Duckett v. Fuller, No. 15-6568 (4th Cir. 2016)
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Plaintiff filed suit against employees of SCDC and others, alleging that the food served to him at a prison managed by the SCDC was so deficient as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it is the same as a complaint filed against SCDC employees by a fellow inmate in 2010, which the district court dismissed on the merits. The court concluded that, because plaintiff was a nonparty to the earlier suit, he is not precluded from pursuing the same claims on his own behalf in the instant action unless the state defendants are able to demonstrate that at least one of the six exceptions to the general rule against nonparty preclusion applies pursuant to Taylor v. Sturgell. Because the state defendants have not demonstrated that any of the exceptions apply, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-6568 LEWIS DUCKETT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARCIA FULLER, SCDC Dietician in their individual or personal capacities; MRS. BALL, First Name Unknown Kershaw Cafeteria Supervisor in their individual or personal capacities; MICHAEL L. FAIR, Legislative Audit Counsel in their individual or personal capacities; SC DISTRICT 6, Greenville County State Senate in their individual or personal capacities; BOYD H. PARR, Director of Poultry Products and Inspection in their individual or personal capacities, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (6:13-cv-03205-JMC) Argued: March 22, 2016 Decided: April 25, 2016 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and Max O. COGBURN, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of North Carolina, sitting by designation. Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion in which Judge Motz and Judge Cogburn joined. ARGUED: Ricardo Camposanto, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Sheila M. Bias, RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen L. Braga, Counsel of Record, Kaitlyn Tongalson, Third Year Law Student, Appellate Litigation Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Caleb M. Riser, RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. 2 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: Lewis Duckett commenced this action against employees of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and others, alleging that the food served to him at the Kershaw Correctional Institution, a prison managed by the SCDC, was so deficient as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights. The form of Duckett’s complaint and the claims made are virtually the same as a complaint filed against SCDC employees by a fellow inmate in 2010, which the district court dismissed on the merits. On the state defendants’ motion in this case, the district court dismissed Duckett’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that, because Duckett would have benefited if his fellow inmate’s 2010 suit had been successful, he is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from pursuing the present action. As the court explained: The claims are at their core identical, and thus qualify as the same cause of action. To allow this claim to go forward would mean relitigating the same issues this court litigated in [the earlier suit]. This goes against the principles behind res judicata. We reverse. As a nonparty to the earlier suit, Duckett is not precluded from pursuing the same claims on his own behalf in the instant demonstrate action that at unless the state least one of the defendants six exceptions general rule against nonparty preclusion applies. 3 are able to to the See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-95 (2008). state defendants have not We conclude that the demonstrated that any of the exceptions applies and accordingly reverse the district court’s dismissal of Duckett’s complaint and remand for further proceedings. I On April 4, 2013, Duckett and 15 other inmates at Kershaw, all proceeding employees and pro se, other filed state a complaint officials, against challenging, two SCDC under the Eighth Amendment, the quality of the food served at Kershaw. In the complaint, which is labeled “Class Action Complaint,” the inmates alleged that the prison authorities failed to serve food satisfying recommended minimum daily amounts of vitamins and nutrients; that they served insufficient portions; and that they misrepresented food as beef when it was actually made from ground poultry offal and organs, thereby violating the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The parties agree that the complaint was drafted by Duckett’s fellow inmate, Bernard McFadden, who was also one of the 16 plaintiffs in the action. On review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the district court ruled that the complaint “should not be allowed to proceed under one joint action,” 4 explaining, among other things, that illnesses the resulting individualized case “Plaintiffs “into complaint and The separate court actions, directed the new under alleged malnutrition findings.” sixteen Plaintiff,” from have numbers, case clerk wide that array would accordingly file severed for copies different of require individualized to a a one the each of the for each paid the account and plaintiff. Following required severance $350 supplemented allegations filing the of of fee the out allegations his specific of action, of his his injury, Duckett prison complaint claiming with further “Bleeding gums, weight loss, High Cholesterol, teeth damage, [and] Heart burn,” among other things. The state defendants filed a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss matter Duckett’s of this complaint, action asserting ha[d] already that “[t]he been subject litigated by Plaintiff’s privies and a full and final decision on the merits [had been] rendered by this court.” They specifically referred to a similar complaint, which the district court had dismissed on the merits, filed by inmate McFadden in 2010 against SCDC employees while McFadden was housed in the Kirkland Correctional Institution, another prison managed by the SCDC. While neither the res magistrate judicata nor judge recommended collateral 5 concluding estoppel bar[s] “that the plaintiff’s complaint,” the district court granted the state defendants’ motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds by order dated March 19, 2015. 