Lefemine v. Wideman, No. 13-1629 (4th Cir. 2014)
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Plaintiff successfully sued various Greenwood County Sheriff's Office officials for First Amendment violations. The court held that qualified immunity, the absence of a policy or custom of discrimination, and the nature of the relief granted here - whether considered individually or together through a "totality of the circumstances" lens - could not support the denial of attorneys' fees to plaintiff, a prevailing civil rights plaintiff; the district court abused its discretion by denying these fees and the court reversed the judgment; and the court remanded with instructions to allow plaintiff to make a fee application and for ensuing determination of the reasonable fee award for his successful prosecution of the civil rights matter, including the time spent defending entitlement to attorney's fees.
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PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-1629 STEVEN LEFEMINE, d/b/a Columbia Christians for Life, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DAN WIDEMAN, individually and in his official capacity; MIKE FREDERICK, individually and in his official capacity; LONNIE SMITH, individually and in his official capacity; BRANDON STRICKLAND, individually and in his official capacity; SHERIFF TONY DAVIS, in his official capacity, Defendants Appellees, and GREENWOOD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (8:08-cv-03638-HMH) Argued: March 19, 2014 Decided: July 11, 2014 Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Diaz joined. ARGUED: Steven W. Fitschen, NATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Andrew Lindemann, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Robert D. Garfield, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee Mike Frederick. Russell W. Harter, Jr., CHAPMAN, HARTER & HARTER, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees Dan Wideman, Lonnie Smith, Brandon Strickland, and Tony Davis. 2 WYNN, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs who prevail in suits to vindicate civil rights are entitled to attorneys fees unless special circumstances make a fee award unjust. Here, Plaintiff Steven C. Lefemine, leader of the Columbia Christians for Life, successfully sued various Greenwood County Sheriff s Office officials for First Amendment violations. the district immunity, (2) discrimination County court deemed the absence against Sheriff s (1) of abortion Office, and the a Defendants policy protestors (3) the by or limited qualified custom the But of Greenwood nature of [Lefemine s] injunctive relief to be special circumstances that made the award of attorneys fees to Lefemine unjust. 1 however, hold that the relief Lefemine obtained was We, notably broader than the district court suggested and that the other two circumstances are not special and do not render a Section 1988 fee award unjust. Accordingly, we reverse. I. In November 2005, Lefemine and other members of his group Columbia Christians for Life demonstrated on a public sidewalk at the busiest intersection in Greenwood County, South Carolina. 1 Lefemine v. Wideman, No. 8:08-3638-HMH, 2013 WL 1499152, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2013). 3 Lefemine v. Wideman, No. 8:08-3638-HMH, 2013 WL 1499152, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2013). They held large signs with graphic images of aborted fetuses hoping to shock the consciences of those who Christians [saw] for the Life s signs and thereby anti-abortion convey message. Columbia Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 296 (4th Cir.), vacated 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012). Passers-by who saw the signs complained to the Greenwood County Sheriff s Office. signs with her For example, a mother who drove by the five-year-old son reported to the Sheriff s Office that her son was screaming, crying after seeing the signs. Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 296. In response, Lieutenant Randy Miles informed the Columbia Christians for Life protestors that the Sheriff s Office had received complaints about the graphic photographs and that this was causing a disturbance in the traffic flow at th[e] intersections. Id. (quotation marks omitted). At the direction of Chief Deputy Mike Frederick, Major Lonnie Smith instructed Lefemine to take the signs down. Major Smith explained that he would have no other choice but to ticket Lefemine for breach of the peace if the protestors continued to display the signs. Lefemine, 2013 WL 1499152, at *2. When Lefemine asserted that this demand violated the First Amendment, Major Smith responded: You do not have a right to be offensive 4 to other people in that manner. Id. Ultimately, the protestors packed up the signs and left. The following year, an attorney for the National Legal Foundation sent a letter on behalf of Columbia Christians for Life to Sheriff Dan Wideman. The letter informed Sheriff Wideman that volunteers will be returning to the Greenwood area again in freedoms the by J.A. 219. near future exercise their the highlighting to First national tragedy of Amendment abortion. The letter asserted that Major Smith s actions the previous year constituted content-based discrimination and a clear violation of its members First Amendment rights. Id. Finally, the letter warned that any further interference with [Columbia Christians for Life s] message by you or your officers will leave us no choice but to remedies without further notice. pursue all available legal Id. Chief Deputy Frederick responded on behalf of the Sheriff s Office. were He stated that the Office s actions the previous year absolutely enforcing content-neutral, existing roadway in that safety, [Major public Smith] decency, was and maintenance of order statutes in order to protect the motoring public from illegal and unwarranted distraction. Chief Deputy circumstances Frederick again, the declared that, Sheriff s faced Office J.A. 225. with would the respond same in exactly the same manner: order the person(s) to stop or face 5 criminal sanctions . . . . criminal sanctions[,] Id. Lefemine Yet, despite the threat of and Columbia Christians for Life returned to the same area in November 2006 and again in 2007 and those protests took place without incident. In October Amendment 2008, violations Lefemine and filed seeking a a suit alleging declaratory First judgment, permanent injunction, damages, and attorneys fees. a Following a hearing on the parties cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the Officers had violated Lefemine s First Amendment rights and enjoined the Officers from engaging in content-based restrictions on [Lefemine s] display of graphic signs without narrowly tailoring [the] restriction to serve a compelling state interest. Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 627 (D.S.C. 2010). Nevertheless, the district court held that Lefemine could not recover damages. It concluded that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the unconstitutionality of their conduct had not previously been clearly established. The court further held that Lefemine failed to establish that the Sheriff s Office had a custom or policy of infringing on citizens First Amendment rights. Finally, the district court refused to award Lefemine attorneys fees. On appeal, this Court affirmed on all issues. Lefemine sought and was granted certiorari by the United States Supreme 6 Court, which ultimately rebuffed our holding that Lefemine did not qualify as a prevailing party under Section 1988 and thus was not entitled to attorneys fees. The Supreme Court held that the injunction ordered the defendant officials to change their behavior in a way that directly benefited the plaintiff, thereby making him a prevailing party. 133 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2012). courts below addressed Lefemine v. Wideman, However, because [n]either of the whether any special circumstances exist[ed] in this case making a fee award unjust, id. at 12, the Supreme Court remanded to us, and we, in turn, remanded to the district court to award fees unless the court determined by express findings that special circumstances rendered such an award unjust. On remand, the district court found three special circumstances that made an attorneys fees award to Lefemine unjust: (1) the Defendants qualified immunity, (2) the absence of a policy or custom of discrimination against abortion protestors by the Greenwood County Sheriff s office, and (3) the limited nature of the injunctive relief. 1499152, at *4. Lefemine, 2013 WL With this appeal, we now review the district court s ruling denying Lefemine his attorneys fees under the abuse of discretion standard. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005) ( A district court s decision to grant 7 or deny attorney s fee[s] under [S]ection 1988 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ). II. A. The Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976 authorizes the award of a reasonable attorney s fee to the prevailing party in certain civil suits brought under Section 1983. rights actions, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The purpose of [Section] 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Congress found that the enacted [Section] private market 1988 for specifically legal services because it failed to provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective access to the judicial process. 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986) City of Riverside v. Rivera, (citations omitted). Congress attributed this market failure in part to the fact that [t]hese victims ordinarily cannot afford to purchase legal services at the rates set by the private market. Id. (citations omitted). Crucially for this case, Congress also attributed the need for Section 1988 to public official immunities that severely limit money damages even in the 8 face of success: [W]hile damages are theoretically available under the statutes covered by [Section 1988], . . . in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy. Id. at 577 (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). Accordingly, awarding counsel fees particularly to prevailing important constitutional rights Report, at 9. plaintiffs and are necessary to be in if such litigation [f]ederal adequately civil protected. is and House Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 527 (1984) (noting that the legislative history of [Section] 1988 clearly indicates that Congress intended to provide for attorney s fees in cases where relief properly is granted against officials who are immune from damages awards and noting that awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if [f]ederal civil and constitutional rights are to be adequately protected ). In light prevailing fee unless unjust. of plaintiff special Hensley, marks omitted). Section should 1988 s ordinarily circumstances 461 U.S. language at would 429 and purpose, recover an render such (citations and a attorney s an award quotation Courts have universally recognized that [the] special circumstances exception is very narrowly limited. Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., 165 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 9 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, [o]nly on rare occasions does a case present such circumstances . . . . Id. See also, e.g., DeJesus Nazario v. Morris Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that the special circumstances justifying denial of attorneys fees are few and far between ). For example, the Supreme Court recognized a special circumstance justifying the denial of attorneys fees to a pro se plaintiff who was an attorney in Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). A fee award would not further the overriding statutory concern . . . in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights concluded violations. that [t]he Id. at statutory 437. The policy of Supreme Court furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel . . . . Id. at 438. Similarly, in Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co. we recognized a rare special circumstance justifying the denial of attorneys fees under Section did not vindicate civil rights. 