United States v. Taylor, No. 12-2916 (7th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseTaylor engaged in sexual acts in front of a webcam during online chats with a law-enforcement officer posing as a 13-year-old girl. He was convicted of attempting to use the facilities of interstate commerce to engage in criminal sexual activity with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that “sexual activity” under 2422(b) requires evidence of physical contact. Taylor was recharged and convicted for the same conduct for attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor using a means of interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1470. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments based on the Double Jeopardy Clause; the district court’s handling of strikes for cause during jury selection; limitations on his cross-examination of law-enforcement officers; and the court’s determination that his conviction triggers the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16911(5)(A)(ii), (7)(I). The court noted that Taylor’s double-jeopardy claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent; that Taylor used peremptory strikes to remove two of the three jurors about whom he complained and did not object to the third; that the relevance of the excluded cross-examination was tenuous at best; and that a procedural impediment prevents review of the SORNA ruling.
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