Ronald Satish Emrit v. DMV, No. 17-1475 (4th Cir. 2017)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 17-1475 RONALD SATISH EMRIT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, (DMV); MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION, (MVA); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George J. Hazel, District Judge. (8:17-cv-00064-GJH) Submitted: June 20, 2017 Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ronald Satish Emrit, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Decided: June 30, 2017 PER CURIAM: Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil complaint for failure to state a claim and improper venue. * We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. See Buchanan v. Manley, 145 F.3d 386, 388-89 (D.C. Cir. 1998). It is apparent from Emrit’s complaint that no conceivable basis exists for venue in the District of Maryland. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) (2012) (describing venue and residency requirements); O’Neill v. Battisti, 472 F.2d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 1972) (describing “residency” of public official). Moreover, we are satisfied that the interests of justice did not require transferring, rather than dismissing, the action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (recognizing that, to survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that district court may dismiss action, despite improper venue, where complaint patently failed to state viable claim). * Although Emrit’s notice of appeal was filed more than 60 days after the district court’s dismissal order, his appeal is timely because the court’s order explains in full its reasons for dismissing the complaint and therefore is not a separate judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). See Hughes v. Halifax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 823 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1987). The order is deemed “entered,” for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), when “150 days have run from entry of the order in the civil docket.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). As Emrit’s notice of appeal was filed within that 150-day period, we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. See Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 843 (4th Cir. 2000). 2 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.