Hersy Jones, Jr. v. Louisiana State Supreme Court,, No. 17-30798 (5th Cir. 2018)
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Case: 17-30798 Document: 00514686372 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 17-30798 Summary Calendar United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED October 17, 2018 HERSY JONES, JR., Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Plaintiff – Appellant, v. LOUISIANA STATE SUPREME COURT; LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD; ROBERT S. KENNEDY, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Disciplinary Counsel; CHARLES B. PLATTSMIER, individually and in his official capacity as Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Defendants – Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana No. 5:15-CV-2766 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant Hersy Jones, Jr. appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994) Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4. * Case: 17-30798 Document: 00514686372 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 No. 17-30798 (“[The Rooker-Feldman] doctrine directs that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments.”). We find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction to hear Jones’s claims. Even if some of Jones’s claims can somehow be characterized as a general, facial challenge to the constitutionality of the disciplinary scheme, he should have raised those issues during the state court proceeding. See Musslewhite v. State Bar of Tex., 32 F.3d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction does not lie for claims that were not presented first to the state court in the disciplinary proceeding.”). Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 1 We also determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for recusal. See Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, 664 F.3d 71, 80 (5th Cir. 2011) (“We review a denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion.”). 1 2
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