Conley v. United States, No. 20-2439 (7th Cir. 2021)

Annotate this Case

Flowers was tipped off about q supposed stash house by a man claiming to be a disgruntled drug cartel courier. Flowers's brother and others recruited Conley to help rob that stash house. The supposed courier was an undercover ATF agent. There was no stash house or real drugs, just a convincing ruse designed to ensnare Flowers and his crew. The FBI had originally focused on Flowers through an investigation into a Chicago street gang. Flowers’s group, including Conley, met to plan the robbery. Conley agreed to participate and volunteered for a frontline role. Once the participants were in a van to go to the stash house, the undercover agent gave the arrest signal. Conley was convicted of conspiring and attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).

Conley invoked 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his convictions, arguing that they were obtained unlawfully through racially selective law enforcement and outrageous government conduct, in violation of his Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. Although the district court required “clear and convincing” evidence for Conley’s selective enforcement claim, his evidence cannot meet even the less‐demanding standard of preponderance of the evidence. The Seventh Circuit does not recognize a defense for “outrageous government conduct,” and even if it did, ATF’s conduct in Conley’s case would not satisfy the standard other circuits have applied.

Download PDF

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 20 2439 TRACY CONLEY, Petitioner Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:18 cv 07122 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED MAY 26, 2021 — DECIDED JULY 21, 2021 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Tracy Conley has invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate convictions arising from his participa tion in a “fake stash house” sting orchestrated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Conley asserts that his convictions were obtained unlawfully through racially selective law enforcement and outrageous govern ment conduct, in violation of his Fifth Amendment equal 2 No. 20 2439 protection and due process rights, respectively. The district court denied Conley’s motion, and we a rm. We disagree with the district court’s decision to require “clear and con vincing” evidence for Conley’s selective enforcement claim, but his evidence cannot meet even the less demanding stand ard of preponderance of the evidence. This circuit has not rec ognized a defense for “outrageous government conduct,” and even if we did, ATF’s conduct in Conley’s case would not sat isfy the standard other circuits have applied. Regardless of the wisdom of this fake stash house sting, it did not violate Con ley’s constitutional rights. I. Background Our opinion a rming Conley’s convictions on direct ap peal sets out the facts of his case. United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017). Here we focus on the facts relevant to his selective enforcement and outrageous conduct theories. On November 1, 2011, Conley found himself stranded at a gas station without money for gas. There he ran into three ac quaintances—Anthony Adams, David Flowers, and Anwar Trapp—who successfully recruited Conley to help rob a co caine stash house later that day. Adams, David, and Trapp had themselves been recruited recently for the robbery by Da vid’s brother, Myreon Flowers. Myreon had been tipped o a week earlier about the sup posed stash house by a man claiming to be a disgruntled cou rier for a drug cartel. The courier told Myreon that the stash house contained fifty kilograms of cocaine, and that to steal it, Myreon should assemble an armed team to overpower the cartel guards. Myreon jumped at the opportunity, bragging about how easy the robbery would be compared to others he had pulled o . Myreon quickly assembled a crew, recruiting No. 20 2439 3 his brother David Flowers and their cousins Anwar Trapp and Dwayne Jones. David also recruited Anthony Adams, who in turn suggested recruiting Conley. The supposed cartel courier was an undercover ATF agent. There was no stash house or real drugs, just a convincing ruse designed to ensnare Myreon and his crew in a conspiracy to steal fifty kilograms of cocaine at gunpoint. It turns out the FBI had originally focused on Myreon through an investiga tion into the Belizean Bloods, a Chicago street gang. Confi dential sources had told the FBI that Myreon was an active member of a Belizean Bloods armed robbery crew, as well as a murder suspect. Based on that information, the FBI had re ferred Myreon to the ATF as a potential target for a stash house sting, and the ATF obliged. On November 1, Myreon’s group, including Conley, met in Adams’s basement to plan the robbery. Conley not only agreed to participate but volunteered for a frontline role as one of two armed robbers who would confront the guards and steal the cocaine. Conley even asked the group whether they should kill the cartel courier (i.e., the undercover agent) but fortunately was told not to harm him. Later that day, the group met the undercover agent at a secluded parking lot near the supposed stash house. Conley and the others were dressed in dark clothing, wearing latex gloves, and equipped with walkie talkies and a toolbox containing three guns for the robbery. Myreon told Conley, Adams, and another mem ber to get into a van that would take them to the stash house for the robbery. As soon as they were all in the van, the un dercover agent gave the arrest signal. 4 No. 20 2439 A jury convicted Conley of conspiring and attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; pos sessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug tra cking o ense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Conley to fifteen years in prison, which included a ten year mandatory minimum based on the large amount of non existent drugs he agreed to steal—an amount the ATF made up just to trigger that ten year mini mum. On direct appeal, we a rmed the denial of Conley’s mo tion for acquittal. United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017). We found that su cient evidence supported his con victions, id. at 397–402, and that he could not argue entrap ment because the ATF recruited neither Conley nor those who recruited him. Id. at 402. Conley then filed his § 2255 motion in the district court seeking to set aside his convictions on two new grounds. First, he asserts that federal agents intentionally targeted him for the sting because he is Black, in violation of the equal protec tion component of the Fifth Amendment. Second, Conley as serts that even though he cannot show entrapment, the ATF’s conduct in executing this fake stash house sting was so outra geous that prosecuting him violated his due process rights. The district court denied Conley’s § 2255 motion but granted a certificate of appealability on both claims. Conley v. United States, No. 18 C 7122, 2020 WL 4226676, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2020). Judge Coleman denied Conley’s selective enforcement claim by relying exclusively on then Chief Judge Castillo’s No. 20 2439 5 denial of a nearly identical claim brought by fake stash house defendants in United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018). See Conley, 2020 WL 4226676, at *4–6. Judge Cole man certified the issue for appeal, however, “based on the un certainty of the applicable evidentiary standard” governing a selective enforcement claim in this circuit. Id. at *6. As for out rageous government conduct, Judge Coleman denied Con ley’s claim because this circuit has repeatedly rejected the ex istence of such a defense. Id. at *3–4. Again, however, Judge Coleman certified Conley’s appeal on this issue: “If there ever was a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents was so outrageous that a criminal defendant’s due pro cess rights have been violated, this is it.” Id. at *4. While this appeal was pending, Judge Coleman granted Conley’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Conley’s release from prison does not re move our jurisdiction over his § 2255 motion or render it moot. A movant under § 2255 must be “in custody.