US v. Luke Preacher, No. 15-6515 (4th Cir. 2015)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-6515 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner - Appellee, v. LUKE PREACHER, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:14-hc-02179-FL) Submitted: September 29, 2015 Decided: October 7, 2015 Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Leza Lee Driscoll, LAW OFFICE OF LEZA LEE DRISCOLL, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Michael Bredenberg, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: On August 20, 2014, the Government filed a Certificate of a Sexually Dangerous Person against Luke Preacher, seeking civil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012). his Preacher moved to dismiss the proceeding, asserting that he was not in the legal custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the time the Government initiated the civil commitment proceeding. district that court Preacher denied the qualified motion as a and subsequently sexually dangerous The determined person and ordered his commitment to the care and custody of the Attorney General. Preacher appeals, challenging the district court’s determination that the Certificate was timely filed. As Preacher correctly notes, a person must be under the legal custody of the BOP at the time the Government files a Certification of a Sexually Dangerous Person; civil commitment proceeding must be dismissed. Joshua, 607 § 4248(a) F.3d 379, (providing 388 that (4th civil Cir. 2010); commitment otherwise, the United States v. see 18 U.S.C. proceeding may commence against a person “who is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons”). Thus, for Preacher’s commitment under § 4248 to stand, he must have been under both the physical and the legal custody of the BOP on August 25, 2014. therefore affirm. 2 We find that he was, and On April 25, 2000, the Fort Hall Police Department on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation in Idaho arrested Luke Preacher on charges of marijuana, rape, and abduction endangering for the defilement, welfare of possession a minor of child. Preacher pled guilty to rape and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. Preacher subsequently pled guilty in the federal district court to aggravated sexual abuse of a child within Indian Country based on the same conduct for which he pled guilty in the tribal court. months’ The district court sentenced him to 168- imprisonment. The district court was silent as to whether the 168-month term was to be served concurrently with or consecutive to the nine-month sentence imposed by the tribal court, but the court did recommend that “the defendant be credited with all time served, including time served through tribal court.” On January 5, 2001, the tribal court relinquished authority over Preacher and turned him over to the U.S. Marshals to begin serving his federal sentence. Preacher recommendation contends that he that, due receive to the district court’s credit for all served, time including that served under his tribal sentence, his federal term of months imprisonment after his expired arrest by on the This argument fails. 3 April Fort 25, Hall 2014, Police exactly 168 Department. Assuming Preacher is correct that the district court intended a credit for all nine months of his tribal sentence, this calculation permitted under would 18 not U.S.C. be § binding 3585(b). on District authority to compute credit at sentencing. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992). the Attorney calculations. General, Id. acting the BOP if courts not lack United States v. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), through the BOP, makes these In determining the amount of prior custody credit a defendant is to receive, § 3585(b) directs the BOP to give the defendant credit “for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; . . . that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added). Here, the BOP heeded the district court’s recommendation and calculated the credit available to Preacher under § 3585(b). First, the BOP determined that the tribal authorities credited Preacher’s nine-month sentence with all of the time served from April 25, 2000, the date of his arrest, until January 5, 2001, the date the tribal court relinquished authority over Preacher. Because Preacher received credit for time served from the Fort Hall Jail, the BOP appropriately determined that Preacher was not entitled any additional prior custody credit against his 168-month federal sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); see also 4 Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 (“Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.”). Accordingly, Preacher commenced sentence on January 5, 2001. serving his 168-month federal Accounting for good time credit, Preacher’s release date was appropriately computed to be October 12, 2014. In sum, commitment on the date proceeding, the August Government 25, 2014, initiated Preacher the was physical as well as the legal custody of the BOP. civil in the Thus, the district court had authority to proceed with the determination of whether to certify Preacher as a sexually dangerous person. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Preacher’s motion to dismiss the proceeding and therefore affirm the civil commitment order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
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