US v. David Stuckey, No. 12-5005 (4th Cir. 2013)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-5005 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DAVID STUCKEY, a/k/a Shortstop, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-5022 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEMARIO COVINGTON, a/k/a Booger, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District Judge. (4:11-cr-00417-TLW-11) Submitted: September 20, 2013 Decided: September 30, 2013 Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Melvin W. Cockrell, III, COCKRELL LAW FIRM, PC, Chesterfield, South Carolina; Nicole Nicolette Mace, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for Appellants. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina; Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina; Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Denis J. McInerney, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E. Booth, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: David Stuckey and Demario Covington pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to traffic in five kilograms or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack cocaine. Stuckey was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment and Covington received a 420-month sentence, a sentence Covington stipulated to pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) in an addendum to his plea agreement. Prior separately moved to to sentencing, withdraw their Stuckey guilty and Covington pleas. After conducting a hearing in each case, the district court denied the motions. Both men now appeal, challenging the denial of the motions to withdraw. court s denial representation. of Additionally, Stuckey appeals the district his counsel s motion to withdraw from Finding no error, we affirm. We review a district court s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). United States In order to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, a defendant must show that a fair and just reason supports his request. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Fed. R. [A] fair and just reason . . . is one that essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The defendant bears the heavy burden of 3 demonstrating the existence of such a reason. United States v. Thompson Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009). In burden, a determining district whether court a must defendant consider has the met six this factors articulated in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). after We have reviewed the record in these cases and, carefully considering the factors described in Moore, conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stuckey s guilty pleas. (1977) presumption of 1290, that (4th evidence to Covington s motions to withdraw their See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (holding 1299 and sworn verity ); Cir. the statements Fields 1992) contrary, v. Attorney ( Absent a carry clear defendant is a Gen., and strong 956 F.2d convincing bound by the representations he makes under oath during a plea colloquy. ). Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly concluded that consideration of the Moore factors counseled against allowing Stuckey and Covington to withdraw their guilty pleas. Stuckey also challenges on appeal the district court s denial of his counsel s motion to withdraw. guarantees that [i]n all criminal The Sixth Amendment prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Implicit in the Sixth Amendment is the right of a defendant to have counsel of his own 4 choosing. 1994). United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895 (4th Cir. But this right is not absolute, and its exercise must not obstruct orderly judicial procedure and deprive courts of the exercise of administration of their inherent justice. power Id. to (internal control quotation the marks omitted). A defendant similarly substitution of counsel. allow a defendant to Id. court substitute substitution of abused counsel Id. its counsel, no absolute right to Instead, the decision whether to discretion of the trial court. district has in the sound When determining whether a discretion this rests court in disallowing considers three the factors: (1) the timeliness of [the request]; (2) the adequacy of the court s inquiry into [defendant s] complaint about counsel; and (3) whether [defendant] and his counsel experienced a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. United States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). After reviewing the transcript of the hearing on counsel s motion and with these standards in mind, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court s denial of counsel s motion to withdraw. Accordingly, convictions and we sentences. affirm We Stuckey s dispense and with Covington s oral argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented 5 in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
