US v. Joseph Patterson, III, No. 14-4406 (4th Cir. 2014)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4406 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. JOSEPH IRA PATTERSON, III, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00196-1) Submitted: October 23, 2014 Before NIEMEYER Circuit Judge. and MOTZ, Decided: Circuit Judges, November 4, 2014 and DAVIS, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Mary Lou Newberger, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Joseph F. Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Joseph Ira Patterson, III, appeals from his thirty-month sentence entered pursuant to the revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Patterson argues that his sentence is longer than necessary to address the purposes of supervised release, was improperly based upon the seriousness of his criminal conduct while on supervised release, and is, thus, plainly unreasonable. We affirm. “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable “plainly unreasonable.” 438 (4th Cir. 2006). statutory maximum and not United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, In exercising its discretion, the district court “is guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal Guidelines manual, as well applicable to revocation sentences.” “Chapter Seven instructs as the statutory factors Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. that, in fashioning a revocation sentence, ‘the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.’” Id. (quoting Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012)). 2 U.S. In determining the length of a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) requires a sentencing court to consider all but two of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). One of the excluded factors is the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” 461 F.3d at 439. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), Crudup, We have recognized that “[a]lthough § 3583(e) enumerates the factors a district court should consider when formulating a revocation sentence, it does not expressly prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted from the statute.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. As long as a court does not base a revocation sentence predominately on the omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, and considered conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” in Id. at 642. A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district defendant court should statutory maximum. states receive a proper the basis sentence for concluding imposed, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. up to the the Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court “then decide whether 3 the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. A sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable. Patterson argues that his Id. sentence was longer than necessary, based in part on the fact that the district court placed undue weight on the seriousness of his armed robbery offense, which led to the revocation of his supervised release. In addition, Patterson avers that the district court failed to give appropriate consideration to the four years he spent in state prison for that offense. Because Patterson challenges the district court’s reliance on an inappropriate factor and did not argue for a sentence below the Policy Statement range, review is for plain error. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640. Under plain error review, Patterson must show that (1) the court erred, (2) the error was clear or substantial rights. obvious, and (3) Id. at 640-41. the error affected his Even if Patterson meets his burden, we retain discretion to recognize the error and will deny relief unless the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this instance, the district court directly addressed Patterson’s argument that he had already been punished for the robbery by noting that Patterson had not yet served a sentence or otherwise been punished for violating the conditions of supervised release. The court 4 observed that Patterson’s order of supervision specifically prohibited him from engaging in criminal conduct and that Patterson engaged in such conduct within a year of his release. The court also noted that Patterson had been given a lenient original sentence and that his breach of trust was very serious. It is clear from the district court’s statement that Patterson’s breach of trust was the main reason district court imposed the sentence it did. did rely while on on the seriousness supervised of release, the Although the court Patterson’s this that factor criminal is conduct essentially “redundant with matters courts are already permitted to take into consideration.” (6th Cir. 2007). United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 Further, the court’s consideration of the seriousness of the crime was consistent with recognizing the magnitude of Patterson’s breach of trust. 642 (approving references to omitted See Webb, 738 F.3d at sentencing factors that were related to references to permissible sentencing factors). Thus, there was no error, much less Accordingly, we affirm Patterson’s sentence. oral argument adequately because presented in the the facts and materials plain error. We dispense with legal contentions are before this and court argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
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