SSA Cooper, LLC v. Lamont Brown, No. 13-2258 (4th Cir. 2014)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-2258 SSA COOPER, LLC; HOMEPORT INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; LAMONT A. BROWN, Respondents. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (13-0127) Submitted: March 27, 2014 Decided: April 9, 2014 Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard P. Salloum, FRANKE & SALLOUM, PLLC, Gulfport, Mississippi, for Petitioners. E. Paul Gibson, E. PAUL GIBSON, P.C., Charleston, South Carolina; Betty English, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Washington, D.C.; Mark A. Reinhalter, Jonathan Peter Rolfe, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: SSA Cooper, LLC ( employer ) seeks review of the Benefits Review Board s (BRB) decision and order affirming the administrative law judge s (ALJ) award of longshore disability benefits to Lamont Brown pursuant to 33 U.S.C. ยงยง 901-950 (2012). On appeal, employer argues that the ALJ applied the true doubt rule, in violation of the Supreme Court s holding in Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 281 (1994). v. Greenwich Employer also argues that the ALJ s evaluation and weighing of the medical evidence is not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, employer asserts that Brown could have obtained an exemption that would have allowed him to return to longshore work with medical limitations and consequently the ALJ erred in concluding that Brown was unable to return to this work. We deny the petition for review. We review BRB decisions for errors of law and to ascertain whether the Board adhered to its statutorily mandated standard for reviewing the ALJ s factual findings. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Green, 656 F.3d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). of the ALJ deference is be affirmed Review evidence. must of legal due to the if The factual findings supported questions Board s 2 legal is de by substantial novo, conclusions. and no Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court will not disregard the ALJ s factual findings merely because other inferences might have been more reasonable, and deference is accorded to the ALJ s inferences and credibility assessments. Id. The ALJ may not merely credulously accept the assertions of the parties or their representatives, but must examine the logic of their conclusions and evaluate the evidence upon which their conclusions are based. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. (Carmines), 138 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1998). Employer first argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Brown was unable to return to his previous employment due to his back injury. The dispute in this case essentially comes down to whether the ALJ s crediting of the medical opinion of Dr. Patel over that of Dr. Kolehma is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable conclusion. mind might accept as adequate to support Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). a Employer argues that the ALJ applied the true doubt rule, which was held inapplicable to cases under the LHWCA. We disagree. The ALJ thoroughly discussed the medical evidence in this case and properly considered condition. the different opinions regarding Brown s We conclude that the ALJ s decision to credit the 3 opinion of Brown s treating physician, Dr. Patel, is supported by substantial evidence. Employer next argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider that, even with restrictions, Brown could have sought an exemption from the longshore union that would have allowed him to return to work within his restrictions at no loss of pay. Employer bases this argument on the testimony of the vocational expert describing a previous case in which a claimant received an exemption and returned to longshore work with restrictions, and cites two provisions of the longshore contract as supporting its position. merit, and We conclude that employer s argument is without the ALJ properly concluded return to longshore employment. that Brown could not The provisions of the longshore contract cited by employer merely indicate that a union member will not lose any seniority credit for a break in service that results from an injury or illness to the extent of becoming eligible for workman s compensation or for benefits under the Employers I.L.A. Welfare Plan, (J.A. 595), and that a union member may be disciplined for [p]ersistently failing to accept employment which exemption. he is capable of performing without an (J.A. 599). These provisions do not establish that a union member may return to work by seeking an exemption from certain jobs based on medical restrictions. Moreover, 4 as the ALJ noted, Brown produced a letter from the union stating that a longshoreman must be 100 percent physically qualified and that there were no waterfront. light duty or sedentary positions on the Thus, the ALJ correctly concluded that Brown could not return to longshore employment with the restrictions imposed by Dr. Patel. Our review of the record discloses that the Board s decision is based upon substantial evidence and is without reversible error. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We oral dispense contentions with are argument adequately because presented in the facts and the materials legal before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. PETITION DENIED 5
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