US v. Jayad Conteh, No. 14-4224 (4th Cir. 2014)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4224 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JAYAD ZAINAB ESTER CONTEH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (8:12-cr-00306-GLR-1) Submitted: October 20, 2014 Decided: November 3, 2014 Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICE OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Thomas P. Windom, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Jayad Zainab Ester Conteh (“Conteh”) appeals her convictions after a jury trial for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349 (2012), bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344 (2012), aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1028A (2012), and two counts of exceeding authorized access to a computer and thereby obtaining information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, 1030(a)(2)(A) (2012). court erred in in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, Conteh argues on appeal that the district denying her motions to suppress evidence and statements because the sworn application supporting her arrest warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause and that the officer executing the warrant did not act in reasonable good faith reliance on the state commissioner’s determination of probable cause. Conteh also challenges the district court’s qualification a of witness as an expert in Sierra Leoneon Creole, arguing that the court abused its discretion because it so qualified him, even though he is not a federally certified interpreter, does not possess degrees in the language, never acted as a translator previously, teacher in another field. We review the and currently works as a We affirm. district court’s factual findings underlying its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error 2 and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572 (2014). “Probable existence of] cause facts to and justify an circumstances arrest means within [a [the police] officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one circumstances offense.” of reasonable shown, that caution, the in suspect believing has in the committed . . . an United States v. Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A “fluid concept that turns on the assessment of probabilities, not on any formula such as is applied to proof at trial,” probable cause “is judged by an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” omitted). Id. at 453-54 (internal quotation marks In reviewing the state commissioner’s probable cause determination, we “must accord great deference to the [commissioner]’s assessment of the facts presented to him” and “may ask only whether the [commissioner] had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” United States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and alteration omitted). The clear that application law supporting enforcement agents the arrest learned that warrant several makes bank accounts had been compromised when information for the accounts was changed and checks were ordered 3 without authorization. Conteh — in her position as a teller for the bank — had accessed the compromised accounts with information personally identifying the account holders in a manner suggesting her access was unauthorized. Additionally, the owner of a vehicle observed being an used in attempt to retrieve checks ordered without authorization from one of the compromised accounts was relying on a bank totality insider of provide him information. circumstances, the to the state Under commissioner the had a substantial basis to conclude that the supporting application established probable cause, and we reject as unsupported by the record Conteh’s assertion that probable cause is lacking because the application contains a “significant misstatement” that she was the individual who changed account information. In determined addition, that, even the if district the court alternatively supporting application did not establish probable cause, suppression of the warrant and the fruits from Conteh’s arrest was not warranted in light of the arresting officer’s good faith reliance on the commissioner’s determination of probable 468 U.S. 897 (1984). United States v. Leon, Pursuant to the good faith exception under Leon, evidence obtained suppressed the if cause. from an officer’s “‘objectively reasonable.’” invalid reliance warrant on the will not warrant be was United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). 4 Leon identifies four circumstances in which an officer’s reliance on a warrant would not so qualify, only one of which Conteh invokes here. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (noting that an officer’s reliance on a warrant would not so qualify if the warrant was so facially deficient that validity). no reasonable officer could presume its We reject, however, as unsupported by the record Conteh’s claim that the arrest warrant was facially deficient because law enforcement agents knew she did not change account information for the bank accounts. Conteh qualification Creole. expert also of a challenges witness as an the district expert court’s in Leoneon Sierra We review a district court’s decision to qualify an witness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 390 (4th Cir. 2014). We reject Conteh’s contention that the unqualified as an expert in Sierra Leoneon Creole. witness was Conteh takes issue with the fact that the witness — who testified regarding messages in Sierra Leoneon Creole extracted from the cellular phone seized from her incident to her arrest — is not a federally certified interpreter, does not hold degrees in the language, never acted as a translator previously, and currently works as a teacher in another field. In undertaking its gatekeeper role to ensure that evidence is reliable under Fed. R. Evid. 702, a district court 5 “must decide whether the expert has ‘sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues in the case.’” Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 162 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999)). In making this decision, the court should “consider the proposed expert’s full range of experience and training.” United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2009). Although the witness here is not a federally certified interpreter, lack organization — dispositive; imprimatur.” of formal although Rule relevant 702 United certification “does States to not v. his by a professional expertise require Gutierrez, — any 757 is not particular F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977). teacher in another Leoneon Creole, and Further, although the witness works as a field, had does not not acted hold as a degrees in translator Sierra for any government agency prior to his involvement in Conteh’s case, we conclude he was properly qualified as an expert in the language based on his education and experience with the language - including familiarity with its slang terms - and his daily use of the language. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 6 because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 7
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