Shasta Staley v. Martin Gruenberg, No. 13-1875 (4th Cir. 2014)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-1875 SHASTA D. STALEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARTIN GRUENBERG, Acting Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. (1:12-cv-00530-GBL-JFA) Submitted: May 30, 2014 Decided: June 6, 2014 Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gerald L. Gilliard, LAW OFFICE OF GERALD L. GILLIARD, ESQ., LLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: The Executive President the United directed the Federal Order, of States, through Deposit an Insurance Corporation ( FDIC or Defendant ) to decide promptly whether to convert certain interns to permanent status. After the FDIC decided not to convert Shasta Staley to permanent status, Staley filed a complaint alleging that the FDIC retaliated against her for engaging in protected activities, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( Title VII ), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2012); and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2012). Staley alleged that she engaged in the following protected activities: (1) requesting a reasonable request accommodation; was complaint with ( EEOC ). Defendant denied; The on the and (2) filing a grievance (3) filing an informal Equal district this claim, Employment court and Opportunity granted Staley summary appeals. after and her formal Commission judgment to Finding no reversible error, we affirm. We review a district court s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in 2 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 1 Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2012). genuine Summary dispute judgment as to is any appropriate material when fact and entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 56(a). there the is no movant is Fed. R. Civ. P. Summary judgment will be granted unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. 242, 248 (1986). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the nonmoving party s] case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Staley presented no direct evidence of retaliation, we analyze her claim under the familiar burdenshifting framework established Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004) (Title VII); Ennis v. Nat l Ass n of Bus. & 1 Because the district court struck Staley s memorandum in opposition to Defendant s motion for summary judgment and Staley does not challenge that order on appeal, we confine our review to Staley s complaint and the evidence presented in the exhibits accompanying Defendant s memorandum in support of summary judgment. See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993) (providing that facts presented in summary judgment motion are uncontroverted if opposing party fails to respond). 3 Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1995) (ADA & Rehabilitation Act). Importantly, although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, [Staley retains] the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact, Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), that her engagement in the protected activities was a but for cause of her non-conversion to permanent status. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); see Feist v. La., Dep t of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying but for test to retaliation claim under ADA). The demonstrated primary that issue on Defendant s appeal proffered is whether reasons conversion to permanent status were pretextual. 2 Staley for her has non- A plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the defendant s explanation is 2 Staley also suggests that the incidents identified in the Letter of Warning and Letter of Admonishment are not legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for her non-conversion to permanent status because they relate to her disability. However, [t]he law is well settled that the ADA is not violated when an employer discharges an individual based on an employee s misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability. Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Calhoun v. U.S. Dep t of Labor, 576 F.3d 201, 214 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that insubordinate behavior is sufficient to discharge the employer s burden to produce a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for an adverse employment action). 4 unworthy of credence circumstantial or evidence by offering sufficiently other probative forms of . of . . [retaliation]. Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir. 2004) quotation (internal marks omitted). [A] plaintiff s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact discriminated. to conclude that the employer unlawfully Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). We conclude that Staley has failed to establish that Defendant s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for not converting her to permanent status were pretext for retaliation either for requesting a reasonable accommodation, filing a grievance after that request was denied, or filing an informal and formal complaint with the EEOC. reveals that because she Staley was disregarded To the contrary, the record not converted FDIC policy, to was supervisors, and demonstrated poor judgment. permanent status disrespectful to Although Staley s non-conversion occurred shortly after she filed the formal EEOC complaint, this temporal proximity alone is not sufficient to establish that her engagement in protected activity was a but for cause Transp., of her non-conversion. Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 660 See (5th Hernandez Cir.) v. Yellow (holding that [b]ut for causation . . . cannot be established by temporal 5 proximity alone ), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 136 (2012). Nor is there any evidence that Staley s supervisors were conspiring to prevent her non-conversion by creating a paper trail of trumped up disciplinary charges. In any event, it is not for this court to decide whether the decision by Staley s supervisors was wise. See DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (observing that this [c]ourt does not sit as a kind of super-personnel employment decisions department made by weighing firms the charged prudence with of employment discrimination (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor dispense of Defendant with contentions are oral on Staley s argument adequately retaliation because presented in the the facts claim. We and legal materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

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