Lance McCoy v. AAU of the United States, Inc., No. 15-1114 (4th Cir. 2015)

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1114 LANCE MCCOY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., Defendant – Appellee, and BRYANT NEWMUIS; FREDDIE HENDRICKS TRACK CLUB, An Affiliate Organization of The Amateur Athletic Union, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge. (1:13-cv-03744-MJG) Submitted: August 10, 2015 Decided: September 3, 2015 Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Edward Smith, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF EDWARD SMITH, JR., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Angela W. Russell, Peter A. Coleman, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: Lance McCoy appeals the district court’s order granting the Amateur Athletic motion for Union summary of the United judgment and States, Inc.’s dismissing his (“AAU”) action. Specifically, McCoy contends that the district court erred in contradicting rulings by a Maryland state court made prior to removal and holding that AAU was not vicariously liable for the sexually abusive conduct of McCoy’s former track coach (“the coach”). McCoy also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to remand the case to state court because AAU failed to timely file its notice of removal. We affirm. We first review de novo the district court’s order denying remand. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815-16 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). before the district Here, because McCoy failed to assert court that AAU’s notice of removal untimely, he has forfeited his right to do so on appeal. was See Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Procedural defects in removal are . . . similar to the lack of personal jurisdiction and other shortcomings that may be waived or forfeited.”) (quoting Matter of Cont’l Cas. Co., 29 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996) (noting that an argument concerning § 1446(b)’s one-year time limit counts as a “nonjurisdictional 3 argument” that “may be deemed waived” under Supreme Court Rule 15.2 when not raised in a respondent’s brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari). We next review summary judgment. 2015). light de novo the district court’s grant of Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693, 696-97 (4th Cir. All facts and reasonable inferences are viewed “in the most Packaging favorable Corp. of to Am., the 673 non-moving F.3d 323, party.” 330 Dulaney v. (4th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is only appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In challenging summary judgment, McCoy first argues that the district estoppel, and court was bound by res judicata, collateral the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to deny AAU’s motion for summary judgment so as to not conflict with the Maryland court’s prior denial of AAU’s previous motion to dismiss. McCoy is mistaken. Aside from the fact that the standards for motion to dismiss and summary judgment collateral are estoppel relitigation. quite distinct, require a both “final res judicata judgment” to and bar See Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 887 A.2d 1029, 1037 (Md. 2005) (res judicata); Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc., estoppel). 863 A.2d 926, 933 (Md. 2004) (collateral Here, there was no final judgment in state court. 4 Further, Erie is inapplicable here because this case involves no conflict between state and federal law. that the district deviated, in court granting did not summary err Therefore, we conclude to judgment, the extent from the that it Maryland court’s order denying AAU’s prior motion to dismiss. Finally, McCoy contends that summary judgment was improper because genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether the coach was AAU’s agent and was acting within the scope of the principal-agent relationship when he sexually assaulted McCoy. Under Maryland law, principals are liable for the conduct of their agents only when the conduct is within the scope of the principal-agent relationship. See S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 836 A.2d 627, 638 (Md. 2003) (stating rule with respect to employeremployee relationship). “[W]here an [agent]’s actions are personal, or where they represent a departure from the purpose of furthering the [principal]’s business, . . . even if during normal duty hours and at an authorized locality, the [agent]’s actions are outside the scope of his [agency].” Sawyer v. Humphries, 587 A.2d 467, 471 (Md. 1991). “[W]here the conduct of unusual, and this itself the [agent] outrageous, is courts unprovoked, tend to highly hold that in quite is sufficient to indicate that the motive was a purely personal one and the conduct outside the scope of [agency].” brackets and quotation marks omitted). 5 Id. (internal Even assuming that the coach was AAU’s agent, we hold that AAU cannot be vicariously liable for his conduct, which was well outside of the principal-agent relationship. McCoy’s claim that AAU negligently supervised and vetted the coach and provided him with the environment in which he committed sexual assault is irrelevant to whether AAU can be held vicariously liable for his conduct. We therefore find that summary judgment was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders denying McCoy’s motion to remand, granting AAU’s judgment, and dismissing McCoy’s case. motion for summary We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.