US v. Jerry Edwards, No. 16-4098 (4th Cir. 2016)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-4098 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JERRY LEE EDWARDS, a/k/a Magic, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:14-cr-00034-MOC-DSC-1) Submitted: October 31, 2016 Decided: November 21, 2016 Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jeffrey W. Gillette, GILLETTE LAW FIRM, PLLC, Franklin, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: A federal grand jury indicted Jerry Lee Edwards for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. distribute § 841(a) cocaine, (2012); in possession violation of 21 with intent U.S.C. to § 841(a); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) seized motion. (2012). during his Edwards arrest moved and the to suppress district the court evidence denied the Edwards then waived his right to a jury trial, and stipulated to facts sufficient to demonstrate his guilt of the offenses, to preserve his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The district court found Edwards guilty and sentenced him to 130 months of imprisonment. Edwards appeals, challenging the district court’s order denying his suppression motion and his sentence. For the reasons that the that district follow, we affirm. Edwards first argues court erred in determining that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him. “We review the factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court's legal determinations de novo.” 2012). United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. When the district court 2 has denied a defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. “The Fourth investigative Amendment detention or Id. permits stop an only officer if to make supported an by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.” F.3d 243, omitted). 246 (4th Cir. United States v. Foster, 634 2011) (internal quotation marks The officer must have “at least a minimal level of objective justification” and “must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and criminal activity.” (2000) (internal unparticularized suspicion or hunch of Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 quotation marks omitted). Courts assess whether an officer has articulated reasonable suspicion for a stop under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). The analysis of reasonable suspicion must take into account all the factors known to the officer at the time. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 339-40 (4th Cir. 2008). “The reasonable suspicion inquiry is fact-intensive, but individual facts and observations cannot be evaluated in isolation from each other.” 208 (4th United States v. Hernandez-Mendez, 626 F.3d 203, Cir. 2010). Moreover, 3 “factors consistent with innocent travel can, when reasonable suspicion.” 781 (4th however, Cir. for 2004) an taken together, give rise to United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, (emphasis officer to omitted). articulate It is factors not that enough, are not probative of behavior in which few innocent people would engage; “[t]he articulated factors together must serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.” Foreman, 369 F.3d at 781. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and conclude that the officers here had reasonable suspicion for the stop of Edwards in a motel parking lot based on the factors These factors include: identified by the district court. 1) that the officers stopped Edwards in a parking lot of a motel known for drugs and prostitution; 2) that this motel was in a generally high-crime area; 3) that instead of moving from his parked car to the motel, Edwards remained in his car, which did not have any lights on; and 4) that the car parked across two spaces in the motel parking lot. The fact violates that a parking city outside ordinance the only lines of bolstered reasonable suspicion to stop Edwards. a parking the a traffic violation provides justification for a officer detain 4 officers’ Branch, 537 F.3d at 335 (“Observing police spot to the sufficient offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.”); see also United States v. Wilson, ordinance 2 F.3d against 226, 231 (7th exiting a Cir. 1993) moving (violation vehicle of justifies investigatory stop). The district court concluded that the vehicle was parked between two parking spaces and Edwards does not challenge that factual finding. Based on the officers’ observations, there was reasonable suspicion to investigate, even if the violation of the ordinance, for example, was a pretext for the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). See Once officers approached the vehicle and witnessed Edwards in possession of marijuana, they had probable cause for his arrest. Therefore, the district court’s denial of Edwards’ suppression motion does not constitute reversible error. Edwards also challenges the district court’s attribution of an extra criminal history point to his North Carolina common law robbery convictions, arguing that those convictions were not for crimes of violence and that since they were consolidated for sentencing, applied (2015). waived the under extra U.S. criminal history Sentencing point Guidelines was Manual incorrectly § 4A1.1(e) However, as the Government correctly argues, Edwards appellate intentional review of relinquishment or this issue. abandonment 5 “A of waiver a known is the right.” United States v. Robinson, 744 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A waiver is distinguishable from a forfeiture, which involves the failure to timely assert a right. Id. Where courts may review a forfeited claim for plain error, a claim that has been waived is not reviewable on appeal, even for plain error. Id. Here, Edwards filed an objection on this basis to the initial presentence report, but explicitly stated at the sentencing hearing that he had no outstanding objections to the revised PSR and agreed with the Guidelines calculations. This waived Edwards’ claim. See id. (“A party who identifies an issue, and then explicitly withdraws it, has waived the issue.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense contentions with are oral argument adequately because presented in the facts and the materials legal before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.