate so.” Building on this idea, Stacy contends that if the restitution debt is due “immediately” it “would also mean that any sums of money Plainti encounters (such as inheritance, gifted money, winnings, etc.) should be paid straight toward his owed restitution.” We need not opine on which of Stacy’s conceivable assets the government may collect through o set to satisfy his restitution debt. The asset at issue here is a judgment against the United States, and 31 U.S.C. § 3728 authorizes the government to use o set for that type of settlement award. § 3728(a) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold paying that part of a judgment against the United States Government presented to the Secretary that is equal to a debt the plainti owes the Government.”) (emphasis added). Further, a restitution order need not identify which of defendant’s assets restitution 14 No. 22-2003 is to be paid from, as statutory law provides those rules. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) provides that “an order of restitution … is a lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property of the person ned as if the liability of the person ned were a liability for a tax assessed under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” That authorizes the government to capture a variety of Stacy’s property, the details of which are not important here. See, e.g., United States v. Wyko , 839 F.3d 581, 582 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the government was empowered to garnish defendant’s pension despite language in the restitution order that he was to pay “not less than 10% of [his] gross monthly income” towards restitution). Stacy demands unnecessary detail from the restitution order. One related question: At oral argument, counsel for Stacy suggested that Stacy’s plea agreement constitutes a written agreement to repay the restitution debt which, for counsel, “obviate[d] the ability of the government to invoke … the administrative o set.” Oral Arg. at 4:20–6:00. This argument apparently grows out of certain procedural requirements for § 3716 o set. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a)(4) (“The head of the agency may collect by administrative o set only after giving the debtor … an opportunity to make a written agreement … to repay the amount of the claim.”). For Stacy, his plea agreement is a written agreement already in place describing how the restitution debt is to be paid. The existence of that agreement, he says, bars the government from using o set. Oral Arg. at 4:44–5:15. To the extent raised at all in Stacy’s brie ng, this argument rst appears in his reply brief, so it is waived. See Stechauner v. Smith, 852 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). No. 22-2003 15 Even on its merits, this reasoning fails. The restitution order—not the plea agreement—de nes how Stacy is to pay restitution. The district court entered that order after the plea agreement, where it mandated that restitution be paid immediately. Stacy’s restitution obligation was not incurred until that order. The plea agreement was executed to resolve Stacy’s federal criminal charges, so it cannot be fairly recharacterized as an agreement to repay a debt. Further, § 3728—which likely controls here—contains no “written agreement” procedural component. We therefore see no legal basis for using the plea agreement as a means around o set. A nal issue remains. According to Stacy, even if he cannot access the settlement award, a portion of the settlement funds should be set aside to pay his attorneys. To him, allowing full o set here—with no carve out for his attorneys— would “ignore[] the principles of quantum meruit.” This is because his attorneys’ e orts created bene ts for him and “the victim creditors,” and he believes that his attorneys should be paid accordingly. But no legal basis exists here for a quantum meruit award. Recovery under that theory requires Stacy to show, at a minimum, that the United States requested his attorneys’ services. See Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 557 F.3d 469, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2009). Obviously, that did not occur. The United States did not ask Stacy’s attorneys to sue the United States. Beyond quantum meruit, Stacy argues “there is no statutory provision indicating that attorney’s fees are subject to an o set.” This point is unpersuasive because in a case like this, applicable federal statutes speci cally subordinate attorney’s fees to restitution debt. The interaction of 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) and 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(8) shows this. As mentioned, § 3613(c) 16 No. 22-2003 states that a restitution order creates a “lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property for the person ned” coextensive with that of a tax liability. In turn, § 6323 identi es certain types of liens that may take priority against federal tax liens. Subsection (b)(8) gives an attorney’s lien a sort of “superpriority” over federal tax liens, see United States v. Ripa, 323 F.3d 73, 80–81, 83 (2d Cir. 2003), but with a critical exception applicable here. The superpriority § 6323(b)(8) grants to attorney’s liens does “not apply to any judgment or amount in settlement of a claim or of a cause of action against the United States to the extent that the United States o sets such judgment or amount against any liability of the taxpayer to the United States.” Stacy’s settlement arose from a claim against the United States itself, which seeks to o set that settlement against his restitution debt. So, we are not free to grant Stacy’s attorney’s lien priority over the government’s o set here. The same goes for o set under both § 3728 and § 3716. Section 3728 allows the United States to o set an entire judgment without mention of attorney’s fees. O set under § 3716 is similarly broad. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that even statutorily authorized attorney’s fees are subject to complete o set under § 3716. See Astrue v. Ratli , 560 U.S. 586, 593 (2010) (concluding that statutorily awarded fees are the property of the litigant—not counsel—which “subjects them to a federal administrative o set if the litigant has outstanding federal debts”). We thus see no basis for sheltering a portion of Stacy’s settlement from o set to pay his counsel rst. 4 4 Stacy also criticizes o set here as bad policy possibly violating the Eighth Amendment. But this is a nonstarter given that Stacy never alleged the prison violated his constitutional rights. Stacy asserts, “Without just No. 22-2003 17 IV. Conclusion The government is entitled to o set Stacy’s settlement award—including any amount that might have been used to compensate counsel—against his outstanding restitution debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it has been past due since the time of sentencing. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. compensation for provided services, no attorneys [will] be willing to accept Federal Tort Claims Act cases for an abused inmate who still owes restitution.” We understand this concern, but “[o]nly Congress may change the law in response to policy arguments, courts may not do so.” Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Chi., 985 F.2d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 1993).
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