1 In its supporting opinion, the court concluded that Duckett “[was] in privity with Plaintiff McFadden in the prior case,” providing the following explanation: Had McFadden I been a successful suit for Plaintiff, Plaintiff in this case would have benefitted. In McFadden I, the Complaint sought “an Order directing the Defendants to serve nutritious and balanced meals according to the daily recommended food charts.” Plaintiff here similarly seeks an Order requiring “a gradual change to daily recommended foods that are balanced and nutritious.” Further, as far as any damages Plaintiff seeks, had McFadden I been successful, Plaintiff could have argued collateral estoppel barred Defendants from denying the facts that were litigated and thus would benefit from a favorable decision. Thus, Plaintiff has the same legal right as Plaintiff McFadden, and is in privity. From the final judgment dismissing Duckett’s claims with prejudice, Duckett filed this appeal. By order dated October 27, 2015, we appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. 2 II Duckett contends that he is not bound by the judgment in McFadden’s 2010 suit because he was not a party to it; he never had his day in court on the issues presented in it; and he had 1 In the same order, the district court dismissed, without prejudice, the claims against defendants Michael Fair, SC District 6, and Boyd Parr, a ruling that Duckett does not challenge on appeal. 2 We are grateful for appointed counsel’s able service. 6 “no meaningful way of participating” in it. In short, he argues that he cannot be bound by the judgment in that action unless his circumstances fit into one of the exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion recognized in Taylor. that, because circumstances, none we of should the exceptions reverse the He asserts applies district to court’s his order dismissing his complaint. The state defendants contend that Duckett is bound by the judgment in McFadden’s 2010 suit because Duckett’s interests in this action are “aligned with and even identical to” McFadden’s interests in McFadden’s 2010 suit and, therefore, Duckett is “in privity” with McFadden. They assert that “‘privity’ between parties exists, as a matter of law, when the interests of one party are so identified with the interests of another that representation by one party is representation of the other’s legal right.” The state defendants maintain that the applicability of Taylor to this case is, “at best, minimal,” because Taylor rejected a preclusion doctrine based on what is known as “virtual representation” and “did not discuss the concept of privity,” on which the district court relied in this case. But even if Taylor were to control, they reason, at least one exception identified in Taylor would apply because Duckett “desires to create a substantive legal relationship with Inmate 7 McFadden” and is, in this case, “acting as an agent or proxy for Inmate McFadden to re-litigate his claims.” The district court agreed with the state defendants and dismissed Duckett’s suit as precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. The general rule is well established that once a person has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim, the person is precluded, under relitigating it. 49 the doctrine of res judicata, from (2001). See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748Sound considerations justify the doctrine. “[P]reclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full adversaries and fair from the opportunity expense and to litigate vexation protects attending their multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” (1979). Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, is applied to bar a suit in light of a prior judgment when three elements are demonstrated: (1) that “the prior judgment was final and on the merits, and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of due process”; (2) that “the parties are identical, or in privity, in the two actions”; and (3) that “the claims in the second matter are based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier 8 proceeding” -- i.e., transaction or series operative facts.” the of claims “arise transactions, or out of the same the same core of In re Varat Enterprises, Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Thus, in this case, it cannot be disputed that inmate McFadden is precluded from relitigating the claims he asserted and lost in his 2010 suit. The question presented here, however, is whether Duckett’s present action, raising the same claims that McFadden made in the 2010 suit, is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion even though Duckett was not a party to McFadden’s 2010 suit and did not participate in it. The answer is provided definitively by Taylor. In Taylor, the Supreme Court noted that under the “deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court” with a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims and issues,” a person not designated a party to an action nor served with process in it “is [generally] not bound by a judgment in personam” entered in the action. (internal quotations marks omitted) 553 U.S. at 892-93 (quoting Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). Richards v. But the general rule has exceptions such that the nonparty may nonetheless be bound by a judgment entered in the action. identified six such exceptions. 9 The Taylor Court First, a nonparty who agrees to be bound by a judgment in an action “‘is agreement.’” bound in accordance by substantive the terms of his Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893 (quoting 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 40 (1980)). bound with a judgment legal “based on Second, a nonparty may be a relationships” variety between of the pre-existing nonparty and a party in the action, such as “preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor.” 894 (alteration, omitted). internal quotation marks, and Id. at citation Third, a nonparty may be bound by a judgment when the nonparty was adequately represented in the action by a party with the same interests, such as in “properly conducted class actions, and suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.” Id. (citations omitted). Fourth, a nonparty is bound by a judgment if the nonparty “‘assume[d] control’ over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered.” Id. at 895 (alteration in original) (quoting Montana, 440 U.S. at 154). Fifth, “a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive force by relitigating through a proxy,” making preclusion “appropriate when a nonparty later brings suit as an agent for a party who is bound by a judgment.” circumstances a special Id. statutory And sixth, “in certain scheme may ‘expressly foreclos[e] successive litigation by nonlitigants . . . if the scheme is otherwise consistent 10 with due process.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989)). These six exceptions to the rule against nonparty claim preclusion constitute an exhaustive list for cases such as this. As the Taylor Court stated unequivocally, “The preclusive effects of a judgment in a federal-question case decided by a federal court should . . . be determined according to the established grounds for nonparty preclusion described in this opinion.” 