Calderon v. GEICO General Ins. Co., No. 13-2096 (4th Cir. 2014)
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GEICO appealed the district court's order granting partial summary judgment against them on the issue of liability in an action asserting denial of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiffs cross-appealed an order granting partial summary judgment against them on several issues relating to the remedy to be awarded. With no final decision to review, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeals before it. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeals.
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PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-2096 SAMUEL CALDERON, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals; MICHAEL HEADLEY; AARON KULSIC; KENNETH MILLER; MICHAEL CREAMER; GEORGE WOOD; ROBERT DEMARTINO; JOHN HALLIDAY; JAMES L. HANSON; THOMAS F. BRADY; DANA FERRIN; MAUREEN AYLING; CANDIDO CUBERO; THOMAS FITZGERALD; WILLIAM DOLINSKY; MARVIN HOURIGAN; DAVID MCCAMLEY; AUGUSTUS STANSBURY, JR.; JOAN BISCHOFF; RANDALL GIBSON; VINCENT GRECO; TERESA HARTEY-ADAMETZ; THOMAS LOWE; DAVID MCENRY; JENNIFER RICCA; ANITA SINGH; BRYAN UTTERBACK; PATRICK WEISE; LEAH HAMILTON; DENNIS FULTON; EBERHARD GROSSER; JOSEPH MILES, JR.; RICKY MCCRACKEN; THOMAS STURGIS; CHRISTOPHER SULLIVAN; MICHAEL RUSSELL; RANDALL STEWART; LAVERNE HOLMES; THOMAS DAVIDSON, JR.; SHANNON BOYD; ANTHONY DEAN, JR.; FRANCISCO NOGALES; JOHN GHETTI; GERALD DEXTER; CLAUDE REIHER; STEVEN MCBRIDE; PHILLIP RONDELLO; ROBERT MERRY, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, COMPANY; GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Defendants Appellants, and GEICO CORPORATION; GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY; GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY; DOES 1-10; MICHAEL BROWN, Defendants. 13-2149 SAMUEL CALDERON, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals; MICHAEL HEADLEY; AARON KULSIC; KENNETH MILLER; MICHAEL CREAMER; GEORGE WOOD; ROBERT DEMARTINO; JOHN HALLIDAY; JAMES L. HANSON; THOMAS F. BRADY; DANA FERRIN; MAUREEN AYLING; CANDIDO CUBERO; THOMAS FITZGERALD; WILLIAM DOLINSKY; MARVIN HOURIGAN; DAVID MCCAMLEY; AUGUSTUS STANSBURY, JR.; JOAN BISCHOFF; RANDALL GIBSON; VINCENT GRECO; TERESA HARTEY-ADAMETZ; THOMAS LOWE; DAVID MCENRY; JENNIFER RICCA; ANITA SINGH; BRYAN UTTERBACK; PATRICK WEISE; LEAH HAMILTON; DENNIS FULTON; EBERHARD GROSSER; JOSEPH MILES, JR.; RICKY MCCRACKEN; THOMAS STURGIS; CHRISTOPHER SULLIVAN; MICHAEL RUSSELL; RANDALL STEWART; LAVERNE HOLMES; THOMAS DAVIDSON, JR.; SHANNON BOYD; ANTHONY DEAN, JR.; FRANCISCO NOGALES; JOHN GHETTI; GERALD DEXTER; CLAUDE REIHER; STEVEN MCBRIDE; PHILLIP RONDELLO; ROBERT MERRY, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, COMPANY; GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Defendants Appellees, and GEICO CORPORATION; GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY; GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY; DOES 1-10; MICHAEL BROWN, Defendants. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:10-cv-01958-RWT) Argued: May 13, 2014 Decided: 2 June 6, 2014 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Appeals dismissed by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Senior Judge Davis concurred. ARGUED: Eric Hemmendinger, SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Matthew Hale Morgan, NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. ON BRIEF: Hyland Hunt, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Timothy C. Selander, NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Appellees/CrossAppellants. 3 TRAXLER, Chief Judge: Government Employees Insurance Company and GEICO General Insurance Company (together, GEICO ) appeal a district court order granting partial summary judgment against them on the issue of liability in an action asserting denial of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA ), see 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The plaintiffs cross-appeal an order granting partial summary judgment against them on several issues relating to the remedy to be interlocutory awarded. and we Concluding lack that jurisdiction these to appeals consider are them, we dismiss the appeals. I. GEICO is plaintiffs in in the business this matter of providing are insurance. security The investigators ( Investigators ) who currently work, or previously worked, for GEICO. The primarily fraudulent. Investigators investigating work GEICO s that claims in are Claims suspected Department of being GEICO classifies its Investigators as exempt from the FLSA s overtime pay protections. In 2010, the plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of a class seeking recovery of overtime pay they claimed GEICO wrongfully withheld in violation of the FLSA and New York state law. The complaint the alleges that GEICO improperly classified Investigator position as exempt from overtime under the FLSA and 4 the law of New York. R. & Regs. compensatory relief. tit. and After See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a); N.Y. Comp. Codes 12, § 142-2.2.. liquidated the The damages, district court complaint among certified other the requests forms class, of the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, and GEICO moved for summary judgment, on the issue of liability. court granted rejecting as the a plaintiffs matter of law motion GEICO s and The district denied contention GEICO s, that the Investigators fell within the FLSA s administrative function exemption. See Calderon v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 917 F. Supp. 2d 428 (D. Md. 2012). The parties later filed cross-motions for summary judgment on several disputed remedy issues. Considering these motions, the court ruled that because GEICO acted in good faith, GEICO did not act willfully and thus the statute of limitations for plaintiffs claims extended only for two years. reasons, the court also ruled that the For similar plaintiffs were entitled to liquidated damages or prejudgment interest. not And finally, the court determined that because the plaintiffs were paid fixed salaries regardless of the varying number of hours they worked, the method of overtime described in Overnight Motor Transportation v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942), applied to this case. 5 The district court then