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). But Conley “was in custody when he filed [his] mo tion” for § 2255 relief, “and that is all that is required….” Torzala v. United States, 545 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2008), citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Moreover, despite his release from prison, Conley is still subject to a three year term of supervised release, which is “a form of custody,” Clarke v. United States, 703 F.3d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 2013), and carries collateral consequences su cient to prevent his motion from being moot. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (“An incarcerated con vict’s (or a parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case or controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction 6 No. 20 2439 and redressable by invalidation of the conviction.”) (empha ses added). II. Controversy Surrounding Fake Stash House Stings Before turning to the merits, we provide some background on the ATF’s controversial and now abandoned practice of conducting fake stash house stings in Chicago. As we noted in Conley’s direct appeal, there is a “substantial body of criti cism of similar stash house cases both from this circuit and others.” Conley, 875 F.3d at 402. We have described the tactic as “‘tawdry,’ noting in particular how these operations are ‘directed at unsophisticated, and perhaps desperate defend ants’ like Conley who easily take the all too tempting bait put out for them by the government.” Id. at 402–03, quoting United States v. Lewis, 641 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2011). These stings are troubling in several ways. First, the agents in these stings blindly encourage the initial target to rope in a large group of co conspirators who otherwise may have stayed out of trouble. See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 225 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J., dissenting) (defendant “was not even the intended target of this operation. Despite his criminal past, [he] was not necessarily destined to commit fu ture crimes…. ‘we don t want the government pushing [crim inals] back into a life of crime.’”), quoting United States v. Kin dle, 698 F.3d 401, 415–16 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting), on reh’g en banc sub nom. United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014). Second, the vast majority of defendants caught in these stings have been poor people of color. See Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 986 (“These sting operations have used tremendous public resources to investigate and prosecute a large number No. 20 2439 7 of principally minority individuals for fictitious crimes.”); see also United States v. Black, 750 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“In this era of mass incarceration, in which we already lock up more of our population than any other nation on Earth, it is especially curious that the government feels compelled to invent fake crimes and imprison people for long periods of time for agreeing to participate in them….”). Third, these stings give law enforcement free rein to ma nipulate sentences by setting imaginary drug amounts. See United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729–30 (9th Cir. 2010) (criticizing ability to manipulate sentences with fake drug amounts). Fourth, economic analysis suggests that fake stash house stings may actually facilitate the illegal drug trade. They make real stash houses more secure by deterring potential robbers. See Kindle, 698 F.3d at 416 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The oper ators of stash houses would pay law enforcement to sting po tential stash house robbers.”). These problems have led jurists to question whether fake stash house stings comport with “the pride we take in presenting American criminal justice as a system that treats defendants fairly and equally.” United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x. 492, 511 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stranch, J., concurring). Amid this controversy, many defendants in Chicago have challenged the ATF’s fake stash house stings as racially selec tive. Sitting en banc in 2015, we laid out principles for grant ing discovery in these cases. United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 719–23 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Various stash house cases then progressed on di erent timelines. In December 2017, the matter culminated in a unique two day evidentiary hearing 8 No. 20 2439 in the Northern District of Illinois before nine district judges presiding over twelve similar stash house cases. Statistical ex perts testified to whether the ATF’s fake stash house program was racially discriminatory. See Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 993. Following that hearing, Judge Castillo issued a careful opinion denying defendants’ selective enforcement claims due to flaws and limits in the statistical analysis performed by the court’s appointed expert, Columbia University Law Pro fessor Je rey Fagan. Id. at 1001–13. The opinion criticized the ATF’s fake stash house stings as a matter of policy, id. at 984– 85, and it took pains to clarify that the court was not deciding whether these stings “are honorable or fair,” but only “whether law enforcement agents violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in pursuing these investiga tions.” Id. at 986. This history forms the backdrop of Conley’s appeal. In particular, Judge Castillo’s analysis in Brown is critical here because Conley relies on the statistics in the Fagan Report to prove his selective enforcement claim. We now turn to the merits of that claim. III. Selective Enforcement Conley asserts that the ATF targeted him for the sting be cause he is Black. Conley did not raise this selective enforce ment claim until his § 2255 motion. But we may consider it because, as the district court noted, the government chose not to raise procedural default as a defense to this claim. See Per rone v. United States, 889 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Proce dural default is a waivable defense.”). Because Conley himself was not the initial target of the sting, his theory is that the ATF first targeted Myreon Flowers No. 20 2439 9 because of his race, with further hopes that Myreon would re cruit other Black people like Conley as co conspirators. If proven, that would amount to purposeful discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection compo nent. