Lejuana Morgan v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 14-1258 (4th Cir. 2014)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-1258 LEJUANA ALICE MORGAN, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (7:13-cv-00137-SGW-RSB) Submitted: October 31, 2014 Before KING and Circuit Judge. SHEDD, Circuit Decided: Judges, and November 6, 2014 HAMILTON, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas E. Strelka, STRICKLAND, DIVINEY & STRELKA, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael J. Finney, James J. O’Keeffe, GENTRY LOCKE RAKES & MOORE LLP, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Lejuana summary granting Morgan appeals judgment against from her a in district a court civil order action for employment discrimination and retaliation brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). Morgan also challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for leave to amend her complaint in order to add a claim for failure to accommodate her disability. We review the district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996). In doing so, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to Morgan and give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Carnell Constr. Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d 703, 716 (4th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 56(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. Summary judgment will be granted unless “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. 242, 248 (1986). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 Because Morgan presented no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, we analyze her claim under the familiar burden-shifting framework established Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). in McDonnell See Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 248 (4th Cir. 2006) (discrimination); Hooven–Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 271–74 (4th Cir. 2001) (retaliation). The sole issue on appeal relating to summary judgment is whether Morgan demonstrated that Wells Fargo’s pretextual. proffered reasons for her termination were A plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the defendant’s “explanation is unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of . . . discrimination [or retaliation].” F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir. omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s sufficient evidence to 2004) prima find Mereish v. Walker, 359 (internal facie that the quotation case, marks combined employer’s with asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Morgan legitimate, failed to Fargo’s employment were pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The articulated that attendance Morgan violated policy. for Wells her reveals reasons that terminating record non-retaliatory establish Wells Although 3 Fargo’s Morgan’s clearly termination occurred shortly after she informed Wells Fargo that she suffered from alcoholism, the record indicates that Wells Fargo decided to terminate alcoholism. sufficient her Moreover, to establish employment temporal that cause of her termination. her before proximity alcoholism she revealed alone was a her is not “but for” Dugan v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 722 (4th Cir. 2002). We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Morgan next contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to add an additional claim for failure to accommodate. We review the district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend a pleading for abuse of discretion. Public Employees’ Ret. Ass’n v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 313 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009). “[L]eave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006). We use the same burden-shifting framework as in Morgan’s discrimination and retaliation claims to analyze her proposed claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA. Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 267-71 (4th Cir. 2001). Just See as Morgan’s discrimination and retaliation claims fail for lack of 4 pretext, so too would her failure to accommodate claim. therefore find discretion in that the refusing to district grant court Morgan did We not leave abuse its to amend her complaint to add a claim for failure to accommodate because such a claim would have been futile. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. dispense with contentions are oral argument adequately because presented in the the facts We and legal materials before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
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