US v. Julie Ann Johnson, No. 15-4174 (4th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4174 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. JULIE ANN JOHNSON, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00012-JPB-JSK-1) Submitted: July 30, 2015 Decided: October 27, 2015 Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curium opinion. L. Richard Walker, Patrick I. Holbrook, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Stephen D. Warner, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Julie reserving Ann her Johnson right entered to appeal a conditional the denial of guilty her plea, suppression motion, to possession of material used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6) and 843(d)(2). On appeal, Johnson contends that the search warrant application failed to establish probable cause and that the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s judgment. I. On April 23, 2013, Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington of the Randolph County Sherriff’s Department applied for a warrant to search Johnson’s home. relevant part, that The search warrant affidavit stated, in (1) on April 13, 2013, Corporal Vanscoy issued Johnson a citation for stealing twelve lithium batteries from a local WalMart; (2) Corporal Talkington reviewed security footage and a sales receipt from the same WalMart, indicating Johnson had purchased airline tubing and Coleman Fuel--materials commonly used in methamphetamine production--from the same WalMart and left in a car owned by Craig Hensley (“Hensley”); and (3) Corporal Vanscoy completed a National Precursor Log Exchange (“NPLEX”) search that revealed that Johnson and Hensley 2 had purchased pseudoephedrine during March and April of 2013. A Randolph County magistrate approved the warrant application. Law enforcement Johnson’s promptly residence methamphetamine manufacturing and executed recovered production, instructions, the search items associated including ice warrant at with methamphetamine compressors, clear pseudoephedrine, and other drug paraphernalia. tubing, A federal grand jury indicted Johnson in the Northern District of West Virginia for two counts of possession of material used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6) and 843(d)(2), and four counts of possession of pseudoephedrine to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (c)(2). Johnson moved to suppress the evidence seized from her residence, claiming that the search warrant affidavit failed to explicitly connect criminal searched, her residence. activity to the place to be Johnson further argued that the good- faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because (1) the affidavit contained “numerous falsehoods”; (2) the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render reliance on it entirely unreasonable; and (3) the magistrate merely served as a “rubber stamp” for the police. After a hearing, the federal magistrate judge recommended granting Johnson’s motion to suppress. 3 The magistrate judge concluded the affidavit failed to establish a sufficient nexus to Johnson’s residence, as the affidavit did not suggest any illegal activity occurred at Johnson’s residence. The magistrate judge also concluded the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because the search affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” as to render police reliance on it unreasonable. Notwithstanding the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court denied Johnson’s motion to suppress, concluding that the facts alleged in establish probable cause. that even assuming the affidavit were sufficient to Further, the district court concluded the warrant was invalid, “the officers’ reliance on the search warrant was objectively reasonable.” After the district court denied Johnson’s motion to suppress, Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of material used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her suppression imprisonment. motion. Johnson Johnson was timely sentenced appealed, jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 and to this 57 months’ court has II. “We review factual findings regarding [a] motion suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2014). to United When the district court has denied the motion, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). In cases where a defendant challenges both probable cause and the applicability of the good-faith exception, we may proceed directly to the good-faith analysis without first deciding whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994). United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d Here, because it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant, we conclude the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies. Thus, we need not decide whether the warrant lacked probable cause. III. The which Fourth protects provides, cause, Amendment that to the individuals “no supported by Warrants Oath from shall or United States Constitution, “unreasonable issue, affirmation, but and searches,” upon probable particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 5 To deter future police misconduct, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally barred from trial under the exclusionary rule. United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2009). However, "[u]nder requirement, the evidence good[-]faith obtained exception from an to the warrant invalidated search warrant will be suppressed only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause." United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1583 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984)). Our case law establishes four situations in which an officer’s reliance on a search warrant would not be considered reasonable: (1) the magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit that the officer knew was false or would have known was false except for the officer's reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role; (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit that was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) the warrant was so facially deficient, by failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized, that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. 