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.... [T]he constitu tional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory ap plication of laws is the Equal Protection Clause.”); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).1 Racially selective law enforcement is a quintessential equal protection violation. One of the Supreme Court’s earli est equal protection opinions granted habeas corpus relief to petitioners who alleged selective enforcement of building codes against Chinese owned laundries in San Francisco. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Yick Wo petitioners showed that authorities had denied the applications of two hundred Chinese people for permits to operate laundries in wooden buildings but granted the applications of eighty non Chinese people “under similar conditions.” Id. at 374. The Court made clear that, in such a situation, law enforcement can be “directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons … with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protec tion of the laws which is secured to the petitioners … by the broad and benign provisions of the fourteenth 1 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States, but it has been “reverse incorporated” to apply to the federal government as a component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Pro cess Clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954) (racially segre gated public schools in District of Columbia violated Fifth Amendment). 10 No. 20 2439 amendment….” Id. at 373. Today, Yick Wo is seen as providing historical roots not only for selective enforcement claims but also for selective prosecution claims. See United States v. Arm strong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–66 (1996) (discussing Yick Wo as one source of selective prosecution claims). Selective prosecution occurs when, from among the pool of people referred by police, a prosecutor pursues similar cases di erently based on race. Selective enforcement occurs when police investigate people of one race but not similarly situated people of a di erent race. Hence, with selective en forcement, “the constitutional problem … precede[s] the prosecutor’s role.” Davis, 793 F.3d at 720. It does not matter if prosecutors then pursue each case equally because the pool of defendants itself was racially selected. Id. As equal protection claims, both selective prosecution and selective enforcement require proof “that the defendants’ ac tions had a discriminatory e ect and were motivated by a dis criminatory purpose.” Chavez, 251 F.3d at 635–36, citing Per sonnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272–74 (1979), Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239– 42 (1976). A plainti must show discriminatory purpose “in his case.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). And dis criminatory purpose “implies more than … awareness of con sequences. It implies that the decisionmaker … selected or re a rmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse e ects upon an identi fiable group.” Id. at 298, quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. No. 20 2439 11 A. Standard of Proof The first issue we confront is the standard of proof Conley must meet to prove his selective enforcement claim. The dis trict court granted a certificate of appealability on this claim “because reasonable jurists could debate that his claim should have been resolved in a di erent manner based on the uncer tainty of the applicable evidentiary standard.” Conley, 2020 WL 4226676, at *6. We review this legal issue de novo. Martin v. United States, 789 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2015). The govern ment argues that Conley must meet the same “clear evidence” standard that governs selective prosecution claims. See Arm strong, 517 U.S. at 465 (“In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present ‘clear evidence to the contrary.’”), quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926). Conley counters that the reasons for Armstrong’s clear evidence standard are specific to prosecutors, so that selec tive enforcement claims against police need be proven by only a preponderance of the evidence. The district court agreed with the government’s view, as did Judge Castillo in Brown. We disagree, however, and hold that racially selective enforcement claims must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, in Part III A 1, we explain Armstrong’s clear evidence standard and why its ra tionale does not extend to selective enforcement claims. In Part III A 2, we explain why McCleskey v. Kemp does not re quire a heightened standard of proof. Finally, in Part III A 3, we draw connections to other doctrines showing that a pre ponderance standard fits better into the broader legal land scape. 12 No. 20 2439 1. Armstrong Does Not Set the Standard of Proof a. Armstrong’s Clear Evidence Standard Equal protection claims generally must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Radentz v. Marion County, 640 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding in § 1983 equal pro tection case that “plainti s first must demonstrate by a pre ponderance of the evidence that they were the victims of in tentional discrimination”), citing Williams v. Seni , 342 F.3d 774, 788 n.13 (7th Cir. 2003) (“the same standards for proving intentional discrimination apply to Title VII and § 1983 equal protection”); see also Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (using “more probable than not” standard for equal protection redistricting claim); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225 (1985) (citing with ap proval circuit court’s statement that “plainti s must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor”). Selective prosecution claims, however, must be proven by “clear evidence.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465. In Armstrong, the Supreme Court reversed a grant of discovery in a selective prosecution case despite evidence that “every defendant in every crack cocaine prosecution filed by a particular United States Attorney’s o ce and assigned to the public defender was black.” Davis, 793 F.3d at 719. The Supreme Court held that, because a “selective prosecution claim asks a court to ex ercise judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the Execu tive,” the plainti s needed further evidence showing that comparators of another race were not prosecuted before a court could even order discovery against the prosecutor’s of fice. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464, 468. No. 20 2439 13 The Court derived that discovery requirement from a heightened “clear evidence” standard governing the merits of a selective prosecution claim. Id. at 468 (“The justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective prose cution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous stand ard for discovery in aid of such a claim.”). Armstrong’s “clear evidence” standard is based in turn on the need to preserve prosecutorial discretion and on the “presumption of regular ity” that applies to federal prosecutors as o cers of the Exec utive Branch: The Attorney General and United States Attor neys retain “‘broad discretion’” to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n. 11 (1982)). They have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe cuted.” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547. As a result, “[t]he presumption of regularity supports” their prosecutorial deci sions and, “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their o cial duties.” United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)…. * * * In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present “clear 14 No. 20 2439 evidence to the contrary.” Chemical Foundation, supra, at 14–15. 