US v. Loretta Meredith, No. 14-4713 (4th Cir. 2015)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4713 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. LORETTA MEREDITH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00017-IMK-JSK-2) Submitted: February 9, 2015 Decided: February 12, 2015 Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charles T. Berry, Fairmont, West Virginia, for Appellant. Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Loretta Meredith appeals the district court’s criminal judgment sentencing her to one year and one day of imprisonment for conspiring to knowingly and corruptly attempt to obstruct, influence, and impede an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and (k) (2012). In accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel for Meredith filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning (1) wrongly increased Guidelines range the for whether base offense substantially the level district for court Meredith’s interfering with the administration of justice, (2) clearly erred in increasing the base offense level for Meredith’s Guidelines range because the offense was extensive in scope, planning, or preparation, or (3) imposed an unreasonable sentence. Although advised of her right to do so, Meredith did not file a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm. In determining whether the district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement, this court “review[s] factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014). Meredith first questions whether the district court improperly enhanced her sentence because “the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice.” 2 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2J1.2(b)(2). “‘Substantial interference with the administration of justice’ includes . . . the unnecessary governmental or court resources.” expenditure of substantial USSG § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1. Our review of the record reflects that the district court properly substantial Because increased interference significant Meredith’s with the government offense level administration resources of were for justice. invested to resolve Meredith’s attempts at obstruction, the district court did not clearly err in this conclusion. court erroneously “double-count” by Nor did the district applying the enhancement even though she was convicted of obstruction of justice. United States v. Dudley, 941 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. See 1991) (defendant may properly receive “substantial interference with the administration of justice” enhancement for underlying questions whether district perjury offense). Meredith clearly erred in next enhancing her sentence the because her court offense “(A) involved the destruction, alteration, or fabrication of a substantial number of records, documents, or tangible objects; . . . or (C) was otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or preparation.” USSG § 2J1.2(b)(3). After reviewing the record, we the appropriately hold that enhancement. district court applied this Meredith’s attempts at obstruction were extensive 3 in scope, planning, and preparation. statute’s disjunctive construction, Accordingly, given the whether she fabricated a “substantial number” of documents is immaterial. Finally, we review Meredith’s sentence reasonableness using an abuse-of-discretion standard. for Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first review for “significant including procedural error,” “improperly calculating[] the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, explain the chosen sentence.” If we find no or failing to adequately Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. procedural error, we examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary[,]” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. See § 3553(a). We presume on appeal that a sentence below or within a properly calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. 445 F.3d omitted). 375, 379 The (4th Cir. defendant United States v. Montes-Pineda, 2006) bears (internal the quotation burden to rebut marks the presumption by showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” Meredith received an Id. adequate, explanation of her below-Guidelines sentence. 4 individualized Our review of the record leads us to conclude that her sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Meredith, in writing, of her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If she requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in representation. this court for leave to withdraw from Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the appellant. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal before contentions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
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