USA v. Demond Wilson, No. 11-1147 (7th Cir. 2011)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted September 21, 2011* Decided September 21, 2011 Before RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge No. 11 1147 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. DEMOND WILSON, Defendant Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. 10 CR 128 BBC 01 Barbara B. Crabb, Judge. O R D E R Demond Wilson, a felon, was carrying several guns in his car, including a shotgun with an obliterated serial number, when police officers conducted a traffic stop. He pleaded guilty to possessing a gun after a felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, id. § 922(k). The district court, over Wilson s objection, set the base offense level at 20 after concluding that his 2002 conviction in Michigan for using a motor vehicle to elude police, a third degree felony, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479a(1), (3), counts as a conviction for a crime of violence, see U.S.S.G. * The appellant states that oral argument is unnecessary, and we agree. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(f); CIR. R. 34(f). No. 11 1147 Page 2 §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) & cmt. n.1, 4B1.2(a)(2) & cmt. n.1. The court sentenced Wilson within the resulting guidelines range to a total of 84 months imprisonment. In this appeal from his sentence, Wilson challenges the characterization of the Michigan offense as a crime of violence. The Sixth Circuit has held that an offense under subsections (1) and (3) of § 750.479a is a crime of violence. United States v. Martin, 378 F.3d 578, 580 84 (6th Cir. 2004); see United States v. LaCasse, 567 F.3d 763, 764 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that violation of subsections (1) and (3) of § 750.479a is a violent felony under parallel Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). We have endorsed the Sixth Circuit s analysis of § 750.479a, see United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 593 96 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011), and we also have held that similar statutes in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois define crimes of violence or violent felonies, United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing IND. CODE § 35 44 3 3(a), (b)(1)(A)), aff d, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 747 53 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 588 96 (analyzing WIS. STAT. 346.04(03)); United States v. Womack, 610 F.3d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing 625 ILCS 5/11 204.1), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3020 (2011); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 415 25 (7th Cir. 2010) (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011). At sentencing Wilson acknowledged that our precedent compels characterizing § 750.479a as a crime of violence, but certiorari had been granted in Sykes, and Wilson sought to preserve the issue pending review by the Supreme Court. In drafting his appellate brief, which was filed before the Supreme Court ruled, Wilson conceded that a decision upholding our opinion in Sykes would foreclose his appeal given that the Indiana statute discussed in that case is substantively indistinguishable from its Michigan counterpart. The Supreme Court has since affirmed Sykes and confirmed that [f]elony vehicle flight, as defined by Indiana, is a violent felony, 131 S. Ct. at 2277. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that a violation of subsections (1) and (3) of § 750.479a is a crime of violence. AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
