US v. Stephanie Chapman, No. 14-4103 (4th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseThis opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on January 7, 2015.
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4103 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. STEPHANIE CHAPMAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00298-LO-1) Submitted: December 19, 2014 Amended: Before NIEMEYER and Senior Circuit Judge. Decided: January 7, 2015 January 8, 2015 THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Alfred L. Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Assistant United States Attorney, Stacey K. Luck, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: A federal jury convicted Stephanie Chapman of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a child, sex trafficking of a child, purposes and of interstate prostitution, transportation in violation 1591(a)(1), 1594(c), 2423 (2012). of of a minor 18 U.S.C. for §§ 2, The district court sentenced Chapman to a total of eleven years’ imprisonment, and she now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. Chapman first argues that insufficient supported the jury’s finding of guilt. contends that benefitted the financially; disregard of violence, or Jane Government’s in (2) Doe’s By proof violation of she were these of failed age; coercion prostitution. child, Government the 18 Specifically, Chapman to had and prove knowledge or violence, to engage assertions, Chapman elements sex U.S.C. that (3) used of § evidence (1) reckless threats Jane challenges She of Doe trafficking 1591(a). she in the of does a not however, address elements of the other charges against her in the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2423, 1594. By failing to brief these issues, Chapman has waived review of them. See United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (“It is a well settled rule that contentions not raised in the argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.”). 2 We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de novo. United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2010). “The standard for reversing a jury verdict of guilty is a high one: the Court does so only where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 175 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The jury’s verdict must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it, where substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” In assessing Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). evidentiary sufficiency, the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. Id. We do not reassess the jury’s determinations of witness credibility. United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007). In § 1591(a)(1), (1) knowingly order the to convict government recruited, a defendant must prove transported, of a that violation the harbored, of defendant: maintained, obtained, or enticed a person, (2) in or affecting interstate commerce, (3) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the victim had not attained the age of eighteen years and would be made to engage in a commercial sex act. United States v. Garcia–Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013). 3 However, “[i]n a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.” U.S.C. § 1591(c). 18 We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that there was substantial evidence of Chapman’s guilt of the offenses. Chapman also argues that the district court erred by denying her request to issue a jury instruction on mistake of fact. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction. Shrader, court’s 675 F.3d refusal reversible charge; and important, to error “(1) correct; (3) Id. is a Cir. the the with to give defendant’s point the F.3d omitted). 471, instruction by in the the requested ability district instruction covered some The jury proffered to is was court’s trial so instruction conduct [her] When jury instructions are challenged on appeal, whether “the instructions, adequately state the controlling law.” 325 2012). requested substantially failure defense.” (4th if dealing impaired issue grant not seriously the 308 only (2) that 300, United States v. 486 (4th Cir. 2003) taken as a whole, United States v. Bolden, (internal quotation marks We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 4 that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Chapman’s proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. legal before We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
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