Otrompke v. Skolnik, No. 15-3875 (7th Cir. 2016)

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Indiana Rules for the Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attorneys state: “No person who advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States or this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal means, shall be certified to the Supreme Court of Indiana for admission to the bar of the court and a license to the practice of law.” Plaintiff intends to engage in “revolutionary advocacy,” as by distributing the Charter of Carnaro and Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto. He challenged the Rule, without stating that he intends to advocate the overthrow of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit as premature. Plaintiff has not applied for admission to the Indiana bar and lacks standing. The rule will harm him only if he would be admitted to the Indiana bar were the rule to be invalidated: “that is highly unlikely,” given “his tempestuous relations with the Illinois bar authorities,” who deemed him unfit to practice law, citing his failure to acknowledge on his applications his multiple arrests and firings over the previous decade.

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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 15 3875 JOHN J. OTROMPKE, Plaintiff Appellant, v. BRADLEY SKOLNIK, Executive Director, Indiana State Board of Law Examiners, and GREG ZOELLER, Attorney General of Indiana, Defendants Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. No. 2:14 cv 00296 RLM JEM — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge. ____________________ SUBMITTED MAY 3, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 24, 2016 ____________________ Before POSNER, FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. POSNER, Circuit Judge. Section 3 of Rule 12 of the Indiana Rules for the Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of At torneys states: “No person who advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States or this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal means, shall be certified to the Supreme Court of Indiana for admission to 2 No. 15 3875 the bar of the court and a license to the practice of law.” The plaintiff intends to engage in “revolutionary advocacy,” as by distributing the Charter of Carnaro (Gabrielle d’Annunzio’s constitution, combining proto fascist, anar chist, and democratic ideas, for his short lived rule over Fiume in 1920), and Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto, and he is concerned, he says, that his actions will be deemed to violate Rule 12(3). He doesn’t quite say that he intends to advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States or of Indiana by illegal means. But he implies that, both by his citation to the Communist Manifesto and by argu ing that the defendants are violating the First Amendment by refusing to admit to the Indiana bar any “person who ad vocates the overthrow of the United States or this state by force, violence, or other unconstitutional or illegal means”— presumably he is such a person. His suit, which is against the director of Indiana’s bar examiners and the state’s attor ney general, seeks to enjoin the enforcement of Rule 12(3) on the ground that it infringes freedom of speech, in violation of the U.S. Constitution. The suit is premature. Otrompke has not applied for ad mission to the Indiana bar. For all we can know, should he apply the board of examiners or the attorney general (the defendants) might agree with him that Rule 12(3) violates the First Amendment, or might decide that in any event his proposed activities would not violate the rule. Given those possibilities, he lacks standing to bring the present suit, as the district court held in dismissing it for want of jurisdic tion. He lacks standing because he’s failed to show that unless he obtains a judgment against the defendants he will be No. 15 3875 3 harmed because until then Rule 12(3) will remain in effect and prevent his admission to the Indiana bar. The rule will harm him only if he would be admitted to the Indiana bar were the rule to be invalidated but not otherwise. And that is highly unlikely, as we know from our previous involve ment in his tempestuous relations with the Illinois bar au thorities. After the state’s Committee on Character and Fit ness deemed him unfit to practice law, citing his failure to acknowledge on his bar and law school applications his mul tiple arrests and firings over the previous decade, he sought to obtain admission by suing the state’s Board of Admissions in federal district court. He lost, see Otrompke v. Chairman of the Committee on Character & Fitness for the First Judicial Dis trict of Illinois, 2005 WL 3050618 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2005), didn’t appeal, but ten years later again sued the Board of Admissions (along with the Illinois attorney general, who has however no authority with regard to bar admission standards), again lost, this time appealed—and lost still again. In Otrompke v. Hill, 592 F. App’x 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2014), affirming the district court’s dismissal of his suit after modifying the dismissal to base it on want of jurisdiction, we explained that the Rooker Feldman doctrine divested the dis trict court of jurisdiction to review the state supreme court’s decision rejecting his application. Otrompke’s baleful Illinois experience makes it impera tive that he apply to the Indiana bar authorities for admis sion before challenging the legality of the state’s rules for admission. At present he has no standing to maintain a suit such as this because he can’t show harm. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

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