US v. Ravar Harris, No. 13-4463 (4th Cir. 2014)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4463 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. RAVAR CARJON HARRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge. (1:12-cr-00258-JAB-1) Submitted: January 30, 2014 Decided: February 11, 2014 Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John Carlyle Sherrill, III, SHERRILL & CAMERON, PLLC, Salisbury, North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Ravar Carjon Harris appeals his conviction after a jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ยง 922(g)(1) (2012). Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court erred by denying Harris motion to suppress. Harris was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Finding no error, we affirm. In considering the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews the district court s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). United States v. We [also] defer to the district court s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress. United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a motion to suppress has been denied by the district court, [w]e . . . construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing party below. Foster, 634 F.3d at 246. The district court properly denied Harris motion to suppress. It is well established that the police can stop and 2 briefly detain a officer has reasonable a person for investigative suspicion purposes supported by if the articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). assessing the validity of a Terry stop, we In consider the totality of the circumstances[,] . . . giv[ing] due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their experience and training. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). We conclude that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop based on several factors, such as the context of the stop, the crime rate in the area, and United (citing the States nervous v. Illinois or George, v. evasive 732 F.3d Wardlow, 528 behavior 296, U.S. of 299 the (4th 119, suspect. Cir. 124 2013) (2000)). Moreover, multiple factors may be taken together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor, taken alone, would be insufficient. Here, high-crime area Id. at 300. the of officer the city observed known Harris for drug walking in a activity where additional patrols had been ordered, even during the daytime hours. See id. The officer also considered that, after making eye contact with Harris, Harris pulled the hood over his head 3 and walked away from the officer into a nearby wooded area. See United States v. Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168, 175 (4th Cir.) ( [A] defendant s flight upon seeing a police car in a high-crime area was enough to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry stop. ) (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 218 (2013). Taken together, we conclude that these circumstances are articulable facts from which the officer, based on his training and experience, could form a reasonable suspicion justifying Harris initial stop. Thus, the district court properly denied Harris motion to suppress. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Harris in writing of the right to petition the Supreme review. If Harris Court of requests the that United a States petition for be further filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move representation. in this court for leave to withdraw from Counsel s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Harris. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 4 presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
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