United States v. Baker, No. 12-6624 (4th Cir. 2013)
Annotate this Case
Justia Opinion Summary
Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Fourth Circuit US Court of Appeals?
Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More ›
You already receive new opinion summaries from Fourth Circuit US Court of Appeals. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here.
Defendant, convicted of multiple federal firearm and drug offenses, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence partly on the ground that his counsel had been unconstitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the search of his vehicle on direct appeal under Arizona v. Gant. The court concluded that defendant's counsel did not perform deficiently in declining to challenge the search on direct appeal because the search of the vehicle was plainly justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement irrespective of Gant. Moreover, counsel's performance did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
Download PDF
PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-6624 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MARIO N. BAKER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:08-cr-00088-REP-1; 3:10-cv-00579-REP) Argued: May 14, 2013 Decided: June 13, 2013 Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Keenan joined. the ARGUED: John W. Akin, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael F. Murray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neal L. Walters, Benjamin P. Kyber, Third Year Law Student, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia; Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: Defendant Mario Nathaniel Baker was convicted of multiple federal firearm and drug offenses based on evidence that police officers uncovered while searching his vehicle during a traffic stop. Baker s counsel never challenged the constitutionality of the search, either through a suppression motion or on direct appeal. After his conviction became final, Baker filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence partly on the ground that his counsel had been unconstitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the search on direct appeal under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which the Supreme Court decided while his appeal was still pending. The district court rejected this claim, and we affirm for the reasons stated herein. I. A. We take the facts pertinent to this appeal from the evidence presented at Baker s trial, construed in the light most favorable to the government. See Bereano v. United States, 706 F.3d 568, 571 n.5 (4th Cir. 2013). On March 3, 2008, Shawn Nelson, an officer with the Henrico County, Virginia, Police Department, stopped a vehicle that had a broken taillight and an expired license plate. 2 Baker was driving the vehicle, passenger seat. and Dashawn Brown occupied the front On checking Baker s driver s license against state records, Nelson learned that Baker was the subject of an outstanding federal arrest warrant. warrant, Nelson called for backup. While verifying the Once additional officers arrived, Nelson arrested Baker and handed him over to one of the other officers, who searched him and, finding no contraband, secured him in a police car. While the other officer was dealing with Baker, Nelson turned his attention to Brown, asking him to exit the vehicle. Brown did so but then began to walk away. Nelson ordered Brown to put his hands on the vehicle and started frisking him. Nelson felt a handgun in Brown s pocket, Brown When attempted to reenter the vehicle -- claiming at the time that he wanted to retrieve his floorboard. cellphone, which was on the passenger-side Nelson struggled with Brown, wrestled him to the ground, and arrested him for possessing the handgun. He then searched Brown incident to the arrest, finding 0.90 grams of heroin, 0.40 grams of crack cocaine, $980 in cash, and a small digital scale on his person. After securing Brown in a police car, Nelson searched the passenger compartment of Baker s vehicle, starting with the center console, where he found 20.6 grams of heroin, 0.24 grams 3 of crack cocaine, 12.2 grams of methadone, and a burnt marijuana cigarette. He also found another handgun in the glove box. B. Based on the evidence found during the search of his vehicle, Baker was indicted for various federal firearm and drug offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(c); 21 U.S.C. § 841. He was also charged with an additional firearm count stemming from a previous run-in with the police, in 2007. Although Baker s lawyer moved (unsuccessfully) to sever this additional count, he never filed a search of Baker s vehicle. counts and was sentenced suppression motion challenging the Baker was convicted by a jury of all by the trial court to 185 months imprisonment. Baker appealed his convictions and sentence to this court, with his lawyer filing an opening brief on March 16, 2009. On April 21, 2009, the day before the government filed its response brief, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, which held that, under the Fourth Amendment, the [p]olice may search a vehicle arrestee incident is to within a recent occupant s reaching distance arrest of only the if the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). sentence on August 7, 2009. We affirmed Baker s convictions and See United States v. Baker, 340 F. 4 App x 145 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1548 (2010). At no point between when the Supreme Court decided Gant and when this court decided Baker s appeal did Baker s lawyer argue that the search of Baker s vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment under Gant. C. Proceeding pro se, Baker subsequently filed a motion to vacate, set § 2255. aside, or correct his under 28 U.S.C. His motion asserted four claims for relief, all of which the district court rejected. No. sentence 3:08cr88, 2012 WL 620240 See United States v. Baker, (E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2012). Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, the district court found that ineffective vehicle Baker s in under counsel failing Gant on to had not been challenge direct appeal the unconstitutionally search [b]ecause of the Baker s evidence found as a result of the search . . . still would be admissible under the good exclusionary faith rule, exception meaning that to the Baker Fourth could not Amendment s show that counsel s failure to argue Gant on appeal prejudiced him. Id. at *2 (footnote omitted). The district court denied a certificate of appealability for all four of Baker s claims. See id. at *3; 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). While agreeing with the district court that three of the did claims not merit our review, 5 we granted a partial certificate of appealability to consider the question whether Baker s lawyer was ineffective in failing to raise a Gant argument on direct appeal. II. Warrantless Fourth searches Amendment established and -- are per to subject se only well-delineated unreasonable a few exceptions. under the specifically Katz v. States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). United Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), addressed when the exception to the Fourth Amendment s warrant requirement for searches incident to a lawful arrest justifies a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle in which an arrestee is traveling. As a general matter, a search incident to a lawful arrest may extend only to the arrestee s person and the area within his immediate control -- construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he evidence. might gain Chimel v. possession of California, a weapon or 395 U.S. 752, destructible 763 (1969). Before Gant, the Supreme Court had interpreted this rule in the context of vehicle searches to mean that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile as well containers found within the passenger compartment. 6 as any New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (footnote omitted); see also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). The federal courts of appeals tended to construe the Court s pronouncement in Belton capaciously. Although a few circuits a cabined Belton s holding to permit search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant only when the arrestee could actually reach the vehicle s passenger compartment, most espoused a broader interpretation, according to which police officers could search the vehicle regardless of the arrestee s location at the time of the search. 556 U.S. at 341-43 & nn.2-3 (collecting cases). See Gant, This court adopted the broad reading, upholding, for instance, the search of a vehicle as a search incident to an arrest where the arrestee had been handcuffed and removed from the vehicle when the search occurred. See United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1995), overruling recognized by United States v. Wilks, 647 F.3d 520, 522 (4th Cir. 2011). Without purporting to overrule Belton and its progeny, Gant rejected the lower courts capacious reading of that decision, making arrest clear that authorizes the exception vehicle for searches searches only in incident two to an specific circumstances. The first circumstance is when the arrestee is unsecured within and reaching distance compartment at the time of the search. 7 of the passenger Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. The second is when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Id. (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). Court concluded, When these justifications are absent, the a search of an arrestee s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. It is important Amendment doctrine addressed only searches that the incident searches. It to recognize Gant did exception to a left to lawful those not the aspects change. warrant arrest, unaltered Id. at 351. other as of The Fourth decision requirement applied exceptions to for vehicle that might authorize the police to search a vehicle without a warrant even when an arrestee is secured beyond reaching distance of the passenger compartment and it is unreasonable to expect to find any evidence of the crime of arrest in the vehicle. 346-47. See id. at The one most relevant to this appeal is the so-called automobile exception, which permits a warrantless search of a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of criminal activity. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 8 See III. Baker argues that his lawyer was unconstitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the search of his vehicle under Gant on direct appeal. Once the Supreme Court decided Gant, he contends, his lawyer should have argued to this court that the decision rendered the search of his vehicle unconstitutional, given that neither he nor Brown was within reaching distance of the passenger Nelson searched the vehicle. * compartment when Officer Had his lawyer made this argument, Baker insists, the evidence obtained during the search would likely have been excluded and all his convictions based on that evidence would likely have been overturned. To effective show a violation assistance of of the counsel, Sixth a Amendment defendant must right prove to (1) that [his] counsel s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. v. Washington, district 466 court s U.S. rulings 668, on 687 each (1984). prong, we In Strickland evaluating review its a legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Fulks, 683 F.3d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 2012). * Because of the other available grounds for disposing of Baker s appeal, we need not decide whether the search was justified under Gant s other rationale -- namely, that it was reasonable to expect to find additional evidence of the crimes for which Baker and Brown were arrested in the vehicle. 