US v. Laura Jones, No. 13-4770 (4th Cir. 2014)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4770 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LAURA SUE JONES, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (7:08-cr-00105-F-1) Submitted: June 19, 2014 Decided: June 23, 2014 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Shailika K. Shah, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: In 2008, Laura Sue Jones pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2012). She was sentenced to thirty-eight months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), Jones was resentenced to sixty months imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. 2012. Jones term of supervised release commenced in July In August 2013, the probation officer petitioned for revocation of Jones supervised release, based in part on Jones arrest on state drug charges. In the absence of any challenge to the factual allegations supporting the motion for revocation, the district court revoked Jones supervised release. The court subsequently imposed the statutory maximum sentence of thirtysix months imprisonment, finding Jones continued involvement in the distribution of controlled substances posed a significant risk to society. On appeal, Jones does not challenge the district court s decision to revoke her supervised release or its policy statement calculations. sentence failed ( BOP ) is to plainly consider drug Rather, she argues her thirty-six-month unreasonable the treatment inadequacy program 2 because of and the the district Bureau whether of court Prisons community-based programs would have better provided Jones with the needed rehabilitative treatment. A district court has broad discretion to impose sentence upon revoking a defendant s supervised release. States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). a United We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable plainly unreasonable. 437, 439 40 (4th statutory maximum and not United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for unreasonableness, follow[ing] generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original sentences. A procedurally supervised reasonable Id. at 438. release if the revocation district sentence court is considered the Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors it is permitted consider in a supervised release revocation case. § 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. to 18 U.S.C. Such a sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Only if a unreasonable sentence will we is found then Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. procedurally decide 3 whether or the substantively sentence is plainly unreasonable. Id. at 439. A sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable. Id. Jones argues her sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately consider the inadequacy of the BOP s substance abuse treatment. Ideally, Jones argues, the district court should have imposed a modest active sentence of incarceration, and then imposed an additional release period that required her to participate in a community program. However, a district court is not authorized to impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment rehabilitation. (2011). Cir. program or otherwise to promote Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 In United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 197 (4th 2012), sentencing. we held that that Tapia applies to revocation We further added, [t]rial judges should thus make plain that a defendant s rehabilitative needs relate at most to recommended programs or locations not to the fact or length of imprisonment. Id. at 199. Upon review of the parties briefs and the record, we conclude that Jones thirty-six-month prison sentence, which represents an upward variance from the advisory policy statement range of twelve to plainly unreasonable. dispense with oral eighteen is not We therefore affirm Jones sentence. We argument months of because 4 imprisonment, the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
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