517 U.S. at 464–65. b. Armstrong’s Rationale Does Not Extend to Selective Enforcement The reasons underlying Armstrong’s clear evidence stand ard for selective prosecution claims simply do not extend to selective enforcement claims brought against police. As the above passage shows, Armstrong’s “clear evidence” standard invokes language from Chemical Foundation, a bedrock pre sumption of regularity case. The presumption of regularity is a deference doctrine that limits judicial scrutiny of procedures and motivations supporting certain Executive Branch deci sions. The presumption is driven by separation of powers concerns, which increase as courts venture closer to core ex ecutive activity. The presumption has been applied to di er ent degrees depending on “the Court’s assessment of the rel evant decisionmaking scheme across several dimensions: pro cedural fairness, accountability, and degree of discretion, as well as complexity….” Note, The Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of the Executive Branch, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2431, 2432–33 (2018). The presumption of regularity is an analytic tool, not an excuse to rubberstamp any and all executive ac tion as lawful absent clear evidence to the contrary. In Armstrong, the court applied the presumption to prose cutorial decision making. And in Reno v. American Arab Anti Discrimination Committee, the Court extended that logic to fed eral deportation decisions, which, like prosecutorial deci sions, implicate core executive strategy that courts should not over scrutinize. 525 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999). The Court has not No. 20 2439 15 extended the presumption of regularity, however, to street level police investigations. Few police o cers are high level executive o cers. And while their decisions certainly reflect law enforcement priorities, judicial inquiry into their motives is routine. We therefore see no persuasive reason to extend Armstrong’s heightened standard to selective enforcement claims. Our en banc opinion in Davis took this limited approach to Armstrong. Like this case, Davis arose in the context of a fake stash house sting. But the issue there concerned Armstrong’s discovery standard. The district court had granted broad dis covery against the prosecutor’s o ce, ATF, FBI, and others based on the fact that the prosecution had “brought at least twenty purported phony stash house cases, with the over whelming majority of the defendants named being individu als of color.” Davis, 793 F.3d at 719. The government argued that, under Armstrong, that was an insu cient showing of ra cial discrimination to authorize discovery. We agreed with respect to discovery from the prosecutor’s o ce, but we disagreed with respect to discovery from the ATF and FBI for selective enforcement because “the sort of considerations that led to the outcome in Armstrong do not apply to a contention that agents of the FBI or ATF engaged in racial discrimination when selecting targets for sting oper ations, or when deciding which suspects to refer for prosecu tion.” Id. at 721. “Armstrong was about prosecutorial discre tion,” and unlike prosecutors, “Agents of the ATF and FBI are not protected by a powerful privilege or covered by a pre sumption of constitutional behavior.” Id. at 720. On the con trary, police o cers are regularly called before courts to jus tify their tactics. Id. at 720–21. Accordingly, Davis found that 16 No. 20 2439 Armstrong’s requirement to show comparators before grant ing discovery did not apply to the plainti s’ selective enforce ment claims. The government in this appeal asks us not to extend Da vis’s reasoning when it comes to the standard of proof. But given that Armstrong imposed its “rigorous standard for dis covery” only to match the correspondingly “rigorous stand ard for the elements of a selective prosecution claim,” 517 U.S. at 468, the distinction we drew in Davis for discovery natu rally extends to the standard of proof. Indeed, we recognized in Chavez that Armstrong does not govern at least one aspect of proving discriminatory e ect in a selective enforcement case. There, we a rmed summary judgment on a selective enforcement claim on the merits without suggesting a stand ard of proof higher than preponderance applied. Rather, we rejected plainti s’ need to satisfy Armstrong’s burden to iden tify comparators to prove discriminatory e ect on the merits. We did so for the same reasons we rejected the need for com parators at the discovery stage in Davis: “[T]he instant case involves police conduct, not prosecutorial discretion, and is in a civil, not criminal, context. This case is thus not like Arm strong.” Chavez, 251 F.3d at 640. 2. McCleskey Did Not Set the Standard of Proof The government argues that McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), provides an independent ground for applying a clear evidence standard, one that relies on a distinction be tween criminal and civil cases rather than a comparison be tween police and prosecutors. This argument comes from a sweeping line of dicta in McCleskey: “Because discretion is es sential to the criminal justice process, we would demand ex ceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion No. 20 2439 17 has been abused.” 481 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). The gov ernment seems to argue that this language in McCleskey im poses a clear and convincing evidence standard on any claim that “challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system.” Id. It appears the district court agreed with this broad reading of McCleskey. Judge Coleman denied Conley’s selective en forcement claim based on Judge Castillo’s reasoning in Brown. And in Brown, Judge Castillo wrote that McCleskey “unfortu nately” required him to extend Armstrong’s clear evidence standard to selective enforcement claims. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 996 & n.14. But McCleskey did not hold broadly that any constitutional claim challenging core criminal justice activity is subject to a heightened standard of proof. This is immedi ately apparent once one recognizes the many claims and de fenses raised by accused defendants that are governed by a preponderance standard even though they challenge activity at the heart of the criminal process. For instance, Batson claims for racially motivated peremp tory challenges by prosecutors can be proven by a preponder ance of the evidence. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (at final step of Batson inquiry, judge must decide “whether it was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated”). Likewise, when seeking to suppress evidence (a remedy that often leads to dismissal), accused de fendants need prove by only a preponderance of evidence that police abused their investigative discretion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978) (if “perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and … the a davit’s remaining content is insu cient to establish 18 No. 20 2439 probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded….”). See also Part III A 3 c, be low, noting other a rmative criminal defenses provable by a preponderance of evidence. Accordingly, rather than reading this passage in McCles key as announcing a broad new standard that would have im plicitly unsettled many doctrines, we understand McCleskey’s call for “exceptionally clear proof” as part of the Court’s crit icism of the petitioner’s insu cient statistics in that case. McCleskey asked the Court to infer intentional racial discrim ination in his specific case from a broad statistical study show ing that Georgia juries more readily imposed the death pen alty on Black defendants. The Court thus noted that “McCles key’s statistical pro er must be viewed in the context of his challenge. McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system” that “necessarily require[] dis cretionary judgments.” 