US v. Larry Rodgers, Jr., No. 12-4397 (4th Cir. 2013)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4397 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. LARRY RODGERS, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00218-H-1) Submitted: April 16, 2013 Decided: August 12, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. separate concurring opinion. Judge Diaz wrote a Kelly L. Greene, GREENE & WILSON, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Larry Rodgers, Jr., appeals his conviction after a jury convicted him of one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); one count of armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) (2006), and 2 (2006); and one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) and 2. months imprisonment. district court erred On in Rodgers was sentenced to 209 appeal, Rodgers allowing him to argues that represent the himself because he was not competent to act as his own counsel, and denied him a fair trial in its management of courtroom proceedings. The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to be represented by self-representation. (1975). counsel but also the right to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 The decision to represent oneself must be knowing and intelligent, reasonable id. at presumption 835, and against courts waiver Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). must of entertain counsel. every Brewer v. Because Rodgers contends he was not competent to waive counsel, we review the record to ensure that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013). 2 This issue, raised for the first time on appeal, is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); Bernard, 708 F.3d at 587-88. While a trial court must determine if a waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, no particular interrogation of the defendant is required, so long as the court warns the defendant of the dangers of self-representation so that his choice is made with his eyes open. United States v. King, 582 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097-98 (4th Cir. 1997). We conclude that the district court did not err in granting Rodgers request to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Our examination of the record as a whole demonstrates that Rodgers election to proceed pro se was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. At the time he elected to proceed pro se, Rodgers was fully aware of the nature of the charges against him and the district potential court punishments also he informed 3 faced if Rodgers of convicted. the perils The of self-representation and stated its belief that he was making a mistake. Rodgers contends that his history of depression and learning disabilities, combined with the fact that he spent his school years in special education classes, made him incompetent to represent himself, and argues that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte terminate his self-representation when it became apparent he was unqualified to represent himself. To support this argument, Rodgers points to the Supreme Court s decision in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008), and states that the right of self-representation is not absolute. Unlike the defendant in Edwards, however, Rodgers did not suffer from a severe mental illness, but merely displayed difficulty communicating with the court and jury. some We conclude that these difficulties were insufficient to require the court to terminate Rodgers self-representation. Rodgers next contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the district court s allegedly prejudicial conduct. He asserts that the court interfered with his ability to put on a case, truncated his cross-examination of witnesses as well as his own testimony, and ultimately forced him to rest his case. We review these allegations for abuse of discretion. States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1995). 4 United Generally, [q]uestions of trial management quintessentially the province of the district courts. States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. are United 2006). The district court has two responsibilities in trial oversight ensuring that matters are clearly presented to the jury and preventing trials from becoming protracted and costly affairs. Id. The court must exercise reasonable control over the interrogation of witnesses and the presentation of evidence in order to ensure the effective determination of the truth [and] to avoid needless waste of time in the presentation of a case. Castner, 50 F.3d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted). We will grant a new trial only if the district court s actions denied the appellant a fair, as distinguished from a perfect, trial. United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530, 536 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court did not excessively interfere with Rodgers properly exercise required of Rodgers his to right to observe proceed the pro se, of criminal rules but procedure and evidence and exercised its discretion to limit repetitive and cumulative examination of witnesses. Thus, the district court s interventions into Rodgers case were for the purpose of clarifying the evidence for the jury and ensuring that evidence was properly presented 5 without undue delay. Therefore, we conclude that Rodgers has failed to demonstrate that the district court s conduct resulted in an unfair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the district court s judgment. We dispense contentions with are oral argument adequately because presented in the facts and the materials legal before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6 DIAZ, Circuit Judge, concurring: I continue to doubt the wisdom of applying plain error review to the appeal of a pro se defendant alleging a defective Faretta waiver on the basis of mental incompetency, for it is paradoxical to expect a defendant to recognize his own gray area competency, and then object to his own motion to proceed pro se. United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 596 (4th Cir. 2013) (Diaz, J., dissenting). But because the facts of this case demonstrate no error in Rodgers s Faretta waiver under any standard of review, I concur in the judgment. 7
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