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976). In Chastang, profit-sharing an 1988 employer s where discriminated based on sex. when incorporated into the the plaintiffs and suit retirement plan The discrimination had been legal plan, could not be modified unilaterally by the defendants once it became illegal, but had 10 been amended with reasonable dispatch . . . once the need for amendment was established and litigation began. Id. at 1045. plan to in was amended any event before the We held that [b]ecause the eliminate its illegally discriminatory aspects before plaintiffs suits were filed, they cannot be said to have derived litigation. any Id. benefit, direct or indirect, from the Accordingly, we upheld the district court s finding of special circumstances. Id. By contrast, in Bills v. Hodges, we held that the district court abused its discretion by denying successful civil rights plaintiffs their attorneys fees under Section 1988. 844 (4th Cir. 1980). them with an 628 F.2d In Bills, the plaintiffs landlord served eviction notice motivated by biracial dating and entertainment practices. the plaintiffs Id. at 845. The district court awarded the plaintiffs injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act and Fair Housing Act but denied them attorneys fees under Section 1988 because the plaintiffs could well afford to hire their own lawyers and because the court felt the defendant acted in good faith. Id. at 847. We squarely rejected both of those special circumstances and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorneys fees . . . . Id. 11 B. As stated previously, the district court here held that three special circumstances justified the denial of attorneys fees to Lefemine: (1) the Defendants qualified immunity, (2) the absence of a policy or custom of discrimination against abortion protestors by the Greenwood County Sheriff s Office, and (3) the limited nature of [Lefemine s] injunctive relief. Lefemine, 2013 WL 1499152, at *4. doing, the district court Lefemine argues that in so committed reversible error. To determine whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that special circumstances justified denying Lefemine his fees, we examine each of the circumstances upon which the district court relied. 1. The district court first found that a special circumstance arose from its determination that the Defendant Officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Because qualified immunity shielded the Defendant Officers from personal liability for damages, Lefemine was unable to obtain even nominal damages the only remedy Lefemine sought but failed to obtain. 2 672 F.3d at 297 301, 303. Lefemine, The district court deemed qualified 2 Although Lefemine s complaint included a prayer for compensatory and/or nominal damages, J.A. 21, Lefemine abandoned his quest for compensatory damages and sought only nominal damages at summary judgment. 12 immunity special such that it made an award of attorneys fees under Section 1988 unjust. But neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that qualified immunity constitutes a special circumstance supporting the denial of Section 1988 attorneys fees. the case law suggests quite the opposite. In fact, As the Supreme Court has underscored, in many Section 1988 cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public preclude or severely limit the damage remedy. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 577 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). awarding counsel fees to prevailing officials, Accordingly, plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if [f]ederal civil and constitutional rights are to be adequately protected. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In its qualified immunity analysis, the district court sought to bolster its special circumstance finding by noting that Defendants actions [were] taken in good faith and that [i]t was never the Defendants intent [Lefemine s] First Amendment rights . . . . 1499152, repeatedly at *5. Yet rejected we, good and faith our as to upon Lefemine, 2013 WL sister a infringe circuits, special have circumstance justifying the denial of Section 1988 attorneys fees and for good reason: The Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act is not meant a as punishment for 13 bad defendants who resist plaintiffs claims in bad faith. Rather, it is meant to compensate civil rights attorneys who bring civil rights cases and win them. Williams v. Hanover Hous. Auth., 113 F.3d 1294, 1302 (1st Cir. 1997). See also, e.g., Bills, 628 F.2d at 847 ( The district court also refused to award attorneys fees at least partly because the court felt the defendant acted in good faith. However, circumstance that a defendant s would render good an faith award is of not fees a special unjust. ); Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 951 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that the alleged special circumstances amount to no more than assertions that the Attorney General has acted in good faith, a ground overwhelmingly rejected by the courts and that Section 1988 is not designed to penalize defendants but to encourage injured individuals to seek relief ); Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 104 (7th Cir. 1985) (calling the defendant s good faith irrelevant to a Section 1988 fee determination); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 999 (5th Cir. 1983) ( Good faith is not a special circumstance. ). We believe that special government immunities that restrict civil rights plaintiffs recoveries weigh in favor certainly not against awarding Section 1988 fees. court here erred in holding otherwise. that the district court abused 14 its of and The district Accordingly, we hold discretion in denying an attorneys fee award to Lefemine because the Officer Defendants were shielded by qualified immunity. 2. The district court also found that the absence of a policy or custom of discrimination against abortion protestors by the Greenwood County circumstance Sheriff s that justified award under Section 1988. Office the constituted denial of an a special attorneys fee Lefemine, 2013 WL 1499152, at *4. We entity of disagree. Unless a government discrimination, a court will has not a policy attribute or an custom individual s constitutional violations to the government entity. Monell v. Dep t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ( [A] local government may not be sued under [Section] 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said inflicts the injury that to the represent government responsible under [Section] 1983. ). official as an policy, entity is Here, Lefemine failed to show that the Greenwood County Sheriff s Office had a policy or custom of discrimination. The Sheriff s Office thus could not be Officer held liable for the 15 Defendants constitutional violations, and Lefemine could not obtain even nominal damages Lefemine, 672 F.3d at 297-301. 