481 U.S. at 297. Given that discretion, if McCleskey wished to rely solely on statewide statistics, they would need to be “exceptionally clear” to infer that his spe cific jury sentenced him to death because he was Black and not because of the “legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision”—that he committed a death eligible murder. Id. In other words, McCleskey clarified that, even under a pre ponderance standard, if “a legitimate and unchallenged ex planation … is apparent from the record,” it takes “exception ally clear proof” in the other direction to push the case across the fifty yard line. Id. McCleskey does not independently re quire a heightened standard of proof here simply because Conley challenges decisions made in the criminal justice sys tem. No. 20 2439 19 3. Support from Related Areas of Law Situating this issue within the larger fabric of the law fur ther confirms that a preponderance standard should govern Conley’s selective enforcement claim. Specifically, the Su preme Court’s distinction between absolute prosecutorial im munity and qualified immunity, its aversion to clear evidence standards in civil cases, and its use of preponderance stand ards for other criminal defenses all bolster the case for apply ing a preponderance standard here. a. Civil Immunity for Prosecutors and Police To begin, the same reasons for treating selective enforce ment di erently than selective prosecution also justify the dif ferent levels of immunity that apply to prosecutors and police in § 1983 and Bivens actions. Unlike police, prosecutors enjoy absolute civil immunity from damages for unconstitutional actions taken in their prosecutorial role. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). The primary justification for prosecu torial immunity is that it preserves core executive discretion, just as in Armstrong: “A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecu tor’s o ce would su er if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own po tential liability in a suit for damages.” Id. at 424–25. On the other hand, when prosecutors conduct police like activity outside their prosecutorial role, the rationale for absolute im munity vanishes and they enjoy only qualified immunity, just like police o cers. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (“When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police o cer, it is ‘nei ther appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, 20 No. 20 2439 immunity should protect the one and not the other.’”), quot ing Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973). This reasoning is consistent with our view that Arm strong’s clear evidence standard similarly should not extend to selective enforcement claims, which challenge police inves tigations, not prosecutorial decisions. An accused defendant who secures release due to racially selective prosecution can not then seek damages from the prosecutor. But a defendant who proves selective enforcement can sue the police. And in such a case, qualified immunity would likely not protect the police because the plainti has already proven racial animus. See Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 490 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Any rea sonable o cial … would have known that intentional racial discrimination … was unconstitutional.”). Since prosecutorial immunity and Armstrong both turn on similar, prosecutor specific reasons, the stark gap in civil relief available in selec tive prosecution cases versus selective enforcement cases supports a similar gap in the standards for proving such claims in the criminal context. b. Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Disfa vored in Civil Cases Habeas corpus cases like this are civil cases. See, e.g., Ban ister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1705 (2020) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally govern habeas proceedings.”), citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(4); Browder v. Director, Dep t of Corr. of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 270 (1978) (analogizing habeas proceedings to “other civil proceedings”). And in civil cases, the Supreme Court has developed a presumption in favor of preserving preponderance standards in the face of attempts to impose “clear and convincing evidence” standards. See Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2016) No. 20 2439 21 (describing “‘the presumption that the burden of proof in fed eral civil cases is proof by a preponderance of the evidence,’ … a presumption reinforced by the Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of more demanding evidentiary burdens in the civil setting”), quoting Yi v. Sterling Collision Centers, Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2007). In rejecting a “clear and convincing” standard under Title VII, the Supreme Court has stressed that one of the “[c]onventional rules of civil litigation … is that parties … need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989). Due to this presumption, the “imposition of even severe civil sanctions … has been permitted after proof by a prepon derance of the evidence.” Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389–90 (1983) (rejecting clear and convincing standard for securities fraud); accord, Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (same for en hanced patent damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557–58 (2014) (same for patent fee shifting under 35 U.S.C. § 285); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (same for bankruptcy dis charges); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48–49 (1914) (pre ponderance standard su ces in civil suits for acts exposing party to criminal prosecution); Ramirez, 845 F.3d at 776–80 (conduct supporting dismissal of civil case as sanction need be proven by only a preponderance of evidence). “Exceptions to this standard are uncommon, and in fact are ordinarily recognized only when the government seeks to take unusual coercive action … against an individual.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 253, citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence needed to 22 No. 20 2439 terminate parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (same for involuntary commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (same for deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122, 125 (1943) (same for denatu ralization). Here we have the opposite situation. The government seeks a clear evidence standard to protect its interest in con tinuing severe coercive action (imprisonment) against an in dividual. Viewed through that lens, granting a writ of habeas corpus that tells a federal o cial to refrain from unconstitu tionally imprisoning someone is not the sort of relief calling for a heightened standard of proof for the benefit of the gov ernment. If anything, the Court’s pattern of departing from the preponderance presumption only to protect individuals from serious government action points in the opposite direc tion.2 The purpose of selecting a standard of proof is “to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the rela tive importance attached to the ultimate decision.” