United States v. Hambright, No. 18-51080 (5th Cir. 2019)
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated on the grounds of a military joint base. The court applied the same standard of review used by the district court, holding that the magistrate judge was not required to credit plaintiff's testimony that she had only taken Benadryl and his decision to credit the officer's testimony that plaintiff smelled of alcohol and exhibited behavior consistent with intoxication was not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, plaintiff's additional argument that the magistrate judge improperly considered her reasons for testifying were unsupported by the record, and the record showed that the magistrate judge held the government to its burden of proof.
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Case: 18-51080 Document: 00515229224 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/09/2019 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED No. 18-51080 Summary Calendar December 9, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ASHLEY R. HAMBRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge: Ashley R. Hambright was charged by Information with one count of driving while intoxicated on the grounds of a military joint base. See 18 U.S.C. § 13; TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04. Following a bench trial, the magistrate judge sentenced Hambright to twelve months of supervised probation. Hambright appealed to the district court and her conviction was affirmed. We apply the same standard of review used by the district court, “review[ing] the magistrate judge’s findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 924 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2015)). In the absence of Case: 18-51080 Document: 00515229224 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/09/2019 No. 18-51080 clear error, we will not disturb the magistrate judge’s credibility findings. United States v. Cormier, 639 F.2d 1177, 1182 (5th Cir. 1981). During the trial, Hambright testified that she had taken Benadryl the night of her arrest, but she affirmed that she did not feel intoxicated. She also testified that she had not ingested any other substance that caused her to feel intoxicated. She argues that the magistrate judge improperly discredited her testimony, relying instead on the testimony of a base law enforcement officer who explained that he smelled alcohol on Hambright’s breath and that Hambright exhibited behavior consistent with intoxication. Despite Hambright’s assertions to the contrary, the magistrate judge was not required to credit her testimony, and his decision to credit the officer’s version of the events over hers was not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Mid-Continental Cas. Co. v. Davis, 683 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985)). Hambright’s additional argument that the magistrate judge improperly considered her reasons for testifying are likewise unsupported by the record. Furthermore, contrary to Hambright’s assertions, the record shows that the magistrate judge held the Government to its burden of proving that Hambright lacked “the normal use of her mental or physical faculties” by reason of having used “alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance.” See § 13; TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 49.01(2)(A), 49.04(a); United States v. Collazo, 117 F.3d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1997). Though the magistrate judge observed that the specific identity of the intoxicant was not relevant to Hambright’s guilt, the magistrate judge did not relieve the Government of its 2 Case: 18-51080 Document: 00515229224 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/09/2019 No. 18-51080 burden of demonstrating causation under the statute. To the contrary, the evidence adduced at the bench trial established that Hambright had been to a bar just before the incident, was slurring her speech and had bloodshot eyes, failed several “technical” intoxication tests, used perfume to cover the smell of alcohol, and behaved belligerently throughout her interaction with the officers. This evidence was “sufficient to justify the trial judge, as the trier of fact, in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.” United States v. Tovar, 719 F.3d 376, 388 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Esparza, 678 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2012)). As a result, Hambright has shown no error by the magistrate judge or the district court in her trial, conviction, or appeal. See Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d at 558. The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. 3
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