Victor Fernandes v. Paul Craine, No. 13-1298 (4th Cir. 2013)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-1298 VICTOR FERNANDES, Plaintiff Appellant, v. PAUL CRAINE, Defendant Appellee, and MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD; DALE ANONSEN; JASON HUGGINS, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Stephanie A. Gallagher, Magistrate Judge. (8:10-cv-00752-SAG) Submitted: July 15, 2013 Decided: August 20, 2013 Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael P. Coyle, CHAIFETZ & COYLE, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Marc P. Hansen, County Attorney, Charles L. Frederick, Associate County Attorney, Edward B. Lattner, Chief, Division of Human Resources & Appeals, COUNTY ATTORNEY S OFFICE FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: Victor Fernandes, having obtained a favorable jury verdict in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against police officer Paul Craine, challenges the district court s denial of his request for attorney s fees. an extension of time to file a motion for See Fernandes v. Craine, No. 8:10-cv-00752 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2013), ECF No. 78 (the Opinion ). 1 As explained below, we vacate and remand. On December 7, 2012, at the conclusion of a trial in the District of Maryland, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fernandes on his § 1983 excessive force claim, awarding $12,700 in compensatory damages. Because he was the prevailing party, Fernandes was entitled to seek attorney s fees. 2 The applicable local motion rule fourteen required days of the December 10, 2012. that, accounting Fernandes for entry to of file any judgment, See D. Md. R. 109.2. the intervening fee which within occurred on The parties agree Christmas holiday, the deadline for submission of such a motion was December 26, 2012. 1 By agreement of the parties, the trial was conducted by a United States magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that [i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [§ 1983] . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney s fee. 3 Fernandes s lawyer did not learn of the judgment until December 27, 2012 one day too late because the Notice of Electronic Filing ( NEF ) heralding the judgment had diverted to his email system s junk mail folder. 3 been On that date, Fernandes moved for a one-day extension of the deadline, simultaneously filing support thereof. his fee request and a memorandum in In his extension motion, Fernandes urged the district court to find that his neglect in filing a timely fee motion could be excused under the federal rules. The district court denied Fernandes s motions, explaining that the lawyer s failure to meet the filing deadline amounted to nothing more than run of the mill inattentiveness. 10. More specifically, the court observed that Opinion Fernandes s lawyer, an experienced litigator, should have known that the federal with, courts or Therefore, monitored generally shortly following, according the enter status to of a the the return court, the judgment case the by of contemporaneously a verdict. lawyer way of should the Id. have court s electronic docket or by contacting his opposing counsel. 3 On appeal, Craine suggests that the record does support the lawyer s explanation concerning misdelivery of NEF. In the proceedings below, however, Craine [did] argue, and [the district court did] not find, that counsel Mr. Fernandes acted in bad faith. Opinion 9. 4 not the not for We review the denial of a deadline for abuse of discretion. motion to extend a filing See Thompson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1996). An error of abuse law by a discretion. district court is by definition an of Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 2002). A party deadline must seeking an demonstrate extension that after failure missing a act within to specified time was the result of excusable neglect. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). described [inquiry], by the taking filing the Fed. R. Whether neglect is excusable has been Supreme account including the following: Court of as at all bottom relevant an equitable circumstances, (1) the danger of prejudice to the non-movant; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). We have stressed that the third Pioneer factor the reason for the delay is the most important. 534. 4 Thompson, 76 F.3d at The sole reason for Fernandes s tardy submission was the 4 It is apparent that the second Pioneer factor (length and impact of delay) and the fourth Pioneer factor (good faith) tend to favor Fernandes. As for the first Pioneer factor (Continued) 5 email malfunction Filtration Corp., described LLC, we above. considered In the Robinson responsibilities counsel under arguably similar circumstances. (4th Cir. 2010). Because of various v. Wix of See 599 F.3d 403 computer problems, Robinson s lawyer failed to receive electronic notice of the defendant s motion for summary judgment prior to its award. appeal, we ruled that the district court did not abuse On its discretion in denying Robinson s motion to vacate the summary judgment. As we emphasized, however, the critical consideration was that the lawyer was aware of his computer troubles and made the strategic decision to remain willfully blind to whether the opposing side had filed a dispositive motion. Id. at 409. Importantly, we declined to impose a general duty to monitor dockets, limiting our ruling to the straightforward conclusion that counsel cannot make the calculated choice to take no action with respect to his electronic inaccessibility . . . and then avail himself of discretionary relief from the consequences of that choice. Id. at 410-11. In contrast to Robinson, there is nothing in this record suggesting that Fernandes s lawyer was aware of any computer (prejudice), Craine does not appear to have ability to respond to the fee motion was Fernandes s one-day delay. 6 shown that his compromised by problems, that he was willfully blind to the status of the electronic docket, or that he made a strategic choice to remain ignorant of the district court s judgment. Absent such a circumstance, requiring Fernandes s lawyer to stay apprised of the status of his case by manually checking the docket would engender a general Robinson rejected. duty to monitor See Opinion 10. the very obligation Thus, on the most important Pioneer factor, the court contravened our precedent, committing a legal error that, by definition, constitutes an abuse of discretion. Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the district court s decision and remand for such other and further proceedings as may be appropriate. 5 facts and legal We dispense with oral argument because the contentions are adequately presented in the materials submitted and argument would not aid the decisional process. VACATED AND REMANDED 5 Fernandes makes two other contentions on appeal: (1) that Craine s subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict reset the time for filing a fee motion, and (2) that the district court abused its discretion in declining to suspend the local rules on a showing of good cause. In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not reach or assess either of those theories. 7

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