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389, quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. Applying a clear evidence standard here would inappropri ately “express[] a preference for one side’s interests” in a case where equally powerful considerations weigh on both sides. Id. at 390. For the government, concerns about finality and separation of powers caution against disturbing a federal con viction obtained after a full trial in the district court, on an 2 We address here the standard of proof in first federal motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not the deferential standard of review that usually ap plies when federal courts review state convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, nor the standard for successive § 2255 petitions under § 2255(h). No. 20 2439 23 indictment brought by executive law enforcement agencies. But for the accused defendant, the preservation of individual constitutional rights weighs equally in favor of substantial post conviction review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has agreed at least in one context that a petitioner’s claim for ha beas relief from a federal conviction can be proven by a pre ponderance of the evidence. See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941) (petitioner alleging deprivation of constitu tional right to counsel “would have the burden of sustaining his allegations by a preponderance of evidence”). Absent the additional prosecutorial concerns that motivated Armstrong’s heightened standard, there is a “balance of interests” here that “warrants use of the preponderance standard … generally ap plicable in civil actions.” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390.3 c. Preponderance Standards Govern Other A rmative Criminal Defenses Even in criminal cases, many a rmative defenses are provable by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 17 (2006) (duress defense); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355–56 (1996) (government cannot prosecute if defendant shows he is “more likely than not” in competent). Even the way the entrapment defense operates in fake stash house cases like this one shows defendants need 3 Even if we thought that habeas corpus relief might call for a higher standard of proof than a run of the mill § 1983 claim for civil damages, that approach would produce an awkward tension under Heck v. Humph rey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, a higher standard of proof in criminal appeals and habeas corpus cases would in practice mean a higher stand ard for ordinary civil relief too because convicted defendants must have their convictions invalidated before they can bring selective enforcement claims for damages. See id. at 486–87. 24 No. 20 2439 not present “clear” evidence to prove their defenses. Rather, so long as the defendant puts forth enough evidence to show that a reasonable jury could find he was entrapped, the judge must submit the defense to the jury with an instruction that, to convict, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992); United States v. Pillado, 656 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2011). So, given that accused defendants can secure release through other a rmative defenses that use prepon derance standards (or standards even more favorable to de fendants), there should be no concern about applying a pre ponderance standard to Conley’s selective enforcement de fense. For these reasons, we hold that Conley could prove his selective enforcement claim by a preponderance of the evi dence.4 4 We have considered whether applying a preponderance standard creates a circuit split requiring circulation under Circuit Rule 40(e), but conclude it does not. To be sure, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Cir cuits have cited Armstrong’s clear evidence standard when assessing se lective enforcement claims. See Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 521 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Mason, 774 F.3d 824, 829–30 (4th Cir. 2014); Gar denhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Her nandez Chaparro, 357 F. App’x 165, 166 (10th Cir. 2009). These cases, how ever, invoked Armstrong in passing without specifically rejecting a pre ponderance standard. Moreover, the rule in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits remains unclear because other cases there have applied a preponderance standard. See United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 355 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[A] defendant would have to demonstrate by a ‘preponderance of the evi dence’ that a police officer decided to approach [or pursue] him or her solely because of his or her race.”), quoting United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995); York v. Sec y of Treasury, 774 F.2d 417, 422 (10th Cir. 1985); Barton v. Malley, 626 F.2d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1980). Regardless, we also view our decision here as simply reaffirming the logic of Davis, where No. 20 2439 25 B. Application In granting a certificate of appealability on Conley’s selec tive enforcement claim, the district court wrote that his claim may have “been resolved in a di erent manner” under a pre ponderance standard. See Conley, 2020 WL 4226676, at *6. We respectfully disagree, however, and find it unnecessary to re mand for new analysis under the preponderance standard. The parties have briefed the issue, and Conley’s key evi dence—the Fagan Report—has already been thoroughly dis sected in Brown. It is clear on this record that particular as pects of Conley’s individual case prevent him from relying on the Fagan Report to prove, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that the ATF targeted him based on race.5 As a general matter, statistics can be “a useful tool” that can establish discriminatory e ect and provide powerful evi dence of discriminatory intent if race can be isolated from other confounding variables. E.g., United States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002). While few judges are statisti cians, we are tasked with determining whether discrimina tion was afoot, and statistics can be important in that determi nation. Judges must therefore pay close attention to what par ties’ statistics can and cannot prove. When program wide sta tistics are the plainti ’s sole source of evidence, it can be we have already held en banc that Armstrong does not apply in the selec tive enforcement context. See 793 F.3d at 720–22. 5 Beyond the Fagan Report, Conley’s only other evidence of discrimi nation is comments made by two ATF agents who were not involved in Conley’s sting. These comments made by other agents in other stings are of little relevance here. They were thoroughly analyzed in Brown and found to be insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. See 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1014–18. We agree with Brown’s analysis of these comments. 26 No. 20 2439 di cult to infer discrimination in a particular case—espe cially where there is another legitimate explanation for the government’s conduct. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n.12 (only in “rare cases [has] a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact demonstrated a constitutional violation”). Still, we must be willing to follow statistics where they fairly lead without fear that they could require “too much justice.