9 For the following reasons, Baker has failed to make the requisite showing under either prong of the Strickland standard. A. Regarding deficient standard when of professional the first his prong, representation reasonableness, norms. reasonableness of a as falls 466 challenged performance below measured Strickland, counsel s lawyer s an against U.S. at objective prevailing 688. conduct, is in [T]he turn, is judged on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel s conduct. Id. at 690. To guard against hindsight bias and unfair second-guess[ing], a defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. The range of reasonable professional assistance is just as wide on direct appeal as it is at trial. In particular, [c]ounsel is not obligated to assert all nonfrivolous issues on appeal, as [t]here can hardly be any question about the importance of having the appellate advocate examine the record with a view to selecting the most promising issues for review. Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 164 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 752 (1983)). Indeed, requiring counsel to raise every claim, or even a multiplicity of claims, runs the risk of detracting from contentions that may 10 be truly meritorious. Appellate counsel accordingly enjoys a presumption that he decided which issues were most likely to afford relief on appeal, a presumption that a defendant can rebut only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented. 1568 (4th Id. (quoting Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560, Cir. 1993); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)). Baker s counsel claimed on direct appeal that the trial court had erred in three respects: in denying Baker s motion to sever the charge stemming from his previous encounter with the police, in denying his post-trial motion for a judgment acquittal, and in imposing an unreasonable sentence. to Baker, each of these issues was clearly weaker of According than an argument under Gant would have been, since the latter would have impugned the search of his vehicle, the evidence it uncovered, and thus the sole basis for all but one of his convictions. Baker incorrectly assumes, however, that the search of his vehicle Gant. would necessarily be unconstitutional if it violated In fact, even if the search exceeded the limits of the exception to the warrant requirement for searches incident to a lawful arrest, as delineated in Gant, it was still justified by another, independent exception, such that Baker s lawyer acted reasonably in declining to challenge it. 11 As noted above, Gant addressed only the rule permitting warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest, as applied in the context of vehicle searches, leaving unaltered other exceptions to the warrant requirement that might be relevant in that context. To illustrate the limits of its holding, the Court in Gant expressly identified three such exceptions. 556 U.S. at 346-47. See Among them was the automobile exception, according to which police officers may search a vehicle without first obtaining a warrant if it is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) (per curiam). Note that, in contrast to Gant s rule, this exception permits police officers to search a vehicle for evidence of any crime, not just the crime of arrest, but only on a showing of probable cause rather than a mere reasonable belief. The Court in Gant emphasized that its decision in no way affected the validity or scope of the automobile exception, noting that [i]f there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. U.S. at 347. This court, in 12 turn, similarly Gant, 556 confirmed the continued viability of this exception in the wake of Gant, holding that even though a warrantless vehicle search might have exceeded the limits articulated in Gant, it was nevertheless constitutional because it was supported by probable cause. See United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 136 n.15 (4th Cir. 2009). So too here. After Officer Nelson found a gun, drugs, $980 in cash, and a digital scale on Brown s person, he had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of Baker s vehicle. Probable cause to search a vehicle exists when reasonable officers can conclude that what they see, in light of their experience, supports an objective belief that contraband is in the vehicle. Cir. 2012). lawfully United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 446 (4th This standard is satisfied when a police officer searches a vehicle s contraband on his person. F.3d 538, discovery 545-46 of a (7th banned recent occupant and finds See United States v. Johnson, 383 Cir. 2004) substance ( [A (drugs) police on officer s] Johnson s person clearly provided him with probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle . . . since the officer had a reasonable basis for believing that more drugs or other illegal contraband may have been concealed inside. (footnote omitted)). Thus, having found drugs, as well as other items indicating involvement in the drug trade, on Brown s person, Nelson had probable cause to search the 13 passenger compartment of the vehicle in which contraband. Brown had just been sitting for additional And if there were any doubt that the drugs and other items alone justified the search of the vehicle, we note that Brown also walked away from Nelson, reached back into the vehicle while being frisked, and struggled with Nelson. These facts provided further reason for Nelson to believe that there was additional contraband in the vehicle. We thus conclude that Nelson s search of Baker s vehicle was supported by probable cause and that it therefore comported with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. This Brown s all assumes, person, which of course, uncovered that the Nelson s items that search gave Nelson probable cause to search the vehicle, was itself lawful. parties argue extensively over the point, but even of The assuming arguendo that Nelson s search of Brown in some way violated the Fourth Amendment, it would be of no avail to Baker. defendant must have proper standing search under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. 