6 United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). Under any of those circumstances, the good-faith exception does not apply, and any evidence gathered pursuant excluded from trial. to the deficient warrant must be Andrews, 577 F.3d at 236. On appeal, Johnson asserts the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement warrant affidavit does not contained apply because: “numerous (1) the falsehoods”; search (2) the search warrant affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render reliance on it entirely unreasonable; and (3) the state magistrate abandoned his neutral role and merely rubber stamped the warrant. We analyze each argument below. A. First, Johnson alleges the good-faith exception does not apply because the search warrant affidavit contains “numerous falsehoods.” Specifically, Johnson points to the officers’ statement in their affidavit that “Johnson and Hensley have been actively purchasing pseudoephedrine based products during March and April of this year.” J.A. 29. Johnson argues this statement is false because only she purchased pseudoephedrine products in March, while only Hensley purchased them in April. We find this argument unpersuasive. 7 The good-faith exception applies unless a magistrate is misled by information an affiant knew to be false or would have known was false but for the affiant’s reckless disregard for its truth. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1156. Even if the officers’ statement were not literally true, Johnson has failed to show that any alleged false statement was knowingly or recklessly made. The NPLEX reports indicated that Hensley had purchased pseudoephedrine products in April, but not March, whereas Johnson had purchased pseudoephedrine products in March, but not April. It was therefore reasonable for Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington to infer from the information they obtained during their investigation that Johnson and Hensley were engaged in a joint venture to obtain methamphetamine materials. This information includes the NPLEX reports, the video footage of Johnson purchasing methamphetamine Johnson leave materials from WalMart, WalMart in commonly and Hensley’s the used video car. to footage While we make showing need not decide whether the combination of these circumstances gives rise to probable cause, we cannot say that Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington made a statement they knew to be false or would have known was false except for their truth. 8 reckless disregard for its B. Next, Johnson alleges that it was unreasonable for the officers to rely upon the warrant because the search warrant affidavit allegedly failed to provide a sufficient nexus to establish probable cause that methamphetamine materials could be found inside Johnson’s home. An officer’s unreasonable We disagree. reliance even if the on a warrant application fails is to not rendered establish a sufficient nexus between a target’s residence and the suspected criminal activity. (4th Cir. 1993). United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582 We have applied the good-faith exception to uphold the search of a suspect’s residence “on the basis of (1) evidence of the suspect’s involvement in drug trafficking combined with (2) the reasonable suspicion (whether explicitly articulated by the applying officer or implicitly arrived at by the magistrate judge) that drug traffickers store drug-related evidence in their homes.” United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008). Even assuming the affidavit failed to provide a sufficient nexus to establish probable cause, we cannot say that its absence is so severe so as to preclude reasonable reliance on the warrant. To the contrary, “it is reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores drugs in a home to which he owns a key.” Id. at 218. Additionally, our 9 case law establishes that disagreement among judges as to the existence of probable cause indicates that an officer’s reliance on an affidavit was objectively reasonable. See Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 926). Although the federal magistrate judge in this instance concluded that the search affidavit failed to establish probable cause that methamphetamine materials could be found in magistrate Johnson’s who home, issued the two judicial warrant, and officers--the the district state judge-- determined that the affidavit provided probable cause to search. Given the circumstances, we cannot say that the officers’ reliance on the warrant was entirely unreasonable. C. Finally, Johnson argues that the magistrate functioned as a rubber stamp for the police when he authorized the warrant. An issuing magistrate acts as a rubber stamp for police when he approves a “bare bones” affidavit. A “bare bones” affidavit is one that contains “wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances independently determine from probable which cause.” a magistrate United States can v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Laury, 985 affidavit is conclusions F.2d 1293, 1311 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993)). An “bare bones” when an affiant merely recites the of others without 10 corroboration or independent investigation of the facts alleged. See, e.g., Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 120. We see no “bare bones.” basis for concluding that this affidavit was To the contrary, Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington stated specific circumstances, including Johnson’s activities at WalMart and involvement the in NPLEX reports, methamphetamine that suggested manufacturing. Johnson’s Additionally, Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington learned this information firsthand during a ten-day investigation. Therefore, we cannot say that this knowledge, magistrate affidavit, is could based “wholly not upon conclusory,” have the affiants’ personal that a neutral determined probable such independently cause. Thus, even assuming the alleged defects in the affidavit demonstrate an absence of probable cause, we cannot conclude that the faith. officers’ reliance on the warrant was not in good Finding that the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies, we need not decide whether probable cause to issue the warrant existed. IV. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 11
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
