Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, No. 17-2073 (7th Cir. 2018)

Annotate this Case

A confidential informant told Officer Hronopoulos that Wheeler had guns in his Chicago apartment. This informant had previously given good information, so Hronopoulos drove the informant by Wheeler’s apartment to confirm the address and took the informant before a judge to testify in support of warrant applications. The judge issued warrants. That night, police executed the warrants and found guns, ammunition, and heroin. Wheeler was acquitted because the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was his. Wheeler sued the city and the officers, raising a Fourth Amendment claim for an unlawful search and arrest (42 U.S.C. 1983) and a state‐law claim for malicious prosecution. The court rejected Wheeler’s argument that the warrant was defective because the informant’s tip was hearsay, reasoning the tip was not offered to prove the truth of the matter it asserted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There was probable cause for the search, arrest, and prosecution via the informant’s tip. The court rejected Wheeler’s “irrational argument” that there was a disputed fact as to whether the informant existed or gave the tip at all, as waived for not having been raised below, as was Wheeler’s supposed Brady claim concerning officers’ failure to procure fingerprint evidence.

Download PDF

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 17 2073 WILLIAM WHEELER and JOYCE THOMAS, Plaintiffs Appellants, v. WILLIAM HRONOPOULOS, et al., Defendants Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:14 cv 03380 — Manish S. Shah, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED MARCH 30, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 6, 2018 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and GILBERT, District Judge.* GILBERT, District Judge. This is a hornbook example of how to waive an argument on appeal. One day, a confiden tial informant told Officer William Hronopoulos that Wil liam Wheeler had some guns in his Chicago apartment. This informant had previously given information that led to suc * Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 2 No. 17 2073 cessful search warrants, so when Officer Hronopoulos re ceived the information about Wheeler, he (1) drove the in formant by Wheeler’s apartment to confirm the address; (2) worked with the Cook County State’s Attorney to obtain a search warrant for the premises; and (3) brought the inform ant before a judge to testify about the information in the warrant applications. The judge issued two search warrants: one for each floor of the apartment. Later that night, the po lice executed the warrants and found guns, ammunition, and some heroin. Wheeler faced several criminal charges relating to the contraband, but a jury acquitted him because the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contra band was his. So Wheeler and his wife—Joyce Thomas— turned around and filed a lawsuit against both the city and the officers involved in the arrest. Only two of their claims survived until the summary judgment stage: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim for an unlawful search and arrest pursu ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) a state law claim for mali cious prosecution. When the defendants moved for summary judgment and pointed out that there were no genuine disputes over any material facts, Wheeler and Thomas brought a bizarre argu ment in response: they claimed that the search warrant was defective because the confidential informant’s tip was hear say. The district court correctly rejected that argument be cause the defendants were not offering the informant’s tip into evidence to prove the truth of the matter it asserted, so the tip was not hearsay material. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244–45 (1983). Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because there No. 17 2073 3 was probable cause for the search, arrest, and prosecution via the informant’s tip. Wheeler and Thomas brought this appeal, but they make an irrational argument: they now say that there is a disputed fact as to whether the confidential informant existed or gave the tip at all, so (1) both the seizure of the contraband and the arrest were the fruits of an illegal search; and (2) there was accordingly no probable cause for Wheeler’s prosecu tion. Although we review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo and summary judgment is not appropriate if there are any genuine disputes as to any mate rial facts, Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2018)) (further internal citations omitted), parties cannot conjure up brand new legal theories on appeal like this. Failing to bring an argument to the district court means that you waive that argument on appeal. United Cent. Bank v. Davenport Estate LLC, 815 F.3d 315, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omit ted); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012). And this case presents an egregious violation of that rule: not only did Wheeler and Thomas fail to argue below that the confidential informant did not exist, they tacitly admitted that the informant existed by arguing that his statements were hearsay. Wheeler also argues that the district court erred by not addressing their supposed Brady claim: whether the officers’ failure to procure any fingerprint evidence—even though Wheeler never requested that evidence during his criminal proceedings—violated Wheeler’s due process rights. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196–97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); see also Saunders El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556, 561–62 4 No. 17 2073 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining the elements of a Brady claim). But Wheeler waived this argument too because the amended complaint did not allege a Brady claim. The amended com plaint did mention a lack of fingerprint evidence, but only in the sense that it (somehow) showed a lack of probable cause for Wheeler’s arrest and prosecution. And even if the district court did miss a tangible Brady claim—which it did not— Wheeler and Thomas certainly never brought that to the court’s attention. So that argument is also waived. Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 855 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted). Rules exist for a reason. Rules are especially important for practicing attorneys. And rules on how to bring an ap peal are critical to the proper functioning of our judiciary: a case must be fully fleshed out at the district court level be fore an appellate court can accurately review that case. Wheeler and Thomas are no exception to that rule, so we must ratify the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED

Primary Holding

Seventh Circuit affirms the rejection of civil rights claims against Chicago and officer, based on a search for which there was a warrant.

Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.