entered a Stipulated Order Relating to Remedy that it described as a final judgment. J.A. 109, 112. That order contain[ed] a complete formula for the computation of backpay based on the rulings that the court had made and the parties stipulations. J.A. 109. The order noted that both parties reserved the right to appeal the rulings of the district court underlying the order and that the order would have no effect unless a judgment of liability is entered and sustained after all judicial review has been exhausted. J.A. 109. The backpay formula that the order adopted would produce amount an of backpay to which each plaintiff was entitled depending upon the total pay received and the total time worked for each two-week pay period within the applicable limitations period. The order further stated that [t]he backpay calculations will be performed by a mutually acceptable entity with right of review and confirmation by Defendants and Plaintiffs counsel. J.A. 112. It also provided that the district court shall have jurisdiction to resolve or supervise the resolution parties are of unable any to issue concerning resolve. J.A. the remedy 111. that There was the no limitation on the right of either party to appeal the district court s decisions. GEICO has now appealed the district court s order granting partial summary judgment to the 6 plaintiffs on the issue of liability, and the plaintiffs have cross-appealed several of the district court s rulings regarding remedy issues. II. Before considering the merits of these appeals, we must determine whether we possess jurisdiction to do so. See Dickens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 228, 229 30 (4th Cir. 2012). Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeals. With certain limited exceptions, our appellate jurisdiction extends only to the review of final decisions of the district courts of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940); In re Carefirst of Md., Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 255 (4th Cir. 2002). The purpose of this stages rule is to combine in one review all of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment results. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). In the ordinary course a final decision is one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves judgment. nothing for the court to do but execute the Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Int l Union of Operating Eng rs & Participating Emp rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 779 (2014). does not fix Accordingly, a judgment on liability that damages is not a final judgment because the assessment of damages is part of the merits of the claim that 7 must be determined. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade, 415 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 134 S. Ct. at 779-80. On the question that of whether an order is final, [t]he label a district court attaches to an order it issues does not control. Id. The finality issue before us is akin to that presented in United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227 (1958). In that case, the plaintiff sued the government seeking to recover for $7,189.59 in federal stamp taxes the plaintiff claimed were illegally collected from it and for interest on the taxes from the date they were paid. See id. at 228. The plaintiff later moved for summary judgment, and, after hearing the motion, the district court filed an opinion on April 14, 1955, finding that the plaintiff had paid $ 7,012.50 in stamp taxes and $177.07 in interest but making no finding concerning on what date or dates those amounts were paid. 29. The district court concluded by See id. at 228- stating plaintiff s summary judgment motion was granted. 229. that the See id. at The court Clerk noted the granting of the motion on the docket on the same day. See id. Eventually, on May 24, 1955, the district court issued a formal document entitled Judgment that ordered that the plaintiff could recover from the United States $7,189.57 plus interest 8 and costs, for a total of $7,769.37, and the Clerk entered this judgment on the docket the same day. See id. On July 21, 1955, the government filed an appeal from the See id. at 230. 1 May 24, 1955, order. motion in the court of appeals The plaintiff filed a to dismiss the appeal, maintaining that it had been taken outside the 60-day period that Federal government Rule to of Civil appeal an Procedure adverse 73(a) allowed judgment. See for the id. The plaintiff argued that the final judgment was entered on April 14, not on May 24, and thus came too late. of appeals Supreme agreed Court relevant and dismissed reversed, here, the however. Court noted the See id. appeal. See that id. in The court See at an id. 236. The action As is seeking monetary damages, a judgment may be embodied in the opinion of the court but only if it embodies the essential elements of a judgment for money and clearly evidences the judge s intention that it shall be his final act in the case. Court held requirements plaintiff that the because paid the April it did taxes. 14 opinion not determine See 1 id. at Id. at 232. did on 234. not meet what The these dates Without the that Although the Supreme Court reported that the government s notice of appeal identified the date of the entry of the order appealed from as May 25, 1955, rather than May 24, 1955, see United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 230 (1958), that discrepancy is immaterial to the issues before us. 9 determination, it could not be ascertained from the opinion the amount of interest to be added to the amounts the plaintiff had paid. See id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the final judgment was entered on May 24, when the total amount to be recovered was determined. See id. at 234-36. The order before us here is not final for similar reasons. It is true that the district court has completed its work on many of the issues that will eventually be used to determine the amount of damages to which each plaintiff is entitled. However, the order does not embody the essential elements of a money judgment because necessary to the compute court the has amount not found of damages all of due; the nor facts has it determined how the backpay formulas would apply to particular facts. See Buchanan v. United States, 82 F.3d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that