Crouch v. Brown, No. 21-2422 (7th Cir. 2022)
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The Indiana Department of Correction places offenders in restrictive housing when their continued presence in the general population would pose a serious threat to life, property, and others, or the security and orderly operation of a correctional facility. Crouch has been an Indiana inmate for about a decade. In February 2016, Crouch was assigned to disciplinary restrictive status housing due to disciplinary code violations. Crouch spent almost four years in solitary confinement. Throughout this period, Crouch received dozens of classification and status reports. Crouch did not appeal any of these reports; before entering solitary confinement he was aware of the process to appeal and had done so. Crouch also received regular 30-day reviews. Crouch did not appeal those reviews. Inmates also may raise concerns through an offender grievance or a disciplinary appeal; both processes are explained to inmates during orientation and copies of the policies are available at the facilities’ law libraries.
Crouch sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his Due Process rights because of his “prolonged placement in solitary confinement” which “did not receive meaningful review.” The district court dismissed because Crouch failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal claim about prison conditions.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-2422 COREY CROUCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD BROWN, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. No. 2:20-cv-00159 — James P. Hanlon, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED JANUARY 20, 2022 — DECIDED MARCH 10, 2022 ____________________ Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before ling a federal claim about prison conditions. Corey Crouch was held in solitary con nement for nearly four years. He challenges his placement there, claiming it was not meaningfully reviewed. During his time in solitary con nement, Crouch received numerous classi cation and status reports which he did not appeal. Because he failed to exhaust 2 No. 21-2422 his available administrative remedies, we a rm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. I The Indiana Department of Correction places o enders in restrictive status housing when their continued presence in the general population would pose a serious threat to life, property, and others, or the security and orderly operation of a correctional facility. 1 See IND. CODE § 11-10-1-7(a). The Department uses several classi cations for its restrictive housing units, such as “disciplinary” and “administrative.” “Disciplinary” restrictive status housing, for example, is typically imposed as a sanction for a conduct violation. “Administrative” restrictive housing, on the other hand, is used to isolate an offender who poses a threat to life, property, self, sta , other o enders, or facility security. Corey Crouch has been an inmate in the Department’s custody for about a decade. In February 2016, the Department assigned Crouch to disciplinary restrictive status housing due to violations of the disciplinary code. Four months later, it transferred Crouch to department-wide restrictive housing.2 Then, after a little more than a year, the Department reclassi ed Crouch to administrative department-wide restrictive 1 This general background on the Department’s restrictive-housing classifications is drawn from the June 1, 2015, version of the Indiana Department of Correction Manual of Policies and Procedures, Policy No. 02-04-101 (“The Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders”), as well as the Declaration of Matt Leohr, a classification specialist, at ECF No. 19-6. 2 According to a more recent version of the Department’s Policy No. 0201-111 (”Administrative Restrictive Status Housing”), a restrictive housing unit may be operated at either the facility level or on a Departmentwide basis. No. 21-2422 3 housing, where he remained until December 2019, when he was nally reclassi ed to the general population. This meant that in total, Crouch spent slightly less than four years—February 2016 to December 2019—in solitary con nement. Throughout this period, Crouch received dozens of classi cation and status reports. There were two types: (1) a “Report of Classi cation Hearing” (“ROCH”), and (2) a monthly “Department Administrative Restrictive Status Housing Review” (“30-day review”). A. The Report of Classi cation Hearing The ROCH begins as a generic form used for weekly reviews of new transfers, 90-day reviews, and annual reviews. Each form includes a section for a caseworker to recommend whether the inmate should remain in his or her current status. Then the supervisor of classi cation reviews the recommendation and either approves or denies. This process is governed by the Department’s Adult O ender Classi cation Policy (the “Classi cation Policy”). Under that policy, classi cation decisions can be appealed through separate procedures based on whether the decision is intra-facility or interfacility. In general, ROCHs are completed more frequently after a change in an inmate’s status. For example, Crouch received a ROCH roughly once a week for the eight weeks following his transfer to administrative department-wide restrictive housing in August 2017. After that period, Crouch received only four ROCHs over the next two years. During his nearly four years in solitary con nement, Crouch received at least 35 ROCHs, most of which concerned changes in his classi cation or status. Crouch did not appeal any of these reports, 4 No. 21-2422 although before entering solitary con nement he was aware of the process to appeal a ROCH and he had previously done so. 3 B. The 30-Day Review The 30-day review is a written status report mandated by Indiana law. See IND. CODE § 11-10-1-7(b) (“The department shall review an o ender so segregated at least once every thirty (30) days to determine whether the reason for segregation still exists.”). In November 2017, Crouch began receiving these monthly reviews, which did not reference the appeal process. It was unclear whether such a review could be appealed. 