Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., No. 21-1616 (7th Cir. 2022)
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Kaminski, a Polish-American woman in her fifties, worked for Elite, a temporary employment agency, for about two-and-a-half years. When assigned to a job, Kaminski traveled to and from the site on a bus equipped with security cameras. During her time at Elite, she never received a disciplinary infraction. Nor did anyone ever reprimand her for poor work or for any other reason. In 2019, Elite informed Kaminski that the warehouse where she was working no longer needed her help and discharged her. Kaminski says she called Elite’s human resources department to obtain the names of her former coworkers, but the office declined to supply the information.
Kaminski sued Elite for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint after screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) and two opportunities to amend. Kaminski failed to allege facts showing a connection between her membership in a protected class and Elite’s decision to terminate her, nor did Kaminski’s complaint identify any similarly situated employees who received more favorable treatment.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-1616 JOANNE KAMINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELITE STAFFING, INC., Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:20-cv-06652 — Franklin U. Valderrama, Judge. ____________________ SUBMITTED * NOVEMBER 8, 2021 — DECIDED JANUARY 19, 2022 ____________________ Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. *We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 2 No. 21-1616 SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Joanne Kaminski, a Polish-American woman in her fties, appeals the dismissal of her lawsuit against her former employer, Elite Sta ng, Inc., for unlawful discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The district court concluded that Kaminski failed to state a claim because she did not plead a plausible case of discrimination. Having taken our own fresh look at Kaminski’s complaint, we a rm the district court’s dismissal. In doing so, though, we sound a concern that the district court may have articulated a pleading standard beyond that imposed by Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court precedent. I Kaminski’s second amended complaint is far from clear, and our takeaways are limited. She seems to say that she worked for Elite Sta ng, a temporary employment agency, for about two-and-a-half years. When assigned to a job, Kaminski traveled to and from the site on a bus equipped with security cameras. During her time at Elite Sta ng, she never received a disciplinary infraction. Nor, she adds, did anyone ever reprimand her for poor work or for any other reason. In late 2019, Elite Sta ng informed Kaminski that the warehouse where she was working no longer needed her help. As a result, and based on its policy of terminating any employee discharged by a host company, Elite Sta ng let her go. At some point following the termination, Kaminski says she called Elite Sta ng’s human resources department to obtain the names of her former coworkers, but the o ce declined to supply the information. No. 21-1616 3 Kaminski responded by suing Elite Sta ng for discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. After screening her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and extending two opportunities to amend, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Relying on summary judgment case law, including our decision in Barricks v. Eli Lilly & Co., 481 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2007), the district court determined that Kaminski failed to plead facts supporting a prima facie case of discrimination under either statute. Kaminski’s complaint fell short, the district court explained, because she failed to allege facts showing a connection between her membership in a protected class and Elite Sta ng’s decision to terminate her. Nor, the district court observed, did Kaminski’s complaint identify any similarly situated employees who received more favorable treatment. Kaminski now appeals. II Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled “General Rules of Pleading,” outlines what a federal complaint must contain to state a claim for relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, the pleading must contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Interpreting this requirement, the Supreme Court has explained that a complaint must “contain su cient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To be sure, 4 No. 21-1616 although a plainti “need not plead detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, she still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered adequate.” Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In the employment discrimination context, we have said these requirements mean a plainti must advance plausible allegations that she experienced discrimination because of her protected characteristics. See Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.4th 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2021). Recognizing that Kaminski represents herself, and therefore construing her complaint liberally, we cannot conclude that her second amended complaint met these standards. At a high level of generality, all agree Kaminski alleges she lost her job because of her age, race, and national origin. But Rule 8 requires more. Beyond saying Elite Sta ng wrongfully discharged her, Kaminski includes no factual allegations directly or indirectly connecting the termination with her national origin, age, or race. It is not enough for the complaint to observe only that federal law prohibits adverse employment actions on those grounds. There must be some facts that make the wrongful discharge contention plausible. See Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 933 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a plainti asserting a discrimination claim “cannot rely on … generalized allegations alone, however, but must combine them with facts particular to his case to survive a motion to dismiss”). The bulk of Kaminski’s allegations focus on bus security cameras and phone calls to Elite Sta ng’s human resources department—events unrelated to her termination. The one No. 21-1616 5 detail Kaminski does allege about her discharge is that Elite Sta ng red her pursuant to a company policy. But her complaint says no more—nothing allowing us to see a link between any aspect of that policy and her contention that the agency discharged her because she is Polish, white, or over 50. Right to it, Kaminski’s complaint allows no inference that Elite Sta ng engaged in discrimination. While we have no di culty reaching this conclusion, we need to sound a soft note of concern about the approach the district court seems to have taken in dismissing Kaminski’s second amended complaint. The district court enumerated the elements of both a Title VII claim of race discrimination and an ADEA claim of age discrimination by drawing on our opinion in Barricks. But Barricks addressed whether a plainti had presented enough evidence to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and avoid summary judgment. Put di erently, Barricks was not about the su ciency of a pleading but rather about evidentiary su ciency—and, even more speci cally, whether the plainti had established a prima facie case of discrimination—under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The distinction matters. Satisfying Rule 8 and the accompanying standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal does not require a plainti to plead a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Graham, 8 F.4th at 627 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). Put more plainly, a plainti need not allege facts aligning with her claim’s every element, which she will have to prove for her claim to survive summary judgment. She certainly does not need to identify—as the district court seems to have suggested—a similarly situated employee who 6 No. 21-1616 managed to avoid termination. See Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 830 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that, although plainti s at summary judgment may need to point to similarly situated comparators, plainti s need not identify comparators in pleadings and often need discovery to identify them). To survive screening or a motion to dismiss, a plainti need only allege enough facts to allow for a plausible inference that the adverse action su ered was connected to her protected characteristics. See Graham, 8 F.4th at 627; see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (interpreting Twombly and explaining that, in the employment discrimination context, avoiding dismissal requires a plainti to “describe the claim in su cient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and to allege a right to relief above “a speculative level” (cleaned up)). Kaminski’s second amended complaint did not meet that standard. * * * The explanation for what transpired here is obvious. Joanne Kaminski is not trained as a lawyer and, perhaps because of resource limitations, was left to litigate this case on her own. All too often that challenge proves too di cult. And all we can do is remind litigants, including those who nd themselves having to proceed pro se, that it is not enough for a complaint to allege labels and conclusions without providing facts—some short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that conveys “a story that holds together.” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 826–27 (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404– 05 (7th Cir. 2010)). A litigant’s best shot at stating a plausible employment discrimination claim is to explain, in a few No. 21-1616 7 sentences, how she was aggrieved and what facts or circumstances lead her to believe her treatment was because of her membership in a protected class. It is the because of allegation that was missing here for Kaminski, so we are left to AFFIRM.
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