United States v. Teague, No. 17-1725 (7th Cir. 2018)
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Teague pled guilty to possession of a weapon by a felon. In a Presentence Investigation Report, the U.S. Probation Department assigned a base offense level of 14. The government argued the base level should be 20 because Teague had previously been convicted of a crime of violence--second-degree murder under Illinois law. The court held that second-degree murder as defined in Illinois law is not a crime of violence because it is not limited to intentional murder, calculated a Guideline range of 21–27 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Teague to 21 months’ imprisonment. The government appealed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The second-degree murder statute incorporates the intentional or knowing use of force element from the first-degree murder statute. An offender cannot be convicted of second-degree murder without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender acted with the intent or knowledge that his actions would cause the death of another, so the offense is a crime of violence under the elements clause of the Guidelines’ definition. Second-degree murder under Illinois law is also a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses because it fits within the generic definitions of murder or voluntary manslaughter.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 17 1725 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellant, v. OMARR D.TEAGUE, Defendant Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 3:16 cr 30079 — Staci M. Yandle, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2017 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2018 ____________________ Before KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and DURKIN, District Judge.* KANNE, Circuit Judge. Prior convictions for crimes of vio lence subject a defendant to a higher base offense level under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Because the district court * The Honorable Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 2 No. 17 1725 below erroneously concluded that the offense of second de gree murder under Illinois law is not a crime of violence, we reverse. I. BACKGROUND Omarr Teague pled guilty to possession of a weapon by a felon. In a Presentence Investigation Report, the United States Probation Department assigned a base offense level of 14. The government objected, claiming the base level should be 20 be cause Teague had previously been convicted of a crime of vi olence, namely second degree murder under Illinois law. At the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled the gov ernment’s objection, concluding second degree murder as de fined in Illinois law is not a crime of violence because it is not limited to intentional murder. Based on this conclusion, the court found that the total offense level was 15, that Teague had a category II criminal history, and therefore that the ap plicable Guideline range was 21–27 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Teague to a term of 21 months’ impris onment, a two year term of supervised release, a $150 fine, and a $100 special assessment. The government appeals, chal lenging only the district court’s conclusion that second degree murder under Illinois law is a crime of violence. II. ANALYSIS The Sentencing Guidelines provide that if a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm commit ted any part of the offense subsequent to sustaining a felony conviction for a crime of violence, the base offense level should be 20. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as: No. 17 1725 3 “any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is murder, voluntary manslaugh ter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or un lawful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The first clause is referred to as the “elements clause” and the second is known as the “enumerated of fenses” clause. See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2013). On appeal, the government contends that the Illinois of fense of second degree murder is a crime of violence under both prongs, and that the district court’s erroneous interpre tation of the Illinois statute led to an improperly computed Guideline range. A sentence based on an improperly com puted Guideline range must be vacated and remanded unless “the sentencing court firmly indicated that it would impose the same sentence regardless of any sentencing error.” United States v. Zahurksy, 580 F.3d 515, 528 (7th Cir. 2009). The district court made no such indication in this case. So Teague must be resentenced if his second degree murder conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. Our review of this issue is de novo. United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 2016). A. Elements Clause To be a crime of violence, the offense must have as an ele ment the intentional or knowing use, attempted use, or threat 4 No. 17 1725 ened use of physical force against the person of another. “‘El ements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal defini tion—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a con viction.’” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). To sus tain a second degree murder conviction under Illinois law, the prosecution must prove that the defendant “commit[ed] the offense of first degree murder” plus one of the following mit igating factors: “(1) at the time of the killing he is acting under a sud den and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negli gently or accidentally causes the death of the indi vidual killed; or (2) at the time of the killing he be lieves the circumstances to be such that, if they ex isted, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9 2 (2001). A person commits the Illinois offense of first degree mur der when he: “kills an individual without lawful justifica tion … [and] in performing the acts which cause the death: (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts of will cause death to that individual or an other; or (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that in dividual or another; or (3) he is attempting or com mitting a forcible felony other than second degree murder.” No. 17 1725 5 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9 1 (2001). The district court focused on the language “negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed” in the second degree murder statute to conclude that the offense did not include as an element the intentional or knowing use of force. But this language only refers to situations in which a person has the intent to kill one person but his actions result in the death of another. This is still intentional murder. See People v. Thompson, 730 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“Under the doctrine of transferred intent, if a defendant shoots at one person, with the intent to kill, but kills an unin tended victim, he may be convicted of the crime of murder for the death of the unintended victim.”). The second degree murder statute incorporates the intentional or knowing use of force element from the first degree murder statute. Because an offender cannot be convicted of second degree murder without the government proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender acted with the intent or knowledge that their actions would cause the death of another, the offense is a crime of violence under the elements clause. B. Enumerated Offenses Clause Second degree murder under Illinois law is also a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause. To determine whether an offense is a crime of violence under this clause, the court looks to whether the charged offense fits within the generic definition of one of the enumerated offenses. The gov ernment contends the offense fits within the generic defini tions of murder or voluntary manslaughter. 6 No. 17 1725 “Voluntary manslaughter in most jurisdictions consists of an intentional homicide committed under extenuating cir cumstances which mitigate, though they do not justify or ex cuse, the killing.” 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 15.2 (3d ed.). The Model Penal Code defines manslaughter as criminal homicide “com mitted recklessly” or “a homicide which would otherwise be murder … committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable expla nation or excuse.” Model Penal Code § 210.3. The Illinois offense of second degree murder fits squarely within these generic definitions of manslaughter. This is con sistent with the history of the Illinois statute. In 1986, Illinois restructured its criminal code and the offense of “voluntary manslaughter” was renamed “second degree murder.” Ill. Pub. Act 84 1450, eff. July 1, 1987. The language of the ele ments were modified somewhat but the core offense re mained the same—“murder plus mitigation.” See id. So we conclude the offense of second degree murder under Illinois law fits within the definition of manslaughter, and thus is a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause. III. CONCLUSION Second degree murder under Illinois law qualifies as a crime of violence under both prongs of section 4B1.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
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