4 Then in February 2019, the Department added language to each 30-day review explaining that process: “Placement on Department-Wide Administrative Status Housing may be appealed by submitting a Classi cation Appeal (SF 9260) within ten working days of admission to a DepartmentWide Restrictive Status Housing Unit or any subsequent Classi cation action (i.e. 30 Day or 90 Day reviews).” 5 Between November 2017 and May 2019, Crouch received at least twenty-one 30-day reviews. Crouch did not appeal any of these reviews, either before or after the addition of the new language. 3 Oral Argument at 4:59. 4 Oral Argument at 10:51. 5 In addition to the ROCH and the 30-day review, inmates also may raise concerns through an offender grievance process or a disciplinary appeal process. These processes are explained to inmates during orientation and copies of the Department’s polices are available at the facilities’ law libraries. No. 21-2422 5 II On March 22, 2020, Crouch sued Department employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things, violation of his Due Process rights because of his “prolonged placement in solitary con nement” which “did not receive meaningful review.” The defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing Crouch failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court granted the motion on exhaustion grounds, citing Crouch’s failure to appeal any of the ROCHs or 30-day reviews. The court dismissed the suit without prejudice, and Crouch appealed. Ordinarily, “a dismissal without prejudice is not a nal order for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2006)). If there is no nal order, we lack jurisdiction to resolve the case. But when “an amendment would be unavailing, then the case is dead in the district court and may proceed to the next tier.” Kaba, 458 F.3d at 680 (quoting Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003)). Here, the “dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust is e ectively a nal order because no amendment could resolve the problem.” Id. Crouch’s claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the deadline to exhaust has long since passed. See id. We may therefore consider the merits of Crouch’s appeal. A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Moss v. United Airlines, Inc., 20 F.4th 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2021); Curtis v. Timberlake, 436 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We review the application of [42 U.S.C.] § 1997e(a) de novo.”). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 6 No. 21-2422 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Crouch appeals only the dismissal of his claim that he endured prolonged solitary con nement because of a lack of meaningful review. So, we must determine whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A We begin by considering the relevant legal framework. The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before ling a federal claim about prison conditions. That Act states: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner con ned in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (citation omitted). “[F]ailure to exhaust is an a rmative defense that a defendant must establish by competent evidence.” Curtis, 436 F.3d at 711 (citations omitted). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006); see also Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (“In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must take all steps prescribed by the prison’s grievance system.”). Indeed, an inmate “must now exhaust No. 21-2422 7 administrative remedies even where the relief sought … cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85 (citation omitted). While an inmate must rst exhaust available remedies, they “need not exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). An “available” remedy is one that is “capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose” and “is accessible or may be obtained.” Id. (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737–38 (2001)). An administrative remedy is “unavailable” if it “operates as a simple dead end—with o cers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates,” when the “administrative scheme” is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,” or “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 643–44. Defendants bear the burden of proving “that an administrative remedy was available and that [the plainti ] failed to pursue it.” Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). For decades, this court “has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Within this legal framework, the parties cite various circuit precedents to support their arguments. First, in Dole, this court considered an inmate’s § 1983 claim, alleging “he was beaten by prison guards in retaliation for punching an assistant warden.” Id. at 805. As required by Illinois regulations, the inmate tried to le a grievance with the Administrative Review Board by giving prison authorities an addressed envelope to mail. Id. But by the time the inmate learned the Board had not received his grievance, it was already too late 8 No. 21-2422 to re- le. Id. The district court granted summary judgment for the prison guards, concluding the inmate failed to exhaust under § 1997e(a). Id. On appeal, this court held that “[b]ecause [the inmate] properly followed procedure and prison o cials were responsible for the mishandling of his grievance, it cannot be said that [he] failed to exhaust his remedies.” Id. at 811. Further, “[i]n this limited context, prison authorities may not employ their own mistake to shield them from possible liability.” Id. In other words, a prison o cial “may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement, … and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly led grievance or otherwise use a rmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Id. at 809 (citation omitted). An inmate therefore exhausts his administrative remedies if he takes “all steps necessary to exhaust one line of administrative review,” and does “not receive instructions on how to proceed once his attempts … [are] foiled.” Id. at 813. Second, in Kaba v. Stepp, the court considered an Illinois inmate’s claim that administrative remedies were unavailable because his case manager “denied him grievance forms, threatened him, and solicited other inmates to attack him in retaliation for ling grievances.” 