US v. Calvin Hall, No. 14-4462 (4th Cir. 2015)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4462 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CALVIN JAMES HALL, a/k/a Kebo, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:12-cr-00513-JFA-16) Submitted: October 28, 2015 Before NIEMEYER Circuit Judge. and KING, Decided: Circuit Judges, November 10, 2015 and DAVIS, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Todd Hagins, THE HAGINS LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, J.D. Rowell, Assistant United States Attorney, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E. Booth, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Calvin Hall appeals his convictions and life sentence for conspiring to participate in racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963(a) (2012) (Count 1); conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2012) (Count 10); two counts of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (Counts 14, 44); using a telephone to facilitate a drug conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2012), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 47); and interfering with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951 (2012) (Count 83). On appeal, Hall contends that (1) evidence seized during the traffic attending stop should officer have lacked been reasonable suppressed because suspicion of the illegal activity; (2) evidence obtained from Hall’s cell phone should have been suppressed, despite the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule (3) wiretap evidence and the should independent have been source suppressed doctrine; because the district court clearly erred in finding that the wiretap was necessary; and (4) his sentence contravened United States v. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). We affirm. 2 I When evaluating a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review its legal determinations de novo and its factual States v. construe determinations Sowards, the 690 evidence F.3d “in for 583, the clear 587 error. United (4th most light Government, the prevailing party below.” Cir. 2012). favorable We to the Id. A “When a police officer stops an automobile and detains the occupants briefly, Fourth Amendment. 506 (4th Cir. the stop amounts to a seizure” under the United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 2011). An officer “may initiate a brief investigatory stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). To determine conduct a whether “totality of reasonable the suspicion circumstances” exists, courts inquiry, asking “whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting activity.” the particular person stopped Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). of criminal Reasonable suspicion is “a commonsense, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 3 men, not legal technicians, act.” United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, seizure based when in an large officer part on effects a information Fourth Amendment received from an informant, the reliability of that informant is an important consideration existed. in determining whether reasonable suspicion See United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2004). Reasonable suspicion depends as much on the “content (or quantity)” of the information provided as it does on the “reliability (or quality)” of the information. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 329 (4th Cir. 2004). Applying these standards to the record before us, we conclude that the police officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to stop Hall’s vehicle. The reliability of the informant is not in question, and the police knew that drug deals often occurred at the arranged location. Moreover, the timing of Hall’s arrival and his behavior were inconsistent with the informant’s information and, together, provided reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Hall’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. B Hall next challenges the admission of evidence found in a forensic search of his phone. The exclusionary rule prohibits 4 introducing “evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, but the sole purpose of the rule is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, and its application properly has been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced.” Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. United States v. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, No. 14-1313, 2015 WL 1970174 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015). As a result, “when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, . . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427-28 (2011) (citation and internal quotation exclusionary rule marks does not omitted). apply to Consequently, searches conducted the in accordance with then-binding appellate precedent, even if that precedent is later overruled. Id. at 2423-24. In this case, at the time of the search, this court had ruled that without the a contents warrant during of a a cell search phone could incident to be retrieved arrest. See United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 410-12 (4th Cir. 2009). While the Supreme Court later held to the contrary, in Riley v. California, officer’s 134 conduct S. Ct. was in 2473, 2484-85 accord 5 with (2014), the then-binding searching precedent. Therefore, the district court properly declined to suppress the evidence obtained. II Hall challenges the district court’s admission of evidence secured by wiretap. We review a district court’s determination of the necessity for a wiretap under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007). To justify a wiretap, the Government must demonstrate that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). The burden imposed by this provision “is not great, and the adequacy of such a showing is to be tested in a practical and commonsense fashion that does not hamper unduly the investigative powers of law enforcement agents.” Wilson, omitted). “[T]he Government need only present specific factual information sufficient difficulties gathering 484 in F.3d to at such (internal establish penetrating evidence 281 that the that it criminal wiretapping quotation has encountered enterprise becomes marks or in reasonable.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We have investigative failed to upheld findings techniques adequately of necessity revealed some penetrate the 6 where illegal full traditional activity, extent of but the conspiracy. F.2d Wilson, 484 F.3d 267; United States v. Leavis, 853 215, 221 investigative failed to (4th Cir. techniques “identify 1988). provided the In Wilson, valuable higher-ups of traditional information, the conspiracy,” but or “uncover the conspiracy’s cocaine source and the extent to which the coconspirators distributed it for resale.” Upholding the emphasized district that court’s wiretaps are finding 484 F.3d at 281. of particularly necessity, necessary we “where crimes are committed by large and sophisticated organizations.” Id. Indeed, “read[ing] the statute in an overly restrictive manner . . . could result in helping insulate more complex and sophisticated conspiracies.” We find Wilson. Hall’s case Consequently, the Id. materially district indistinguishable court correctly from denied Hall’s motion to suppress this evidence. III Finally, Hall contends that the district court erred in sentencing him. a sentence. We review de novo a constitutional challenge to United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 2014). The Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment require that any fact that raises the minimum or maximum sentence a defendant faces must be charged in the indictment and admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury 7 beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160-63 (2013). Excepted from this general requirement is the fact of a prior conviction. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998); see Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1 (refusing to revisit Almendarez-Torres). When a defendant is convicted of a drug conspiracy, “prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendant’s sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final.” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2006). Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant convicted of a drug trafficking offense “after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final” is subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. The specific district verdict conspiracy court’s as to continued failure whether after to seek Hall’s the date from the participation on which jury in his a the prior convictions became final was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Count 44, the jury determined that on June 26, 2012, Hall received cocaine from individuals who were known members of the Bloods, which he then intended to distribute. convictions became final in October 2011. Hall’s prior Thus, the district court’s failure to obtain a specific finding from the jury that 8 Hall participated in the conspiracy beyond October 2011 was harmless. IV We affirm the district court’s judgment and deny Hall’s motion to file a pro se brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 9

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.