judgment was not final when it failed to specify either the amount of money due the plaintiff or a formula by which the amount of money could be computed in mechanical fashion ); see also Associated Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Loan & Inv. Co., 313 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding that there was no final judgment when the amount of damages depended upon the amount of money collected by one of the parties after a particular date on particular contracts but the district court did not specifically determine that amount). And while the district court s 10 order provides that initial calculations will be performed by an entity acceptable to both the plaintiffs and GEICO, the parties have both retained the right to review and confirm[] those determinations and the district court has retained jurisdiction to resolve or supervise the resolution of any issue concerning the remedy that the parties are unable to resolve. J.A. 111, 112. Thus, it cannot be said of the order before us that it left nothing more for the district court to do than enforce a judgment. At oral argument, it was argued that Ram v. Paramount Film Distributing Corporation, 278 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam), supports a conclusion that the order here is a final one. We disagree. The issue in that appeal, as in F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., concerned the timeliness of an appeal and depended on whether a particular order was final. motion picture distributors brought suit to In that case, recover certain moneys they claimed to be owed them by certain exhibitors of films. See id. at 192. The cases were referred to a Special Master so that he could take testimony and make factual findings and legal conclusions. See id. recommended plaintiffs that the The Special Master eventually were entitled to certain amounts, including interest at 3 percent per year from October 1, 1958, until the date of the judgment. See id. After the district court overruled objections, the court on September 9, 1959, ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as per the 11 Special Master s recommendation. See id. And on September 10, 1959, the Clerk of Court entered an order confirming the Special Master s report. See id. Twenty days later, on September 30, 1959, the plaintiffs submitted to the Clerk in each of the cases a document damages entitled each Final defendant or Judgment, which group defendants of set forth owed plaintiff with interest from the date of the judgment. the each See id. However, the calculations were incorrect insofar as the amounts included interest from October 1, 1958, to September 30, 1959, on the amounts the Special Master had found owing; this was erroneous because the Special Master s calculations had already included interest up to October 1, 1958, so that the document submitted to the Clerk on September 30, 1959, included interest on interest. Id. The Clerk signed these documents and entered them on his docket on October 3, 1959. signed by the judge. See id. They were not See id. We held that the judgment signed by the district judge on September 9, 1959, and entered by the Clerk on his docket the next day was the final judgment because, while it did not set out the total amount to be paid, that amount was determinable from the statement that a specific sum was due by each defendant with interest at 3 per cent from October 1, 1958. 193-94. See id. at In so doing, we cited F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. for the rule that a money judgment may not be deemed final unless 12 it determines or specifies the means of determining the specific amount of recovery. Id. at 193. Ram is distinguishable from the present case, however. critical fact in Ram was that the district court in The its September 9, 1959, order had already found all the facts and resolved all questions of law necessary to determine the amount of recovery. All that remained was the performing the necessary calculations. ministerial act of See Republic Nat. Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68 (1948) ( [I]f nothing more than a ministerial regarded as act remains to concluding reviewable. ). be the done case . . and ., the is decree is immediately That simply is not true of the case before us, where any number of factual or legal issues might arise that will affect the amount of damages, as was reflected by the district court s retention of jurisdiction to resolve any of the parties disputes regarding the damages determination. See id. at 70 (noting that while simple application of a formula is ministerial, determinations judgment are not). requir[ing] the exercise of The district court s work was not completed and the judgment thus was not final. With no final decision to review, we have no choice but to dismiss the appeals before us. In a civil damage suit such as this, a judgment for the plaintiff that determines liability for, but does not fix the amount 13 of, damages is appealable solely under appropriate 28 U.S.C. certification § 1292(b), by the which requires district court not only but also application within ten days to the Court of Appeals and that court s grant, in its discretion, of permission to appeal. 2 Pemberton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). In this case, the district court did not attempt to certify under § 1292(b), and even had it done so, we would lack application jurisdiction because there for appeal. See leave to has id. been no timely Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals. 2 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides: When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order. At oral argument the possibility was also discussed of certifying the relevant issues under Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). However, that rule is inapplicable here, as it pertains only to judgments that entirely dispose of one or more claims. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 74244 (1976). 14 III. Concluding that we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeals before us, we dismiss. 3 DISMISSED 3 We note that should the parties eventually appeal from a final judgment, we would entertain a motion to adopt the briefs and joint appendix from this appeal. 15
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