Thomas v. Blackard, No. 20-1718 (7th Cir. 2021)
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Thomas moved to a cell at Pontiac Correctional Center. Thomas claimed there were feces, urine, and mold smeared on the walls, sink, and cell door; the mattress was soiled with feces and reeked of urine; there were dead flies on the bunk bed; and the sink emitted only cold, black, oily water. After Thomas complained about his mattress, prison officials got him a new one within two weeks. Thomas used his sheets and blanket to avoid contact with the soiled mattress. Thomas received gloves to remove the dead flies; he had a towel for cleaning and received a disinfectant solution several times during his eight-week stay in the cell. Thomas refused to clean the walls. While awaiting a plumbing repair, officials allowed Thomas three hot showers per week. Pontiac’s water supply underwent regular testing and met all environmental requirements. Thomas sought treatment for dry skin and a rash on his back. A health worker noted “a small clogged pore,” recommended warm moist compresses, and told Thomas to return as needed. Thomas obtained hot water for the compresses from another inmate. Thomas sought no further medical care at Pontiac.
Thomas later invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his suit. Had the officials done nothing in response to Thomas’s complaints, they would have violated the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment but the prison responded to Thomas’s concerns and medical needs.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 20-1718 ADRIAN THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES S. BLACKARD and TODD PUNKE, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 1:18-cv-01122 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge. ____________________ SUBMITTED MAY 24, 2021 * — DECIDED JUNE 28, 2021 ____________________ Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Adrian Thomas sued several prison o cials at Pontiac Correctional Center in Illinois alleging they violated the Eighth Amendment by restricting him * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 2 No. 20-1718 for two months to a cell with feces on the walls, a mattress covered in human waste, a bunk bed with a hundred dead ies, and inadequate plumbing that caused him to develop a rash. Had the o cials done nothing in response to Thomas’s complaints, they would have violated the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. But, relying on undisputed evidence showing that the prison responded to Thomas’s concerns and medical needs, the district court entered summary judgment for the o cials. We a rm. I Thomas moved to a new cell on October 24, 2017. By his account, the cell was disgusting. Thomas claimed there were feces, urine, and mold smeared on the walls, sink, and cell door; the mattress was soiled with feces and reeked of urine; there were roughly one hundred dead ies on the bunk bed; and the sink emitted only cold, black, and oily water. Thomas complained orally and in written grievances about these conditions until he was transferred to another prison two months later. In the meantime, Pontiac o cials mitigated most of the issues in Thomas’s cell. After Thomas complained about his mattress, prison o cials got him a new one within two weeks. In those two weeks, Thomas used his sheets and blanket to avoid contact with the soiled mattress. Thomas also received gloves, which allowed him to remove the dead ies. To address the feces smeared on the walls, Thomas had a towel for cleaning and received a cup of a disinfectant solution at least six times during his eight-week stay in the cell. The feces remained in his cell, however, as Thomas admits that he refused to use the solvent to clean the walls. No. 20-1718 3 As for the lack of hot water, prison o cials knew of the problem and ordered a repair in September 2017, before Thomas had even moved into the cell. While awaiting the repair, the o cials allowed Thomas three hot showers per week, and the engineering sta attempted the repair in November but were unsuccessful. Pontiac’s water supply underwent regular testing and met all environmental requirements. Shortly after moving to the new cell, Thomas sought treatment for dry skin and a rash on his back. A health worker noted “a small clogged pore on [his] midback,” recommended warm moist compresses, and told Thomas to return to sick call as needed. Thomas responded by saying he lacked access in his own cell to hot water, but he then managed to obtain hot water for the compresses from a neighboring inmate. Thomas sought no further medical care during the remainder of his time at Pontiac. Thomas later invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sued multiple correctional o cials, asserting Eighth Amendment claims regarding his cell conditions and medical treatment at Pontiac. At screening, the district court dismissed all but two defendants, James Blackard and Todd Punke. Following discovery, the district court entered summary judgment for Blackard and Punke, concluding that Thomas was exposed to the cell’s poor conditions only brie y and the Pontiac sta addressed the issues without delay. As for the medical claim, the court determined that Thomas had failed to present evidence that his rash was serious enough to implicate the Eighth Amendment. Thomas now appeals. 4 No. 20-1718 II A Although “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” it does mandate humane ones. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). By prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, the Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison o cials to “provide humane conditions of con nement” and “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. An o cial who fails to uphold these duties violates the Eighth Amendment upon exhibiting “deliberate indi erence to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.” Id. at 828. This deliberate indi erence standard includes “both an objective and subjective component.” Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 2018); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prisoner challenging conditions of con nement must rst show that the conditions were su ciently serious as an objective matter, meaning “that they den[ied] the inmate ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety.” Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Second, in covering the subjective component of the inquiry, the inmate must prove that prison o cials acted with deliberate indi erence—that they knew of and disregarded this excessive risk of harm to the inmate. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Williams v. Shah, 927 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2019). Thomas challenges the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendants. In this procedural posture, we No. 20-1718 5 owe Thomas our own fresh look at the record, reviewing it in the light most favorable to him as the nonmoving party. See Bridges v. Dart, 950 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2020). B Thomas rooted his § 1983 claims in the allegedly inhumane conditions of his cell and the prison’s treatment of his skin condition. Having undertaken our own review, we agree with the district court’s assessment that no reasonable jury could conclude that Blackard and Punke violated Thomas’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. An essential teaching of Farmer v. Brennan—indeed the central essence of the Eighth Amendment—is that prisoners cannot be con ned in inhumane conditions. See 511 U.S. at 832. Doing so deprives an inmate of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and satis es the objective requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases that clearly establish that holding an inmate in a cell smeared with feces and blood, and lacking running water or a mattress, creates an excessive risk to health and objectively amounts to the deprivation of humane conditions). The Supreme Court reinforced these precise points in Taylor v. Riojas, holding that prison o cials were not entitled to quali ed immunity where they con ned an inmate for four days in a cell covered oor to ceiling with feces, followed by two days in a frigid cell with a clogged drain over owing with bodily waste, forcing the inmate to sleep naked on the oor in raw sewage. See 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (per curiam). The Court had no reservations in concluding that such 6 No. 20-1718 conditions “violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment” and, even more, that “any reasonable o cer should have realized that [the inmate’s] conditions of con nement o ended the Constitution.” Id. But to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must go beyond allegations and produce evidence not only of the inhumane conditions, but also that o cials were subjectively aware of these conditions and refused to take steps to correct them, showing deliberate indi erence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Daugherty, 906 F.3d at 611 (a rming entry of summary judgment for prison o cials because no evidence showed the o cials were aware of the alleged unconstitutional conditions). The initial cell conditions Thomas described, if true, were inhumane, as they posed an excessive risk to his health and deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Prison o cials, we have underscored, must “provide inmates with ‘reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials, and utilities.’” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016)). Thomas’s assertions of feces-covered walls, a lack of hot water, hundreds of dead ies in his bed, and a mattress covered in human waste no doubt establish a material dispute on the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim. Indeed, these purported cell conditions are not far from the “deplorably unsanitary conditions” decried in Taylor. 141 S. Ct. at 53. But that is not the end of the matter. Unlike in Taylor, Thomas failed to point to evidence that prison o cials responded with deliberate indi erence to the abysmal cell conditions. See id. at 53–54. To the contrary, the record shows that No. 20-1718 7 o cials reacted reasonably: Thomas promptly received a new, unsoiled mattress, several cups of disinfecting solvent to clean the walls, and gloves to remove the dead ies from his bunk bed. As for his complaint that his cell lacked hot water, Pontiac o cials provided him with three hot showers per week while awaiting repair of the faucet. On this record, no reasonable jury could conclude these o cials responded with deliberate indi erence to Thomas’s cell conditions. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (explaining that prison o cials “may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk”); cf. Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that prison o cials may have violated the Eighth Amendment where they ignored an inmate’s request for cleaning supplies and water access while the inmate was housed for three days in a cell smeared with feces and without running water). Thomas admits that he received disinfectant but contends that the cold and dirty running water in his cell was un t to use with the solvent for cleaning. But Thomas furnished no evidence that he ever told Blackard or Punke that he could not use the cleanser with the cell’s running water to remove the feces. So Thomas cannot establish that the o cials’ response was unreasonable. See Daugherty, 906 F.3d at 611–12 (“[N]o reasonable jury could nd that [the defendants] acted with deliberate indi erence” when “there is no evidence that either of them was speci cally aware of the particular conditions forming the basis of [the plainti ’s] Eighth Amendment claim.”). In a grievance, Thomas also complained that the cell’s tap water was undrinkable. Although a lack of drinking water can constitute a separate Eighth Amendment violation, see 8 No. 20-1718 Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820–21, Thomas has not developed any argument to this e ect on appeal. Nor does he dispute that the prison’s water supply was regularly tested and met environmental requirements. In short, Thomas has not created a triable issue concerning a lack of clean drinking water. We pause to highlight one particular statement Thomas made in his appellate brief. He stated he “endured 35 days in a cell without working or running water.” This statement caught our attention, for a complete deprivation of running water for that length of time, coupled with the cell’s lthy conditions, would o end the Eighth Amendment. See id. (collecting cases). But Thomas’s assertion is belied by the record evidence: he testi ed at his deposition that the cell’s faucet produced cold running water for the two months that he was con ned there. Our review of the record shows that Thomas has failed to show that he lacked access to running water in his cell or otherwise for over a month. C Thomas pressed a second Eighth Amendment claim stemming from the prison’s treatment of his skin condition. Prison o cials can be liable for violating the Eighth Amendment when they display deliberate indi erence towards an objectively serious medical need, meaning “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The district court correctly concluded that, based on undisputed evidence, no reasonable jury could nd that No. 20-1718 9 Thomas’s skin condition presented an objectively serious medical need. Thomas had only a “small clogged pore” on his back that was treatable with warm compresses (which he received), and he never returned to sick call or su ered any lingering e ects. Not “every ache and pain or medically recognized condition involving some discomfort can support an Eighth Amendment claim,” and Thomas has not adduced any evidence that his clogged pore was su ciently serious. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unquali ed access to health care, deliberate indi erence to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’”). Even if he had, Thomas also failed to identify any evidence showing that Blackard or Punke manifested deliberate indi erence to his skin condition, a culpability standard akin to criminal recklessness. See King, 680 F.3d at 1018. The conditions of con nement Thomas encountered at Pontiac are troubling. But prison o cials took steps to address the inadequacies. Because Thomas has not produced evidence of deliberate indi erence by Blackard and Punke, we AFFIRM.
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