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Conley’s statistics cannot pass muster, even under a pre ponderance standard. In 2014, Professor Fagan was ap pointed by the court in Brown to conduct a statistical analysis of whether the federal government’s fake stash house pro gram in Chicago was racially selective. 299 F. Supp. 3d at 992. In 2016, Professor Fagan issued a comprehensive report ex plaining his findings. The Fagan Report concluded that, even “after controlling for criminal propensity, race remains statis tically significant, meaning that the ATF is selecting defend ants on the basis of race.” Id. at 1003. Judge Castillo, however, found that there were “fundamental concerns about the relia bility of Professor Fagan s findings” that prevented a showing of discriminatory e ect or intent. Id. at 1013. At least with respect to Conley’s case, we agree. No Chi cago stash house case is more susceptible to the limits of the Fagan Report. Two critical limits in Professor Fagan’s analysis apply here. His statistical finding of discrimination depends on the assumptions that (1) law enforcement o cers (not co conspirators), and (2) the ATF Chicago o ce (not other agen cies) independently selected each stash house defendant. Conley was not selected by law enforcement at all, let alone by the ATF. He was brought in by other conspirators who were themselves chosen by the initial target, Myreon Flowers. No. 20 2439 27 And Chicago ATF did not even select Myreon Flowers; the FBI did. These gaps undermine Conley’s ability to rely on the Fa gan Report. As Judge Castillo explained in Brown: Critical to Professor Fagan’s entire analysis [is] an assumption that the ATF selected each of the 94 stash house defendants for participation in the stings…. As a factual matter, the bulk of the 94 defendants were not recruited by ATF. Instead, the record reflects that the stash house investigations be gan with the ATF’s selection of one or more ini tial targets…. The remaining defendants were recruited by the targets themselves, or by other members of the conspiracy who were, in turn, recruited by the targets. In fact, the record re flects that the ATF never even met 32 of the 94 defendants—nearly one third of the total de fendant group—until the day of their arrest. Ad ditionally, two of the stash house cases, involv ing a total of 14 defendants, were not initiated by the ATF at all. Instead, those investigations were initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investi gation (“FBI”) based on information provided by its own confidential informants. The record reflects that the ATF did not become involved in these two cases until after the selection of the in itial targets had already been made. In the Court’s view, ATF cannot be said to have “se lected” individuals it never met or individuals targeted by another governmental agency un der any ordinary meaning of that term. 28 No. 20 2439 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1003–04 (footnotes and citations omitted). Conley is one of the thirty two defendants who were se lected by co conspirators and whose race law enforcement did not know until his arrest. And the larger Flowers sting of which Conley was a part was one of the two initiated by the FBI, not the ATF. Moreover, the FBI individually targeted Myreon Flowers based on his current armed robbery activity, not based on the ATF criteria that Professor Fagan used to construct the comparison group for his analysis. The Fagan Report’s inference of discrimination, whatever strength it might have in other cases, is therefore based on two assump tions that simply do not apply to Conley’s case. Professor Fa gan himself acknowledged that correcting for those assump tions would reduce the data to “such a small sample” that it would be nearly “impossible to conduct a reliable statistical analysis” that could support an inference of racial discrimina tion. 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. These two inapplicable assumptions undermine the pro bative value of the Fagan Report’s conclusions as applied to Conley’s case. We thus do not need to review arguments over other problems with the report that Judge Castillo discussed in Brown, such as the use of predominantly white LaSalle County in the comparison pool. See id. at 1009–13. Absent ad ditional evidence showing that the FBI would not have re ferred (or the ATF would not have then pursued) a white tar get situated similarly to Flowers, we could not conclude that, more likely than not, the government targeted Flowers based on his race. And even if we assume that Flowers was racially targeted, to extend the reasoning to Conley we would need to find further that the ATF a rmatively hoped Flowers would recruit other Black people as co conspirators. When agents No. 20 2439 29 targeted Flowers, they were surely aware that, given the con tinued patterns of social and neighborhood segregation in Chicago, his chosen co conspirators would likely include other Black people. See, e.g., Matthew Bloch, Amanda Cox & Tom Giratikanon, Mapping Segregation, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 2015/07/08/us/ census race map.html (click on Chicago). Yet the “awareness” of that likely consequence does not prove purposeful discrim ination, Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, and Conley lacks any other evidence indicating that the ATF a rmatively intended Flow ers to recruit Black co conspirators like Conley. These prob lems “cannot be brushed aside simply because of an underly ing discomfort with” fake stash house stings. 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1013. In deciding this appeal, we have not forgotten the long his tory of race in America and in the Chicago region and the many aspects of that history that contribute to the fact that “between 2006 and 2013, the defendants prosecuted in the ATF false stash house cases in this District were 78.7 percent black, 9.6 percent Hispanic, and 11.7 percent white.” Id. at 1001. But the Equal Protection Clause and its federal Fifth Amendment corollary provide legal relief only when a party can prove purposeful discrimination against him by the gov ernment in his case. Our inquiry here is limited to whether Conley has o ered evidence that would support a finding that it is more likely than not that federal law enforcement agencies intentionally targeted him for this sting because he is Black. It does not, despite the district court’s suggestion to the contrary. So we must a rm dismissal of his selective en forcement claim. 30 No. 20 2439 IV. Outrageous Government Conduct Conley’s second claim for relief under § 2255 is that ATF’s fake stash house sting was so outrageous that it violated his due process rights. This argument, known as the “outrageous government conduct” defense, stems from an entrapment case where the Supreme Court suggested that “we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process princi ples would absolutely bar the government from invoking ju dicial processes to obtain a conviction.” United States v. Rus sell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973). But the Supreme Court has never reversed criminal charges due to outrageous govern ment conduct, and neither have we.6 This defense fails for three reasons. First, we have repeat edly rejected the existence of an outrageous conduct defense. See United States v. Westmoreland, 712 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur court has disallowed such a defense.”); United States v. Stallworth, 656 F.3d 721, 730 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Outra geous government conduct is not a defense in this circuit.”); United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]his circuit clearly and consistently has refused to recognize any defense based on … ‘outrageous government conduct.’”); 6 Some defendants invoke this due process argument when they can not satisfy the elements of a traditional entrapment defense. For instance, in Russell, entrapment was unavailable because the defendant conceded that he may have harbored a predisposition to commit the offense. 