458 F.3d at 679–80. The inmate also claimed that “other named o cials knew about and did nothing to stop [the case manager’s] activities until after [the inmate] was actually beaten in his cell.” Id. at 680. Once again, the district court granted summary judgment for the prison guards on exhaustion grounds. Id. On appeal, this court reversed the district court, holding that the prison o cials failed to meet “their burden of proving the availability of administrative remedies.” Id. at 686. The court noted that it was “unclear based on the evidence” whether the inmate No. 21-2422 9 could “avail himself” of the formal remedy process, even though the court did not doubt that such a process existed. Id. Finally, in Curtis v. Timberlake, this court considered a former pretrial detainee’s claim that he was assaulted by two guards at an Illinois jail. 436 F.3d at 710. The applicable remedial procedure required grievances be placed in a designated lockbox for collection by a social worker. Id. In practice, though, the social worker would also accept hand-delivered grievances. Id. at 711. The detainee used this informal procedure to submit his grievance by hand. Id. Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment for the prison o cials, holding the detainee failed to exhaust under § 1997e(a). Id. On appeal, this court vacated the district court’s decision, stating that it was a disputed issue of fact whether the prisoner submitted a grievance “in the place required” by the “administrative rules.” Id. at 711–12. The court then reiterated that administrative-exhaustion rules are not exclusively “those reduced to writing.” Id. at 712 (citing Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). These cases establish that a prisoner must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before ling a federal claim about prison conditions. The rules for administrative remedies may include both written policies and informal procedures. Importantly, though, prison o cials and sta may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement or make a remedy unavailable by failing to respond properly or through a rmative misconduct. B Under these authorities we conclude that Crouch failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Throughout his solitary 10 No. 21-2422 con nement, Crouch had at least 56 opportunities to appeal a report or review, but he never did. Crouch could have appealed any one of the 35 ROCHs he received. Before the district court, Crouch attested that he had in fact “appealed” a ROCH dated May 21, 2018. The district court rejected this argument, nding there was no “designated evidence … creat[ing] a genuine factual dispute to defeat summary judgment” because Crouch’s assertion was “vague and not speci c.” Even accepting Crouch’s testimony as true, the court found that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Crouch appealed the “ROCH by submitting the proper form to the proper o cial by the applicable deadline.” On appeal, Crouch cites no record evidence to rebut the district court’s conclusion. In fact, Crouch concedes he could have appealed any of the four ROCHs issued between October 2017 and September 2019. There is no evidence that Crouch appealed a ROCH through the available administrative process. Crouch also could have appealed one of the twenty-one 30-day reviews he received. At least six of these reviews contained new language explaining how inmates could appeal the reviews within 10 working days. Regardless, at any point Crouch could have attached relevant copies of his 30-day reviews to a ROCH to support his claims. This, too, is a su cient basis on which to determine that Crouch failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA. The added language is irrelevant, Crouch responds, because it was not accompanied by a change in the Department’s Classi cation Policy. That policy stated inmates could appeal classi cation “decisions,” but did not speci cally mention “reviews” or “recommendations” as part of the process. No. 21-2422 11 In other words, Crouch claims the additional language on the 30-day reviews was meaningless. According to Crouch, encouraging inmates to appeal their 30-day reviews without a policy change was “akin to a rmative misconduct.” Defendants argue Crouch forfeited this argument by failing to raise it before the district court. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (“A party generally forfeits issues and arguments raised for the rst time on appeal.”). We need not address the issue of forfeiture here, though, because Crouch’s argument is without merit. Crouch has provided no evidence of “a rmative misconduct” by prison o cials, and we nd no con ict between the Classi cation Policy and the appellate language added to the 30-day reviews. He has o ered no evidence of misrepresentation by prison sta or the Department refusing to consider appeals from 30-day reviews. * * * Crouch could have pursued administrative remedies by appealing a ROCH or a 30-day review, but he failed to do so. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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