US v. Michael Casteen, No. 15-4681 (4th Cir. 2016)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4681 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MICHAEL WAYNE CASTEEN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (7:05-cr-00029-F-2) Submitted: May 18, 2016 Decided: May 20, 2016 Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Michael Casteen appeals the district court’s order imposing a 60–month prison sentence upon revoking his supervised release. On appeal, he claims that his sentence to the statutory maximum is substantively than necessary plainly to unreasonable satisfy the because purposes of it was greater sentencing. We affirm. We will not disturb a district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside the statutory maximum or is otherwise “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.) (citing United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir.2006)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 494 (2015). Only if the revocation sentence is unreasonable must we assess whether it is plainly so. Id. (citing United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir.2007)). “In determining whether a revocation sentence is unreasonable,” we are informed by the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our review deferential of original appellate sentences posture.” but Id. “we strike (citations and a more internal quotation marks omitted). A district court “retains broad discretion to ... impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Id. In exercising such discretion, the district court “is guided by the Chapter 2 Seven policy statements in the federal Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).” 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013). United States v. Webb, “Chapter Seven instructs that, in fashioning a revocation sentence, ‘the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012)). “Although § 3583(e) enumerates the factors a district court should consider when formulating a revocation sentence, it does not expressly prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted from the statute.” listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) are Id. Moreover, “the factors intertwined with the factors courts are expressly authorized to consider under § 3583(e).” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, “although a district court may not sentence impose a seriousness sentence revocation of to the promote releasee’s respect based violation for the predominately on the for the or the need law and provide just punishment . . . mere reference to such considerations does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” 3 Id. at 642 (citation omitted); see USSG ch. 7, pt. A(3)(B) (punishing new criminal conduct is not “the primary goal of a revocation sentence,” but the “nature of the conduct leading to the revocation [is] considered in measuring the extent of the breach of trust”). Here, the district court properly considered the Chapter 7 policy statements as well as the relevant § 3553(a) factors. The court also appropriately considered struggles with substance abuse. that the unreasonable. order. legal before sentence admitted On these facts, we cannot say imposed Accordingly, Casteen’s was we affirm substantively the plainly district court’s We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 4
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