441 U.S. at 433. Similarly, in Conley’s direct appeal, we rejected his ability to argue entrapment. Entrapment “applies only when a government actor recruits a defendant,” yet Conley was recruited by private co conspirators who themselves were recruited by Myreon Flowers, not police. Conley, 875 F.3d at 402. No. 20 2439 31 Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We flatly rejected the doctrine in United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241–42 (7th Cir. 1995).”). Second, even if the defense were available in theory, Con ley procedurally defaulted it. “A claim cannot be raised for the first time in a § 2255 motion if it could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal,” absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or actual innocence. McCoy v. United States, 815 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2016), citing Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009). Conley did not raise the defense until this § 2255 motion, and the government argues that he has not shown cause for excusing the default. Conley, however, seeks to excuse his default on the grounds that (1) the basis for his claim did not exist when his direct appeal was pending, and (2) he tried to raise the argument but his lawyer decided against it. As to the first argument, “a showing that the factual or le gal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel … would constitute cause” for excusing procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). But Conley’s outrageous conduct defense is not a newly available legal theory. Even in the face of our “uniform wall of precedent” rejecting the defense, Conley still needed to raise it to preserve it for potential reconsideration here. See, e.g., Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2099 (2021) (unpreserved claim is subject to plain error review under Fed eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 even if precedent fore closed the claim at the time the defendant could have ob jected). Perhaps recognizing this problem, Conley instead says that the factual basis for his claim was unavailable on di rect appeal because the Fagan Report had not yet been 32 No. 20 2439 published. We understand Conley’s outrageousness argu ment, however, to rest primarily on the nature of fake stash house stings as police created traps, not on the Fagan Report’s (disputed) finding that they were racially motivated. We also reject Conley’s second excuse for defaulting the claim—that he tried to raise it on direct appeal but was thwarted by his attorney’s decision to advance other argu ments instead. Attorneys have wide discretion to choose is sues for appeal. Not raising an outrageous conduct defense made strategic sense given our repeated rejections. An outra geous conduct argument would certainly not have been “clearly stronger” than the arguments his lawyer raised. Cf. Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying in e ective assistance of counsel standard to appellate counsel). Conley says we nonetheless have excused default in a case like his where the defendant did all he could to try to raise an issue. But that case is clearly distinguishable. In Gregory Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 2003), we excused pro cedural default where the petitioner had tried to raise the is sue with his attorneys and courts for fifteen years, and his re quests had been completely ignored—not rejected for a good strategic reason. Third, even if we recognized the defense and could reach its merits, the sting here was not so outrageous as to violate due process. In the very rare cases where other courts have reversed convictions due to outrageous government conduct, law enforcement agencies were much more active in coaxing the defendants to commit their crimes. For example, in Con ley’s best supporting case, United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit found outrageous conduct where the DEA “involve[d] itself so directly and continuously No. 20 2439 33 over such a long period of time in the creation and mainte nance of criminal operations.” Id. at 379. The DEA not only purchased most of the supplies for a methamphetamine lab, but the government informant provided all the expertise and led the actual process of producing meth in the lab. Id. at 380– 81. All of Twigg’s actions were at the specific direction of the government informant; Twigg did not provide any expertise, supplies, or ideas himself. Moreover, the DEA even supplied the location for the lab after the defendants were having di culty finding a place. The agents were thus actively solving problems and holding the defendants’ hands at every step. Here, by contrast, the ATF proposed a fake crime and stood back and watched as Myreon Flowers quickly gathered a crew, developed a plan, and showed up ready to execute an armed robbery. Like Twigg, Conley was recruited by another defendant. But unlike Twigg, Conley was an active partici pant who contributed to the planning process and agreed to a frontline (i.e., armed) role. Conley was not coaxed along by government agents at every turn. His case simply does not exhibit the sort of constant police nudging that outraged the court in Twigg. Rather, Conley’s sting closely resembles the ATF sting we upheld in United States v. Smith, 792 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2015), in which an undercover ATF agent arranged for the defendant to provide armed security for the transport of cocaine. On ap peal, the defendant argued that the sting constituted outra geous government conduct. We disagreed: “when an individ ual is ready and willing to engage in illegal activity, the fact that the Government a ords him an opportunity to commit the crime provides no legal impediment to prosecution.” Id. at 766. That is all the ATF did in Conley’s case. It presented a 34 No. 20 2439 criminal opportunity, which Conley freely accepted when other conspirators asked him to join the team. Even assuming some police tactics could be so outrageous as to violate due process, such a defense could not simply “give the federal judiciary a ‘chancellor’s foot’ veto over law enforcement practices of which it d[oes] not approve. The ex ecution of the federal laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive Branch….” Russell, 411 U.S. at 435. The ATF’s conduct in Conley’s case stopped short of “violat ing that ‘fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,’ mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 432, quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960). Because Conley has failed to prove that the ATF violated his Fifth Amendment equal protection or due process rights, the district court’s denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is AFFIRMED.

Primary Holding

Seventh Circuit upholds drug convictions obtained by means of a "stash house sting," rejecting claims of racially selective law enforcement and outrageous government conduct/

Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.