US v. Randy Jones, No. 13-4242 (4th Cir. 2013)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4242 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RANDY WESLEY JONES, a/k/a Shabba-J, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III, Chief District Judge. (5:12-cr-00004-D-1) Submitted: November 19, 2013 Before WYNN and Circuit Judge. FLOYD, Circuit Decided: November 21, 2013 Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. MayParker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Randy Wesley Jones pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute powder cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to 228 months in prison. Jones counsel California, view, 386 there questioning error when filed U.S. are whether it a 738 no the accepted sentencing hearing. brief in (1967), meritorious district Jones accordance stating that, issues court guilty with for in and v. counsel s appeal, committed plea Anders but reversible during Jones Jones has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do so, and the Government has declined to file a responsive brief. We affirm. The purpose of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy is to ensure that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters the guilty plea. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands the nature of, the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Crim. P. 11(b). Fed. R. The court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). 2 There is a strong presumption that a defendant s guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was adequate. Cir. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th 1995). Additionally, in the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under Rule 11. 2002). United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. To establish plain error, [Jones] must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights. 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). United States v. Muhammad, Even if Jones satisfies these requirements, correction of the error remains within our discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Jones has not presented any evidence or argument to demonstrate plain error. Indeed, the record reveals that the district court fully complied with Rule 11 s requirements during the plea colloquy, ensuring that Jones plea was knowing and voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed the offense attested to during which the he was hearing pleading that 3 he guilty. fully Jones understood also the ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises to him outside agreement. those made by the Government in his plea We conclude that Jones plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis. Accordingly, we affirm Jones conviction. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). both the procedural sentence. district This review requires consideration of and substantive Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. court properly reasonableness of the We first assess whether the calculated the advisory Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 76 (4th Cir. 2010). we If the sentence is free of significant procedural error, review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence § 3553(a). it chose satisfied the standards set forth in United States v. Mendoza Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). 4 In this case, the district court properly calculated Jones Guidelines range, assistance motion, considered the granted treated applicable the § the Government s Guidelines 3553(a) as substantial advisory, Moreover, factors. and the record establishes that the district court based Jones sentence on its individualized assessment of the facts of the case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we conclude that Jones sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. therefore affirm the district court s judgment. This We court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in representation. this and materials legal before for leave to withdraw from Counsel s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. facts court We dispense with oral argument because the contentions are adequately this and argument court presented would not in the aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5