US v. Johnathan Stroud, No. 14-4254 (4th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4254 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOHNATHAN J. STROUD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00285-WO-1) Submitted: September 25, 2014 Before NIEMEYER Circuit Judge. and MOTZ, Circuit Decided: Judges, October 10, 2014 and DAVIS, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gregory S. Smith, LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY S. SMITH, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Johnathan J. Stroud appeals the district court s judgment and commitment order revoking his supervised release, ordering that he serve a sentence of twenty-four months imprisonment with no further period of supervision, directing that the sentence run consecutively to any anticipated state sentence, and that he be given credit for part of the period of time he was in federal detention. We affirm. Because Stroud did not object to the district court s decision that the revocation sentence run consecutively to any anticipated state sentence, review is for plain error. States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). plain error, Stroud must show (1) that the United To establish district court erred, (2) that the error is clear or obvious, and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 640-41 Even if Stroud meets this burden, we retain discretion to choose whether to recognize the error and will deny relief unless the court s error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. alteration omitted). at 641 (internal quotation marks and We find no error, much less plain error, in the district court s sentencing decision at issue. Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012) (sentencing courts 2 have discretion to order a sentence to run consecutively to an anticipated state sentence). Stroud also contends that the district court erred by ordering that he receive sentencing credit for a period of time he was in federal detention and that the court compounded the error by choosing computation wrong date credit of the to must occur commence after credit. the defendant The is sentenced. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992). It Attorney is the responsible for General computing in the first sentencing detention prior to sentencing. instance credit Id. at 334-35. who time for is in If the Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons ( BOP ), does not give Stroud the sentencing credit he believes he deserves, he can seek an administrative remedy. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2014). If he is not satisfied with the result, he can file a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 336; United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489-90 (4th Cir. 1989). The court s decision to order a sentence and to give credit to Stroud for a period of time in federal detention prior to sentencing is without effect as the BOP will be determining how much credit Stroud should receive for the period he was detained prior to sentencing. [T]he district court cannot perform the necessary at Attorney calculation General, in the time implementing 3 of the sentencing and defendant s [] the sentence, cannot avoid computing the credit. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 336. Thus, there is no reason to vacate the court s judgment and commitment order. Finally, Stroud claims that counsel was ineffective because he received an unreasonable twenty-four month sentence. This claim is not ripe for review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively establishes that defense counsel did not provide effective representation. F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. United States v. Benton, 523 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). To allow for adequate development of the record, ineffective assistance claims are, generally speaking, more appropriately pursued U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). 216 n.1 (4th conclusively Cir. show in a motion filed pursuant to 28 United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 2010). that Because counsel was the record ineffective, we does not will not review the issue. Accordingly, order. legal before we affirm the judgment and commitment We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