553 U.S. at 904 (emphasis added). Despite the state defendants’ arguments to the contrary, therefore, the resolution of the issue presented in this appeal begins and ends with Taylor. While the state defendants correctly point out that the Taylor Court declined to use the term “privity” -- with the Court explaining that it was avoiding the term to prevent confusion, 553 U.S. at 894 n.8 -- no one can seriously dispute that the Court nonetheless sought to provide a comprehensive synthesis of the “discrete exceptions that apply in ‘limited circumstances’” to the “fundamental . . . rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party,” id. at 898 (quoting Martin, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2). Consequently, the question of whether the judgment in McFadden’s 2010 suit bars Duckett from pursuing his claims in this case must be determined according preclusion described in Taylor. to the grounds See id. at 904. 11 for nonparty Turning to this case, the relevant facts to consider are those alleged in Duckett’s complaint and the undisputed record facts from McFadden’s 2010 suit, of which the district court in this case took judicial notice. 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000). McFadden, alleging thereby while that incarcerated SCDC violated employees his Eighth See Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d These facts show that, in 2010, at Kirkland, had served Amendment filed complaint deficient rights. court dismissed that action on the merits. a food The and district Duckett was not a party to that action, nor was he in any way involved in its process. Indeed, he was, at the time, incarcerated at Kershaw, a different prison. After McFadden was transferred from Kirkland to Kershaw, he drafted a complaint on behalf of himself and 15 other inmates, including Duckett, to challenge the adequacy of the food served at Kershaw. This complaint made the same claims that McFadden had made in 2010 while at Kirkland. When the district court severed the action, requiring each inmate to prosecute his own claims, Duckett did indeed pursue his own, using the McFaddendrafted injuries complaint he and claimed adding to be his own suffering. allegations The about district the court dismissed Duckett’s action because the complaint was virtually identical to McFadden’s 2010 complaint that had been dismissed, stating that “to go forward would mean relitigating the same 12 issues this court litigated in McFadden I. the principles behind res judicata.” This goes against Because Duckett was not a party to McFadden’s 2010 suit and was not served in that action, however, he cannot be bound by the judgment of dismissal in that action unless one of the six Taylor exceptions applies. It appears exceptions undisputed clearly have that no four of applicability the here. six Taylor There is no indication that Duckett agreed to be bound by the judgment in McFadden’s 2010 suit (exception one); that McFadden represented Duckett in the 2010 suit through a class action mechanism or other type of functioned as representational Duckett’s action, trustee, such guardian, that or McFadden fiduciary (exception three); that Duckett assumed control over McFadden’s 2010 suit (exception four); or that Duckett’s action implicated a special statutory scheme limiting relitigation (exception six). As to the second Taylor exception, which applies based on “a variety of pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the person to be bound [in the current action] and a party to the (alteration, the state exception [previous] internal defendants applies judgment,” Taylor, 553 U.S. quotation marks, and suggest, almost in passing, this casual here. But citation at 894 omitted), that this assertion misunderstands the nature of the exception, which is reserved 13 for a variety of legal, property-based relationships. Taylor Court explained, second exception include relationships “preceding qualifying and As the under succeeding the owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor,” noting further that this exception “originated ‘as much from the needs of property law as from the values of preclusion by judgment.’” Id. (quoting 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4448 (2d ed. 2002)). Nothing in this record hints of any qualifying substantive legal relationship between Duckett and McFadden that might implicate the second exception. The state defendants’ argument for nonparty preclusion therefore can rest only, if at all, on the fifth exception, which would preclude Duckett from bringing his suit “as a representative or agent of [McFadden] who is bound by the prior adjudication.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 905. But nothing in the record supports this exception, which, in essence, is aimed at precluding McFadden from relitigating his 2010 case by using Duckett as his foil. To be sure, McFadden apparently drafted the original complaint in this case for himself and 15 other inmates, and, indeed, “jailhouse lawyer.” Duckett has referred to McFadden as a But such jailhouse-lawyer assistance does not prove that Duckett is acting “subject to the control” of McFadden for the purpose of pursuing McFadden’s claim. 14 Id. at 906. To the contrary, the record indicates that Duckett used McFadden’s assistance to pursue his own claim. the original consistent complaint with his as a plaintiff, own earlier and Duckett signed his grievance joinder was about the institution’s food, which he filed in May 2012, nearly a year before this action was commenced. claim was severed from the claims In addition, when Duckett’s of the other 15 inmates, Duckett paid the filing fee from his own prison account and supplied the court with language, in his own words, describing the nature of his personal injuries. Nothing in the record suggests that Duckett was acting as an agent for McFadden to pursue McFadden’s claims or that McFadden was serving as some form of “puppeteer” controlling Duckett, as the state defendants argue. Taylor’s fifth exception thus does not apply to this case. At bottom, we conclude that the state defendants have failed, at this stage, to meet their burden of demonstrating the applicability of any of the six Taylor exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion. Accordingly, as a nonparty to McFadden’s 2010 suit, Duckett is not barred by a judgment in that suit from pursuing his own similar claims in this action. The district court’s judgment dismissing 15 Duckett’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is thus reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 16
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