US v. Lamont Miller, Jr., No. 12-4981 (4th Cir. 2013)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4981 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LAMONT LEE MILLER, JR., Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-4982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LAMONT LEE MILLER, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00062-1; 3:11-cr-00192-1) Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 18, 2013 Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS Virginia, for Appellant. R. Attorney, William B. King, II, Charleston, West Virginia, for LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West Booth Goodwin II, United States Assistant United States Attorney, Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: Lamont Lee Miller, Jr., was sentenced to 132-months imprisonment after pleading guilty to two counts of receiving a firearm while under felony indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n), 924(a)(1)(D) (2006), and five counts of distribution of a quantity § 841(a)(1) of cocaine (2006). base, Miller in violation initially pled of 21 guilty U.S.C. to the firearms charges pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange for the Government s promise to drop the drug charges. However, after Miller breached the plea agreement and thereby released the Government from its obligation, Miller pled guilty to the drug charges as well. He now appeals his guilty pleas and sentence, contending the district court erred in voiding his plea agreement, in allowing him to plead guilty to both the drug and firearms enhancements. charges, and in applying several offense-level We affirm. I. Miller first contends voiding the plea agreement. the district court erred in We review a claim that a party has breached a plea agreement under a bifurcated standard, reviewing the district court s factual findings for clear error and its application of contract interpretation principles de novo. United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000). Under general contract interpretation principles, an injured party is 3 relieved of its obligations under an agreement upon a breach only if that breach is material. United States v. Scruggs, 356 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2004). A material breach is one that deprives the injured party of the benefit that it reasonably expected to receive under the agreement. Id. In the context of a plea agreement, [s]uch a breach relieves the government of its obligation to conform to the agreement s terms even when defendant has relied to his substantial example, entering his guilty plea. detriment by, for United States v. West, 2 F.3d 66, 69-70 (4th Cir. 1993). The district court properly found that Miller materially breached his obligation under the plea agreement to cooperate with the Government, by failing to be forthright and truthful in a debriefing and in grand jury testimony. Moreover, despite Miller s contention to the contrary, the district court properly allowed Miller s guilty plea to the firearms charges to stand despite dismiss the freeing drug the charges. Government West, 2 from F.3d its at obligation 69-70. As to the district court indicated, voiding the guilty plea would have unjustly rewarded Miller sentencing process. for his breach and disrupted the United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 1999) ( defendant s breach of the plea agreement does not permit him to withdraw his guilty plea ); see also United States v. Bowe, 309 F.3d 234, 4 239 (4th Cir. 2002) ( Double Jeopardy Clause cannot be applied to reward [defendant] with a type of punishment less severe than that provided for in his plea agreement when the less severe punishment was obtained only by his breach of his plea agreement. ). We therefore conclude that the district court properly voided the plea agreement. II. Miller next contends that the district court erred in combining his guilty plea to the information with his guilty plea to the indictment. To the extent Miller challenges the validity of his guilty pleas, his contention fails. of the transcripts of the guilty plea hearings Our review leads us to conclude that the district court complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Miller s pleas. The court ensured that both of Miller s guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, and that Miller pleading understood guilty and the the rights sentence he he was faced. relinquishing Moreover, by the court s order voiding the plea agreement did not force Miller to plead guilty to both the firearms and drug charges. That Miller was not free to withdraw his guilty plea to the firearms charges does not mean that he entered the plea involuntarily. the Government s ability to pursue compel Miller to plead guilty. the drug charges Likewise, did not We therefore conclude that the district court properly accepted both of Miller s guilty pleas. 5 III. Miller also contends that the district court erred in applying several offense-level enhancements at sentencing. determining whether the district court properly In applied the sentencing Guidelines, this court reviews its interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2004). A. Miller contends that the district court erred in applying an enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(4) (2012) based on his possession of a firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number. Miller asserts that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the said firearm that allegedly had an obliterated serial number was intentionally possessed by the Defendant with full knowledge of the fact. presented This ample investigating firearm that serial of is meritless. evidence including agent s Miller number, knowledge contention and the testimony, possessed the a obliterated Miller s and a firearm Guidelines The stipulation, photograph with an specifically serial Government number is an of the obliterated indicate not that required. USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4) cmt. n.8(B); see United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2008) (enhancement for obliterated serial number is a strict liability enhancement). 6 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly applied the enhancement. B. Miller next argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence to support an enhancement for use of a minor to commit an offense. to use includes USSG § 3B1.4. directing, Used or attempted commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring, or soliciting. USSG § 3B1.4 cmt. n.1. including Miller s The Government presented ample evidence, factual stipulation and an investigating agent s testimony, that Miller used a person under eighteen to assist him by carrying and producing firearms for sale. United States 2001). v. Murphy, Accordingly, we 254 F.3d conclude 511, that the 513-14 (4th district Cir. court properly applied the enhancement. C. Miller argues that the district court erred in imposing a four-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) based on firearms. its finding that he engaged in the trafficking of The enhancement applies if the defendant transferred two or more firearms to another individual, knowing or having reason to believe that the other individual intended to use or dispose of the firearms unlawfully. n.13(A). USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) cmt. Miller contends that the Government failed to prove 7 that he knew or had reason to believe that the buyers intended to use or dispose of the firearms unlawfully. fails. This contention The Government presented sufficient evidence that Miller had reason to believe that his buyers would use or dispose of the firearms unlawfully, including that fact the buyers also purchased large quantities of crack cocaine from Miller, that the buyers indicated they were purchasing the guns to sell in other cities buyers, and for a the profit, the clandestine inflated nature of prices the paid by the transactions. In fact, Miller admitted that he had reason to suspect that the firearms would conclude be that disposed the of unlawfully. district court Accordingly, properly applied we the enhancement. D. Miller next contends that the Government presented insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Miller was an organizer or district court pursuant to defendant manager erred USSG must § have of the offense in imposing 3B1.1. To exercised a merit and therefore two-level the managerial the enhancement enhancement, responsibility the over other persons, rather than over property, assets, or activities. USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The Government presented evidence that Miller occupied a managerial role over multiple associates by directing them to complete menial tasks, such as carrying and 8 producing the firearms and driving, while Miller retained the authority to plan the transactions, negotiate prices, and collect the money. See United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 165-66 2003) (4th participant exercised. ) Cir. is ( Leadership sufficient as long over as there only is one some other control Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly applied the enhancement. E. Finally, Miller asserts error in the imposition of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Government claims that Miller USSG § 3C1.1. obstructed justice by providing false information and failing to cooperate during a debriefing and in testimony before a grand jury. Miller contends that his claim of full responsibility for and refusal to implicate others in his offenses did nothing to obstruct his own investigation or prosecution. However, this contention must fail. As stipulation conduct. part of of facts his plea agreement, describing his Miller offense agreed and to a relevant However, during his debriefing and before the grand jury, Miller directly contradicted various details contained in the stipulation. Miller repeatedly lied about his associates involvement, repeatedly claimed not to know or remember various details of his offense, and repeatedly attempted to plead the 9 Fifth. Miller thereby attempted to obstruct justice with respect to his own investigation, prosecution, or sentencing, and Miller s actions related to his offense of conviction and relevant conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly applied the enhancement. We therefore affirm Miller s convictions and sentence. We dispense contentions with are oral argument adequately because presented in the facts and the materials legal before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. AFFIRMED 10

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.