Johnathan Franklin v. John Burr, No. 13-1154 (7th Cir. 2013)

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NONPRECEDENTIAL  DISPOSITION   To  be  cited  only  in  accordance  with  Fed.  R.  App.  P.  32.1 United States Court of Appeals For  the  Seventh  Circuit Chicago,  Illinois  60604   Submitted  October  1,  2013*   Decided  October  23,  2013       Before                               No.  13-­ 1154     FRANK  H.  EASTERBROOK,  Circuit  Judge     ANN  CLAIRE  WILLIAMS,  Circuit  Judge     JOHN  DANIEL  TINDER,  Circuit  Judge   JOHNATHAN  L.  FRANKLIN,     Plaintiff-­ Appellant,       v.   JOHN  R.  BURR,  et  al.,     Defendants-­ Appellees.     Appeal  from  the  United  States   District   Court   for   the   Western   District  of  Wisconsin.     No.  12-­ cv-­ 779-­ bbc   Barbara  B.  Crabb,  Judge.   Order     Johnathan  Franklin,  who  is  serving  sentences  for  felony  murder  and  aggravated  bat-­ tery,  contends  in  this  suit  under  42  U.S.C.  §1983  that  police  and  a  state  prosecutor  vio-­ lated  his  privilege  against  self-­ incrimination  when  they  interrogated  him  after  he  re-­ quested  counsel.  The  district  court  screened  the  complaint,  see  28  U.S.C.  §1915A,  and   dismissed  it  under  the  holding  of  Heck  v.  Humphrey,  512  U.S.  477  (1994).  See  2013  U.S.                                                                                                   *  Defendants  have  not  been  served  with  process  and  are  not  participating  in  this  appeal.  After  exam-­ ining  appellant s  brief  and  the  record,  we  have  concluded  that  oral  argument  is  unnecessary.  See  Fed.  R.   App.  P.  34(a);  Cir.  R.  34(f).     No.  13-­ 1154   Page  2   Dist.  LEXIS  2575  (W.D.  Wis.  Jan.  8,  2013).  In  response  to  a  motion  for  reconsideration,  the   judge  stated  that,  if  Heck  allows  the  suit,  then  the  complaint  must  be  dismissed  as  un-­ timely.  We  agree  with  the  second  of  those  conclusions.     In  the  state  prosecution,  Franklin  moved  to  suppress  his  statement.  After  the  state   judge  denied  his  motion,  Franklin  pleaded  guilty.  The  statements  were  made  in  1996   and  the  pleas  entered  in  1997.  The  time  limit  for  §1983  litigation  in  Wisconsin  is  six   years,  see  Gray  v.  Lacke,  885  F.2d  399,  409  (7th  Cir.  1989),  so  the  current  suit,  filed  in   2012,  is  untimely  unless  Heck  applies and,  if  Heck  does  apply,  then  the  suit  is  prema-­ ture.  Franklin  loses  either  way,  but  the  appeal  is  justiciable  because,  if  he  loses  on  Heck   grounds,  he  retains  the  potential  to  make  a  new  claim  should  his  convictions  be  vacat-­ ed.     Heck  holds  that  a  person  who  seeks  damages  on  account  of  supposedly  unconstitu-­ tional  acts  that  lead  to  imprisonment  must if  the  theory  of  relief  would  imply  the  inva-­ lidity  of  the  conviction show  that  the  conviction  has  been  set  aside  by  a  court  or  by  ex-­ ecutive  clemency.  As  long  as  the  conviction  stands,  no  damages  action  that  would  be   incompatible  with  the  conviction s  validity  is  permissible.  The  Court  added  that  the   claim  does  not  accrue  until  the  conviction  has  been  vacated,  which  means  that  the  stat-­ ute  of  limitations  does  not  begin  to  run  until  then.  512  U.S.  at  489 90.     The  district  court  thought  that  Franklin s  claim  that  interrogation  occurred  without   counsel,  if  accepted,  would  be  incompatible  with  the  validity  of  the  convictions.  Yet  the   convictions  rest  on  Franklin s  guilty  plea,  not  on  the  admissibility  of  any  particular  evi-­ dence.  Wallace  v.  Kato,  549  U.S.  384  (2007),  holds  that  a  claim  contending  that  arresting   officers  violated  the  Fourth  Amendment  accrues  at  the  time  of  the  arrest,  not  when  a   conviction  is  set  aside,  because  the  remedy  of  suppression  under  the  exclusionary  rule   does  not  necessarily  prevent  a  valid  conviction.  Moreover,  a  motion  to  suppress  evi-­ dence  may  be  denied  even  when  a  violation  of  the  Constitution  occurred;  the  exclusion-­ ary  rule  is  not  coterminous  with  the  substance  of  the  Bill  of  Rights.  That  is  equally  true   of  a  contention  that  a  confession  is  invalid.  See  Simmons  v.  O Brien,  77  F.3d  1093  (8th  Cir.   1996)  (coerced-­ confession  claim  not  barred  by  Heck).  There  is  no  necessary  inconsistency   between  the  propositions  that  (a)  a  conviction  based  on  a  guilty  plea  is  valid,  and  (b)  the   police  violated  the  accused s  rights  at  the  time  of  arrest  or  interrogation.  One  court  of   appeals  held  otherwise  in  Trimble  v.  Santa  Rosa,  49  F.3d  583,  585  (9th  Cir.  1995),  but  that   decision  predates  Wallace  and  cannot  be  considered  authoritative.     Given  Wallace,  Franklin s  claim  is  not  barred  by  Heck which  means  that  the  claim   accrued  in  1996  and  that  this  suit  is  untimely.  The  judgment  of  the  district  court  is  af-­ firmed.