128 (1978). in order to For a challenge a See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 Baker of course has standing to challenge the search of his own vehicle. But not so the search of Brown. This court has repeatedly held that one occupant of a vehicle lacks standing to challenge the frisk or search of another. See, e.g., United States v. Rumley, 588 F.3d 202, 206 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 14 1988). and Baker therefore lacks standing to challenge the frisk search of Brown, which uncovered the contraband that ultimately gave Nelson probable cause to search Baker s vehicle. For this reason as well, it would have been futile for Baker s lawyer to challenge the search of the vehicle on direct appeal. In short, because the search of Baker s vehicle was plainly justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement irrespective of Gant, Baker s lawyer did not perform deficiently in declining to challenge the search on direct appeal. And because we find no deficient performance on this basis, we need not address the government s alternative argument that his lawyer would have been precluded from raising such a challenge in the first place because, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, Baker had waived the issue by failing to file prior to trial a motion to suppress the fruits of the search. B. We must reject as well Baker s argument under the second prong of Strickland, namely that what he alleges was deficient performance somehow prejudiced the defense. To show prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, proceeding would have been different. 694. the result of the Strickland, 466 U.S. at A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 15 Id. Baker takes it for granted that he was prejudiced by his lawyer s failure to challenge the search of his vehicle under Gant on direct appeal. Had such a challenge succeeded, he contends, this court would have had to suppress the evidence found during the exclusionary rule. were based solely search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment And because all but one of his convictions on that evidence, Baker argues that those convictions would necessarily have been overturned. As the district court noted, however, application of the exclusionary rule is in fact barred in Baker s case by the Supreme Court s decision in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). Davis extended the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to hold that [e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 2429. The Court announced this rule, moreover, in a case that also involved the retroactive application of Gant. See id. at 2426. Applying the good-faith exception to Davis s case, the Court held that even though Davis had successfully challenged a search on direct appeal under Gant, the evidence obtained during the search was not subject to suppression because the search had accorded with binding circuit precedent when it was conducted. 2434. 16 See id. at Similarly, at the time Nelson searched Baker s vehicle, our precedent permitted the police to search a vehicle incident to the lawful arrest of one of its occupants regardless of whether the occupant was compartment, United (citing a States rule v. United 1995)). within that Wilks, States Following exclusionary reaching rule Gant 647 v. does F.3d we not of subsequently Milton, Davis, distance 520, 52 have bar (4th 78, accordingly the passenger abrogated. 522 F.3d the Cir. 80 2011) (4th held introduction See that of Cir. the evidence found during searches that would have been constitutional but for Gant and that were conducted before the decision. at 524. See id. Davis mandates the same result here, given that Nelson was doing exactly what the law at the time said he could do when he searched Baker s vehicle. This is precisely the kind of good-faith reliance on precedent that Davis meant to protect and encourage. Baker attempts to avoid this conclusion by noting that Davis was not decided until 2011, after his appeal had concluded and his conviction had become final. Baker thus argues that, had his lawyer successfully challenged the search of his vehicle under Gant on direct appeal, the good-faith exception would not have barred case. This appeal would the application shows, have Baker been of the contends, very exclusionary that different 17 the indeed rule to his outcome of his had his lawyer raised Gant and that his defense was therefore prejudiced within the meaning of Strickland. Baker, however, misunderstands the nature of Strickland s prejudice inquiry. While it is certainly necessary to show that the outcome of the proceeding at issue would have been different in order to prove prejudice, it is not sufficient. As the Supreme Court has explained, an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective, for set[ting] aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)). To avert such windfalls, Strickland s prejudice prong is governed by the law as it stands at the time a court is considering a defendant s ineffective-assistance claim, in contrast to the performance prong, which is governed by the law as it stood when the defendant s lawyer acted. Id. at 372. In determining whether Baker was prejudiced by his lawyer s alleged deficient performance, then, we must apply current law, including Davis s application of the good-faith exception. the reasons suppressing noted the above, evidence the found 18 exception during the would bar search of us For from Baker s vehicle, because the officers were existed at the time of the search. following the law as it This means that, regardless of any appellate challenge to the search under Gant, Baker still would not Strickland be prejudiced in the ineffective-assistance sense required claim. To to hold prove his otherwise would be to confer on Baker a windfall to which the law does not entitle him, id. at 370, and to stray far from the core purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter unlawful conduct on the part of officers, not law-abiding actions, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). This we decline to do. IV. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED 19
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
