US v. Charles Jones, No. 13-4087 (4th Cir. 2013)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4087 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHARLES S. JONES, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (3:07-cr-00008-HEH-1) Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 21, 2013 Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mark Bodner, Fairfax, Virginia, Norman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED Virginia, for Appellee. for Appellant. Olivia L. STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: In 2007, Charles Sherrod Jones pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and the district court sentenced imprisonment. him In as a 2010, career the offender district court to 275 months reduced Jones sentence to 193 months imprisonment pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(2). sentence Jones subsequently filed a motion to vacate his pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2013), arguing that he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. In 2012, finding felony the that district Jones convictions court did in not order granted possess to Jones the qualify § 2255 requisite as a motion, two career prior offender pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ( USSG ) § 4B1.1 (2012). After appointing counsel to represent Jones and hearing arguments from both parties, the district court re-sentenced Jones to 98 months imprisonment. Jones now appeals. His counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are whether no the meritorious district grounds court for committed appeal but procedural questioning error in calculating Jones Guidelines range because it included Jones 2002 uncounseled, consolidated state court convictions in his 2 criminal history score. Jones has filed a supplemental pro se brief arguing that his waiver of the right to counsel in his 2002 consolidated state court convictions violated the Sixth Amendment because his waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Jones further argues that the district court plainly erred when it used the 2002 convictions to calculate his criminal history score. The Government has filed a motion to dismiss Jones appeal of his sentence based on the appellate waiver provision in the plea agreement. We grant the motion to dismiss. We review de novo a defendant s waiver of appellate rights. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive his right to appeal if that waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to forgo the right to appeal. United States v. Amaya-Portillo, 423 2005) F.3d 427, omitted). To intelligent, 430 determine this circumstances, (4th Cir. whether the waiver looks to the court including (internal the experience and quotation is marks knowing totality conduct and of the of the accused, as well as the accused s educational background and familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement. United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his 3 sentence. The questioning error in issue whether calculating the raised by district Jones Jones court Guidelines and his committed range, is counsel, procedural within the scope of the waiver. Jones contends that enforcement of his waiver would constitute a miscarriage of justice. appellate We disagree. [W]e have refused to enforce valid appeal waivers for a narrow class of claims, . . . based on our determination that those claims were not within the scope of the waiver. F.3d at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). Blick, 408 For example, we refuse to enforce a valid appellate waiver when an appellant challenges a sentence imposed in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute or based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992), or when an appellant challenges a sentence on the ground that the proceedings following entry of the guilty plea were conducted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732 (4th Cir. 1994); see United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (summarizing holdings in Marin and Attar). We refuse to enforce an otherwise valid waiver if to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. Johnson, 410 F.3d at 151 (quoting United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2003)). 4 Here, consolidated Amendment Jones state right to argument court that his convictions counsel asserts a 2002 uncounseled, violated violation his by Sixth the state court, but does not amount to a constitutional violation by the district court. court s calculation miscarriage waiver. Because Jones challenge regards the district of of justice his Guidelines sufficient to range, overcome there the is no appellate See Andis, 333 F.3d at 892 (describing miscarriage of justice exception as extremely narrow, and noting that an allegation that the sentencing judge misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines . . . is not subject to appeal in the face of a valid appeal waiver ). Consequently, appellate review of the district court s calculation of Jones Guidelines range is foreclosed. Pursuant to Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have outside found the no unwaived scope of the issues that waiver. We are meritorious therefore grant and the Government s motion to dismiss the appeal of Jones sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move representation. in this court for leave to withdraw from Counsel s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. 5 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal before contentions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. DISMISSED 6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
