Lewis v. Village of Alsip, No. 21-2528 (7th Cir. 2022)
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Lewis left her car parked on an Alsip street during a snowstorm. She was fined $50 for violating an ordinance that prohibits parking on any “primary snow route” if more than one inch has fallen within 12 hours and requires all primary snow routes to be identified by signs; a three-inch limit applies to “all other public streets not designated as primary snow routes.” The street where Lewis had parked was not posted as a primary snow route.
Lewis could have challenged the fine in state court but instead filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Alsip violated the Due Process Clause by failing to erect signs on every block of every street telling drivers when snow requires them to remove their vehicles. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Due Process Clause requires governmental bodies to make laws available to the public, not to ensure that everyone knows all rules. The statute or regulation itself is adequate notice if it is clear. Drivers know that many traffic rules are not set out on signs but still must be obeyed.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-2528 SHELLIE LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF ALSIP, ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 21 C 2124 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED JANUARY 12, 2022 — DECIDED JANUARY 19, 2022 ____________________ Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and WOOD, Circuit Judges. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Shellie Lewis left her car parked on a public street in the Village of Alsip during a snowstorm. She was ned $50 for violating an ordinance that prohibits parking on any street if more than three inches of snow has fallen in the preceding day. The ordinance bans parking on any “primary snow route” if more than one inch has fallen within 12 hours and requires all primary snow routes to be identi ed by signs; the three-inch limit applies to 2 No. 21-2528 secondary snow routes, which the ordinance de nes as “all other public streets not designated as primary snow routes.” Alsip Code §19-91(b). The street where Lewis had parked was not posted as a primary snow route and therefore was a secondary snow route. Lewis could have obtained review of the ne in state court, and she would have had reasonable chances under 625 ILCS §5/11-208(a)(13), (b), which require municipalities to post signs notifying drivers which streets they must avoid during “snow removal operation[s]”. But instead of seeking a remedy under state law, Lewis led this suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §1983. She contended that the Village violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to erect signs on every block of every street telling drivers when snow requires them to remove their vehicles. That contention opped in the district court, which dismissed the complaint as legally de cient. 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139667 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2021). The district judge was right. The Due Process Clause requires governmental bodies to make laws available to the public, not to ensure that everyone knows all rules. “Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and a ord the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.” Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982). The maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse sums up this perspective. People must learn about their legal obligations, and failure to do so does not provide a defense to a law’s enforcement. Some statutes require prosecutors to show that a person knows about the rule, see, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), but No. 21-2528 3 that is a legislative exception to Texaco’s norm, not a constitutional command. Lewis asserts that tra c regulations are a special situation as a constitutional maker, but at oral argument her lawyer conceded that he had not found any appellate decision supporting that proposition. We haven’t found one either—but it is easy to nd decisions holding that tra c laws are not exceptional. One example is Cochran v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 828 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2016). A driver ned for failure to pay tolls contended that the Due Process Clause requires all pertinent rules to appear on roadside signs. We rejected that contention, writing: “Due process does not require a state to post signage notifying all those entering of its laws and regulations. Rather, the statute or regulation is adequate notice in and of itself as long as it is clear.” Id. at 600. Counsel allowed as much at oral argument in response to the question whether a village would violate the Constitution by enacting an ordinance seking the speed limit at 30 miles per hour unless otherwise posted, or providing that cars may not park within 10 feet of a corner or more than 12 inches from the curb. Drivers know that many tra c rules are not set out on signs but still must be obeyed. Lewis does complain that the application of the snow-route ordinance varies with the circumstances—that is, with how much snow has fallen recently—but she does not argue that a municipality must post daily snow-depth gures on every street or perhaps create electronic notice boards that keep running snowfall totals. A municipality can insist that drivers monitor the weather for themselves. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), does not help Lewis. It concerns the application of an unusual local law to 4 No. 21-2528 someone who had no way to discover the rule and no reason even to inquire whether such a rule existed. Our case, by contrast, concerns the application of easily discovered rules, available on a village’s website, to drivers who must recognize that ordinances a ect where and when they can park. The Supreme Court has never applied the holding of Lambert to any case other than Lambert itself. A dispute about parking rules is not an apt occasion to extend a novel constitutional doctrine that the Justices have let lie fallow for 65 years. AFFIRMED
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