US v. Ricky Crawford, Jr., No. 15-4064 (4th Cir. 2015)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4064 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. RICKY DOUGLAS CRAWFORD, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00138-WO-1) Submitted: September 30, 2015 Before DUNCAN Circuit Judge. and WYNN, Circuit Decided: Judges, and October 6, 2015 DAVIS, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Brian Michael Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Ricky Douglas Crawford, Jr., was convicted of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2012), and carrying and using, by discharging, a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) Crawford received an aggregate sentence of 382 months. appeals. He now Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, stating (2012). 386 that U.S. there 738 are (1967), no raising meritorious several issues Crawford has filed a pro se supplemental brief. claims for but appeal. We affirm. I Crawford first contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated. Because he did not raise this claim below, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). The record reflects that the indictment was returned on April 28, 2014, and trial was scheduled to begin on July 21, 2014. On July 15, defense counsel moved for a continuance until the September term of court because counsel suffered a ruptured appendix on July 9. The district court granted the motion upon the determination that denying the motion “would likely result in a miscarriage of justice by denying counsel for Defendant reasonable time” to prepare a defense and “the ends of justice served by the granting of a continuance . . . outweigh the best 2 interests of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial.” Trial commenced on September 22, 2014. A defendant has both a statutory and a constitutional right to a speedy trial. commence within 70 indictment is filed. Under the Speedy Trial Act, trial must days of the date the information 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012). or Periods of delay are excludable from the calculation if they result from the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for a continuance, provided that the court grants the motion on the basis “that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). A defendant also has a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider when determining if a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated: the “length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” “The length mechanism. of the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). delay is to some extent a triggering Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Id. Given the reason for the delay, the relatively short length of the delay, and the lack of any apparent prejudice to the 3 defense caused by the delay, we hold that there was no violation of either the Speedy Trial Act or Crawford’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. II Counsel claims that the district court erroneously denied Crawford’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. In a related claim, counsel asserts that the Government violated Crawford’s rights when it introduced the allegedly perjured testimony of Crawford’s accomplice, Shiheem Williamson. We find neither claim to have merit. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion. United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 2015). “[T]he verdict . . . must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, government, to omitted). finder taking support the it.” view Id. most favorable (internal to quotation the marks “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 630 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Testimony at trial established that on August 15, 2013, two men entered a Wells Fargo Bank in Reidsville, North Carolina. One of the men fired a shot into the ceiling of the bank. robbers instructed everyone to get on the floor. 4 The Both men wore dark clothing, bandanas pulled over their faces, and gloves. They stole approximately $14,000. Officers who responded viewed surveillance videos and noted what the robbers wore. Later that day, a delivery man at a convenience store glanced into the store’s dumpster and noticed what clothing strewn inside. He reported this to the store manager who, in turn, contacted the police. The clothing in the dumpster matched the description of the clothing the robbers had worn. DNA samples taken from bandanas that were recovered from the dumpster matched the DNA of Crawford and his cousin, Shiheem Williamson. Williamson testified against Crawford. According to Williamson, Crawford planned the robbery, instructing Williamson what to do when they entered the bank and supplying Williamson with gloves and a bandana to wear during the robbery. When they entered into the bank, Williamson, as instructed, fired ceiling, and Crawford took money from tellers’ drawers. the They left the bank and drove to the convenience store, where they disposed of their clothing in the dumpster. Williamson identified the clothing that was recovered and introduced at trial as the clothing they had worn during the robbery. He also testified that videos from both the bank and the convenience store were of him and Crawford during subsequent disposal of their clothing. 5 the robbery and the Finally, Shunta Frazier, who was incarcerated with Crawford for a brief period, testified that Crawford admitted committing the robbery. Among other things, Crawford stated that he and his cousin had thrown clothing worn during the robbery into a dumpster. Based on the evidence presented at trial, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict Crawford of both offenses and that the district court properly denied the Rule 29 motion. Crawford makes a related claim that the Government erred when it introduced Williamson. the allegedly perjured testimony of We review this allegation for plain error because it was not raised at trial. U.S. at 732-34. See United States v. Olano, 507 At trial, Williamson admitted that, when he was first interviewed by the police, he minimized his role in the offense by stating that it was Crawford who shot into the ceiling and that his take of the proceeds of the robbery was around $300 when, in fact, Crawford gave him $5000. testified that he lied because he was scared. counsel cross-examined discrepancy between his statement to the police. determine whether Williamson testimony At trial, defense extensively at Williamson trial and about his the initial The jury had ample opportunity to Williamson’s testimony was truthful. discern no plain error in the introduction of his testimony. 6 We III Counsel next contends instructions on accomplice erroneous. In reviewing that and the district informant jury court’s testimony instructions, we were consider “whether, taken as a whole and in the context of the entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the controlling law.” United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d 756, 771 (4th (internal Cir. 2010) omitted). informant We have previously instructions, and instructions in this case. 183, 186-87 (4th quotation Cir. upheld we marks and similar discern no alteration accomplice and error the in See United States v. Luck, 611 F.3d 2010) (informant testimony); United States v. Bivins, 104 F. App’x 892, 902 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4743) (accomplice testimony). IV Counsel sentenced as also a maintains career that offender. Crawford Our was review of incorrectly the record, however, establishes conclusively that Crawford qualified as a career offender. He was over 18 when he committed the instant offenses, the present offenses are crimes of violence, and he had the requisite two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. (2013). See U.S. Further, Sentencing there was no Guidelines requirement Manual that § 4B1.1(a) his career offender status be charged in the indictment and found by the 7 jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). V In his informal brief, Crawford arguments raised in the Anders brief. repeats many of the He additionally contends that an affidavit filed in support of his arrest warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. The arrest warrant, however, states on its face that it was issued pursuant to the indictment. Accordingly, we find this claim to lack merit. VI In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. therefore affirm Crawford’s convictions and sentence. We This court requires counsel, in writing, to inform Crawford of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Crawford requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel representation. may move in this court to withdraw from Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served on Crawford. We dispense with oral argument be cause the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 8
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