Armstrong v. Norsetter, No. 13-3482 (7th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseArmstrong was imprisoned for 29 years for a rape and murder. He maintains his innocence. His conviction was set aside in 2005. In 2009 a Wisconsin state judge dismissed the charges because the prosecution had destroyed key exculpatory evidence. Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging shocking prosecutorial misconduct, including: destroying potentially exculpatory evidence from the crime scene; arranging for highly suggestive hypnosis of an eyewitness; contriving suggestive identification show-ups; concealing a later confession from a third party that was relayed by a person with no apparent motive to fabricate the report; and enlisting lab technicians to perform an inconclusive DNA test that consumed the last of a sample that could have proven Armstrong’s innocence and identified the true killer. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; federal due process claims based on destruction of exculpatory evidence are not barred by the availability of state tort remedies for the same wrongs. At the time of the original investigation, it was clearly established that bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence would violate a suspect’s due process rights. A reasonable police officer or prosecutor would not have concluded that he could destroy evidence to avoid disclosing it. If Armstrong can show that unconstitutional destruction of exculpatory evidence caused him to a deprivation of liberty, he can sue for that injury without a second trial.
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