Troy Stewart v. Morgan State University, No. 14-2056 (4th Cir. 2015)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-2056 TROY STEWART, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; WARREN HAYMAN; BENJAMIN WELSH; DALLAS R. EVANS; MARTIN R. RESNIK; T. JOAN ROBINSON; DAVID WILSON, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District Judge. (8:11-cv-03605-DKC) Submitted: February 27, 2015 Decided: March 25, 2015 Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Troy Stewart, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Faulk, Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Assistant Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Troy Stewart, a former doctoral candidate at Morgan State University (MSU), faculty and Hayman, Dallas filed a civil administrators, David Wilson Title VII Evans, employment including Martin (collectively, action against and Benjamin Resnick, Welsh, T. Robinson, Joan “Defendants”). discrimination MSU and MSU Warren and Stewart alleged retaliation claims, violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), and breach of contract. At the heart of Stewart’s claims is his disagreement with feedback and grades he received for an internship course and two lecture courses taught by Welsh academic during the probation, Spring 2010 unsuccessful semester, grade and appeal, his and eventual dismissal from the doctoral program. Following the dismissal of several of Stewart’s claims, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Stewart responded. The court granted summary judgment as to each of Stewart’s remaining claims. Stewart now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. On appeal, Stewart’s brief. we limit See our 4th review Cir. R. to arguments 34(b). raised in Additionally, arguments and allegations not raised in the district court are 2 not properly before us. See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014). We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Title individual, VII prohibits an or otherwise . employer . . from “discharg[ing] discriminat[ing] against any any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) discriminatory (2012). discharge A claim plaintiff either by can establish providing a direct evidence of discrimination or by proceeding under the burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident 310, Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff provides direct evidence by demonstrating that race was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s adverse employment decision. Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 3 F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, employment action, performing his legitimate expectations, circumstances (3) job at in giving a Adams, 640 F.3d at 558. the to he time manner and rise (2) (4) an suffered of the that met he was inference an adverse action, his he employer’s terminated of was under discrimination. If the employer provides evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the employee must demonstrate that discrimination. the proffered reason was pretext for Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). We have reviewed the record in this case and find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Stewart failed to meet his burden of establishing a viable claim of racial discrimination under either method. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. See also Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that subjective beliefs about discrimination are “insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to any discriminatory conduct on [employer’s] part”). 4 Similarly, a plaintiff may prove a Title VII retaliation claim either by providing direct evidence of retaliation or by proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). method, the plaintiff establishes a prima Price v. Under the latter facie retaliation claim by demonstrating “(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the employment action.” Ct. App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. Coleman v. Md. 2010). Protected opposition activities include both “complaints about suspected violations” and “staging informal protests and voicing one’s own opinions in order to bring discriminatory activities.” F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. attention to an employer’s EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 2005) (internal quotation marks and discern no alterations omitted). Reviewing the record in its entirety, we reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Stewart failed to establish a viable retaliation claim. See Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190; Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2006). To succeed on a breach of contract claim under Maryland law, a plaintiff must establish “that the defendant owed the plaintiff a contractual breached that obligation.” obligation and that the defendant Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 776 5 A.2d 645, 651 (Md. 2001). A contract is only binding if it is supported by consideration — that is, “a performance or a return promise must be bargained for” in that “it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise promisee in exchange for that promise.” and is given by the Chernick v. Chernick, 610 A.2d 770, 774 (Md. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no error in the court’s conclusion that the Statement of Agreement between Stewart and Welsh lacked either an obligation on Welsh therefore (or any Stewart other did Defendant) not demonstrate or consideration, the existence and of a contract to support his breach of contract claim. Turning to Stewart’s § 1983 claims, Stewart argues that the district court erred in adjudicating his First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. Even assuming, without deciding, that Stewart properly alleged in the district court a First Amendment claim of infringement on his right to free speech, we conclude such a claim necessarily fails. See Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2014) (addressing requirements for claim that adverse employment action violates public employee’s free speech rights); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (addressing school-sponsored speech). constitutional restrictions on Additionally, we find no error in the court’s adjudication of Stewart’s claim related to his grade 6 appeal and affirm as to that claim for the reasons stated by the district court. Finally, to the extent Stewart alleges that the district judge exhibited assertions bias provide impartiality of the no against him, legitimate experienced we basis district conclude for questioning court Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). we affirm the district court’s motion for default judgment. judgment. We his judge. bald the See Accordingly, deny Stewart’s We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 7

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