3 from the Sheriff s Office. But neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever suggested that a plaintiff s inability to bring a viable Monell claim against prevailing a government civil rights entity somehow plaintiffs from blocks otherwise obtaining their attorneys fees under Section 1988. And for good reason because Section a 1988 is not meant as punishment for bad defendants but is instead meant to compensate civil rights attorneys who bring civil rights cases and win them. 113 F.3d at 1302. suggest that a Williams, It would turn Section 1988 on its head to plaintiff officials for civil attorneys fees for who rights the successfully violations profoundly sues should non- special government be denied circumstance that the entity for whom those officials work could not be held liable under Monell. Again, awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights litigation against government entities and officials is particularly important and necessary if [f]ederal civil and constitutional rights are to be adequately protected. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 577 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court here erred in suggesting otherwise by deeming 3 Though, again, nominal damages Lefemine sought but failed to achieve. 16 was the only relief the absence of a custom or policy a special circumstance. Denying Lefemine attorneys fees on that basis constituted an abuse of discretion. 3. Finally, the district court found that the limited nature of the relief granted to Lefemine constituted a circumstance making a Section 1988 fee award unjust. special Yet this factor, like the two before it, cannot support denying Lefemine his attorneys fees. The relief Lefemine obtained is notably broader than the district court acknowledged. Significantly, Lefemine obtained two of the remedies he sought: an injunction and a declaratory judgment against multiple defendants. Additionally, although the district court characterized the injunction as extremely limited[,] Lefemine, 2013 WL 1499152, at *7, it bars Defendants from future restrictions of Lefemine s graphic signs without narrowly tailoring compelling state interest. [the] restrictions to serve a Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 627. Particularly in light of Defendants position that, faced with the same circumstances again, the Sheriff s Office would respond in exactly the same manner: order the person(s) to stop or face criminal sanctions[,] J.A. 225, hardly de minimis. 17 the injunction s impact is Moreover, while the district court accurately noted that Lefemine was able to conduct incident, Lefemine, 2013 WL Defendants had yet two further not other protests at the 1499152, *7, violated without fact Lefemine s that First Amendment rights is of little moment. Defendants previously maintained a exactly that the they same would way respond as they to future originally protest responded: in by order[ing] the person(s) to stop or face criminal sanctions. Lefemine, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 619 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The injunction bars that response. The fact that Lefemine appealed to this Court and then to the Supreme Court and won only further underscores that the significance of his case is not as minimal as the district court portrayed. Lefemine, 2013 WL 1499152, at *7. In downplaying the relief Lefemine achieved, the district court looked to Mercer, 401 F.3d 199, which, in turn, looked to Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). Farrar, in which the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of attorneys fees based on the limited nature of the plaintiff s instructive contrast to this case. relief, provides an In Farrar, the plaintiff sought $17 million in compensatory damages, alleging violations of his right to due process. 506 U.S. plaintiff was awarded only nominal damages. at 106. Yet Id. at 107. the The Supreme Court held that [w]hen a [prevailing party] recovers 18 only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all. Id. at 115 (citation omitted). In contrast elements to required Farrar, to Lefemine secure the successfully relief injunction and a declaratory judgment. he proved sought namely, the an And, for the reasons discussed above, Lefemine could not have obtained money damages against the Defendants for reasons related not to the merits of his case, but rather to the special governmental immunities and defenses that weigh in favor of awarding fees. Accordingly, neither Mercer nor Farrar supports denying attorneys fees here. In sum, Lefemine obtained nearly all of the relief he sought namely, declaratory and injunctive relief protecting his First Amendment rights. that the limited And the district court erred in holding nature of relief granted special circumstance making a fee award unjust. constituted a Lefemine, 2013 WL 1499152, at *7. III. Today, we hold that qualified immunity, the absence of a policy or custom of discrimination, and the nature of the relief granted here whether considered individually or together through a totality of the circumstances lens cannot support the denial 19 of attorneys plaintiff. district fees to Lefemine, a prevailing civil rights By denying Lefemine his fees on those bases, the court abused its discretion, and, accordingly, is reversed. Consequently, we remand this matter to the district court with instructions to allow Lefemine to make a fee application and for an ensuing determination of the reasonable fee award for Lefemine s successful prosecution of this civil rights matter, including the time spent defending entitlement to attorney s fees . . . . 4 Mercer, 401 F.3d at 202 n.3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). REVERSED AND REMANDED 4 [T]he critical focus in calculating a reasonable attorney s fee is in determining the lodestar figure[,] i.e., [a] fee based upon reasonable rates and hours[.] Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1078 (4th Cir. 1986). Indeed, [a] proper computation of the lodestar fee will, in the great majority of cases, constitute the reasonable fee contemplated by [Section] 1988. Id. 20
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